nep-iue New Economics Papers
on Informal and Underground Economics
Issue of 2013‒06‒24
ten papers chosen by
Catalina Granda Carvajal
Universidad de Antioquia

  1. Moving Towards a Single Labour Contract: Pros, Cons and Mixed Feelings By Nicolas Lepage-Saucier; Juliette Schleich; Etienne Wasmer
  2. Labour Market and Social Policies to Foster More Inclusive Growth in Sweden By Stéphanie Jamet; Thomas Chalaux; Vincent Koen
  3. Farmland loss, nonfarm diversification and inequality: A micro-econometric analysis of household surveys in Vietnam By Tran, Tuyen; Vu, Huong
  4. Growing their own: Unobservable quality and the value of self-provisioning By Hoffmann, Vivian; Gatobu, Ken
  5. Quality Incentives in Informal Markets: The Case of Ecuadorian Cocoa By Jano, Pilar; Hueth, Brent
  6. Informal or Formal Financing? Or Both? First Evidence on the Co-Funding of Chinese Firms By Degryse, H.A.; Lu, L.; Ongena, S.
  7. The Impact of Index-Based Insurance on Informal Risk-Sharing Networks By Boucher, Steve; Delpierre, Matthieu
  8. Can conditional cash transfers compensate for a father's absence ? By Fitzsimons, Emla; Mesnard, Alice
  9. Informal Care and Caregiver's Health By Young Kyung Do; Edward C. Norton; Sally Stearns; Courtney H. Van Houtven
  10. Piracy and Copyright Enforcement Mechanisms By Brett Danaher; Michael D. Smith; Rahul Telang

  1. By: Nicolas Lepage-Saucier; Juliette Schleich; Etienne Wasmer
    Abstract: This paper discusses the pros and cons of a single labour contract. After reviewing the current state of dualism in labour markets and the recent labour reforms in Europe, we discuss the various proposals to eliminate dualism. Next, we emphasise the costs of dualism and discuss whether they would be addressed by introducing a single labour contract. We notably introduce a distinction between reforms based on introducing a single contract with progressive seniority rights (CPSR) or a single contract with long probation periods (CLPP).We argue that their gains and costs are very different, especially with regards to the stigma effects and dualism. We also consider alternative reforms: the introduction of a single labour contract as such, and alternative reforms independent of the labour contract but addressing the issue of dualism (training, access to housing and to credit) and compare their costs and benefits.<P> We then build a simple model where both temporary and permanent contracts are available to firms. We use it to describe the demand for temporary contracts and the potential consequences of removing them and reach the following conclusions. First, employment protection has a moderate negative impact on employment, which can be mitigated when temporary contracts are available. Second, the elimination of temporary contracts decreases total employment (by 7 percentage points according to our calculations). Offsetting this effect would require an ambitious reform of employment protection laws of permanent contracts (in this specific setup, amounting to a cut in layoff costs by two thirds). Finally, the coexistence of temporary and permanent contracts may also have negative effects on social norms within the firm and workers' motivation and eliminating temporary contracts could therefore enhance productivity in this context.<P> We conclude that while there are costs to dualism, these are not as obvious and well established as the ones triggered by employment protection itself. Further, the single employment contract may partly be a qui pro quo (misunderstanding) Instead, more clarity on the objectives of a labour reform is needed.<P>Vers un contrat unique, vraiment ? : Les avantages et les inconvénients<BR>Ce texte discute des avantages et des inconvénients du contrat de travail unique. Après une discussion du dualisme et des réformes récentes du marché du travail en Europe, nous décrivons les différentes propositions visant à éliminer le dualisme. Nous soulignons ensuite les coûts du dualisme et tentons de comprendre si la création d'un contrat unique les supprimerait. Nous introduisons notamment une distinction entre les réformes basées sur un contrat unique à droits progressifs (CUDP, ou CPSR pour l'acronyme anglais), ou sur un contrat avec une période d'essai allongée (CPEA ou CLPP pour l'acronyme en anglais). Les gains et les coûts sont très différents selon l'hypothèse retenue, en particulier par rapport aux effets de stigmatisation des travailleurs et par rapport à la persistence du dualisme. Nous envisageons aussi d'autres réformes: outre celle de l'introduction d'un contrat unique, nous discutons de différentes réformes indépendantes du contrat de travail mais modifiant les conséquences du dualisme du marché du travail (accès à la formation, au marché du crédit, au logement) et en comparons les coûts et avantages.<P> Nous élaborons ensuite un simple modèle où les contrats permanents et temporaires sont tous deux à disposition des entreprises et coexistent en leur sein. Nous utilisons cette structure théorique pour décrire la demande de contrats temporaires et les conséquences potentielles d'en supprimer l'usage. Nous en concluons: premièrement, que la protection de l'emploi a un impact négatif mais modéré sur l'emploi total, qui est précisément atténué par l'existence de contrats temporaires; deuxièmement, que l'élimination des contrats temporaires diminue l'emploi total (de 7 points de pourcentage selon notre modèle); pour anihiler cet eet négatif, il faudrait une réforme radicale des contrats permanents (qui dans le cas d'espèce diminuerait des deux tiers les coûts des licenciements associés aux contrats permanents); enn, la coexistence de contrats temporaires et permanents peut aussi avoir des conséquences négatives au niveau des normes sociales au sein de l'entreprise et sur la motivation des salariés; éliminer les contrats temporaires serait alors une amélioration de la productivité des entreprises.<P> Nous concluons sur le fait que si les coûts du dualisme sont réels, ils sont moins évidents et moins bien démontrés que ceux engendrés par la protection de l'emploi elle-même. De plus, le contrat unique pourrait être en partie un qui pro quo. Il serait au contraire utile de clarifier les objectifs fondamentaux des réformes du marché du travail.
    Keywords: unemployment, dualism, labour market reform, employment contracts, single labour contract, chômage, dualisme, réforme du marché du travail, contrats de travail, contrat unique
    JEL: J41 J42 J80
    Date: 2013–02–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:1026-en&r=iue
  2. By: Stéphanie Jamet; Thomas Chalaux; Vincent Koen
    Abstract: Sweden is a very egalitarian country but inequalities have risen and some groups are poorly integrated into the labour market. For growth to become more inclusive, the gap between the cost of labour and productivity for some groups needs to be reduced, transitions from education to work should be facilitated, incentives to take a job ought to be strengthened and the non-employed need to be protected against the risk of falling into unemployment or inactivity traps. This calls for lowering minimum wages relative to the average wage for groups at risk of becoming unemployed, improving vocational education and training, and extending the coverage of the unemployment insurance while strengthening obligations for the unemployed. To address labour market duality risks, the gap in job protection between temporary and permanent contracts needs to be reduced. Women’s employment is high but the gender wage gap could be narrowed further by enhancing their employment opportunities.<P>Des politiques sociales et du marché du travail au service d'une croissance plus solidaire en Suède<BR>Bien qu’elle soit un pays très égalitaire, la Suède accuse aujourd’hui un creusement des inégalités, et certaines catégories de sa population restent en marge du marché du travail. Pour favoriser une croissance plus solidaire, il est nécessaire de réduire l’écart entre le coût du travail et la productivité de certaines catégories de main-d’oeuvre, de faciliter le passage de l’école à la vie professionnelle, de renforcer les incitations au travail et de protéger les sans-emploi contre le piège du chômage ou de l’inactivité. Pour y parvenir, il faudra abaisser les minima salariaux par rapport au salaire moyen pour les groupes risquant de se retrouver au chômage, améliorer l’enseignement et la formation professionnelle et élargir la couverture de l’assurance-chômage, tout en renforçant les obligations des chômeurs. Pour faire face au risque de dualisme du marché du travail, les disparités dans la protection de l’emploi entre contrats temporaires et contrats permanents devront être réduites. Le taux d’emploi des femmes est certes élevé, mais l’écart salarial par rapport aux hommes pourrait être encore réduit en améliorant les perspectives d’emploi des femmes.
    Keywords: Sweden, employment protection legislation, labour costs, unemployment insurance, public employment services, minimum wage, vocational training, labour market dualism, vocational education, inclusive growth, inequality, gender equality, Suède, assurance chômage, salaire minimum, coût du travail, service public de l'emploi, dualisme du marché du travail, croissance inclusive, inégalités, législation pour la protection de l’emploi, apprentissage et formation professionnelle, égalité des genres
    JEL: I14 I28 I3 J08 J16 J3 J51 J65
    Date: 2013–02–18
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:1023-en&r=iue
  3. By: Tran, Tuyen; Vu, Huong
    Abstract: The relationship between farmland loss, nonfarm diversification and inequality has been well-documented in the literature. However, no study has quantified this relationship. Using a dataset from a 2010 field survey involving 477 households, this study has contributed to the literature by providing the first econometricevidence about the impacts of farmland loss (due to urbanization and industrialization) onnonfarm diversification and income quality among households in Hanoi's peri-urban areas. Our results show that under the impact of farmland loss, households have actually diversified their income through various nonfarm activities,notably in informal wage work. In addition, while farmland loss has reduced the share of farm income, resulting in an increase in income inequality,it has also increased the share of informal wage income, leading to a decrease in income inequality
    Keywords: Farmland acquisition, formal wage income, fractional multinomial logit and Gini decomposition
    JEL: Q12
    Date: 2013–06–14
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:47596&r=iue
  4. By: Hoffmann, Vivian; Gatobu, Ken
    Abstract: Many important food quality and safety attributes are unobservable at the point of sale, particularly in informal markets with weak reputation effects. Through a framed field experiment conducted in western Kenya, we show that farmers place a large premium on maize they have grown themselves, relative to that available for purchase. Providing information on the origin of maize, and on its taste and safety, reduces this gap. We conclude that information which is unavailable during typical market transactions is important to how consumers value maize, and that imperfect information may contribute to the prevalence of agricultural production for subsistence needs in developing countries.
    Keywords: asymmetric information, non-separability, field experiment, Demand and Price Analysis, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, International Development,
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea13:150004&r=iue
  5. By: Jano, Pilar; Hueth, Brent
    Abstract: We investigate the economic importance of implicit quality incentives in an agricultural market that lacks the institutional capacity for measuring quality verifiably. We measure the magnitude of implicit price premiums for quality, and we distinguish empirically between hedonic-pricing and implicit-contracting motivations for observed incentives. We find price premiums comparable in magnitude to premiums observed in other agricultural markets where quality is measured verifiably. Premiums are highest for relatively low-value but highly-informative quality characteristics, and buyers who are informationally close to farmers implicitly reward actions that affect unobservable quality characteristics. We conclude that implicit contracting is used to provide quality incentives comparable in magnitude to what is provided through more explicit means in formally organized markets.
    Keywords: quality, incentives, implicit contracts, cocoa, Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Industrial Organization, International Development, Risk and Uncertainty,
    Date: 2013–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea13:150001&r=iue
  6. By: Degryse, H.A.; Lu, L.; Ongena, S. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: Abstract: The recent financial crisis has reopened the debate on the impact of informal and formal finance on firm growth in developing countries. Using unique survey data, we find that informal finance is associated with higher sales growth for small firms and lower sales growth for large firms. We identify a complementary effect between informal and formal finance for the sales growth of small firms, but not for large firms. Informal finance offers informational and monitoring advantages, while formal finance offers relatively inexpensive funds. Co-funding, i.e. the simultaneous use of formal and informal finance, is the optimal choice for small firms.
    Keywords: Informal Finance;Formal Finance;Co-Funding;Growth.
    JEL: G21 G32 P2
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2013034&r=iue
  7. By: Boucher, Steve; Delpierre, Matthieu
    Keywords: Farm Management, Risk and Uncertainty,
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea13:150440&r=iue
  8. By: Fitzsimons, Emla; Mesnard, Alice
    Abstract: This paper investigates how the permanent departure of the father from a household affects children's school enrollment and work participation in rural Colombia. The results indicate that the permanent departure of the father decreases children's school enrollment by approximately 5 percentage points and increases child labor by 3 percentage points. This paper explores the rollout of a conditional-cash-transfer program during the period of study and shows that this program counteracts these adverse effects. When coupled with other evidence, this finding strongly suggests that the channel through which the father's departure most affects children is by reducing the income of very poor households, which tightens their liquidity constraints. This finding also highlights the important safety-net role played by welfare programs with respect to disadvantaged households, particularly because these households are unlikely to have formal or informal mechanisms with which to insure themselves against such vagaries.
    Keywords: Labor Policies,Street Children,Primary Education,Youth and Governance,Population Policies
    Date: 2013–06–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6476&r=iue
  9. By: Young Kyung Do; Edward C. Norton; Sally Stearns; Courtney H. Van Houtven
    Abstract: This study aims to measure the causal effect of informal caregiving on the health and health care use of women who are caregivers, using instrumental variables. We use data from South Korea, where daughters and daughters-in-law are the prevalent source of caregivers for frail elderly parents and parents-in-law. A key insight of our instrumental variable approach is that having a parent-in-law with functional limitations increases the probability of providing informal care to that parent-in-law, but a parent-in-law's functional limitation does not directly affect the daughter-in-law's health. We compare results for the daughter-in-law and daughter samples to check the assumption of the excludability of the instruments for the daughter sample. Our results show that providing informal care has significant adverse effects along multiple dimensions of health for daughter-in-law and daughter caregivers in South Korea.
    JEL: I1
    Date: 2013–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19142&r=iue
  10. By: Brett Danaher; Michael D. Smith; Rahul Telang
    Abstract: Much debate exists around the impact that illegal file sharing may have on the creative industries. Similarly, opinions differ regarding whether the producers of artistic works should be forced to accept any weakening of intellectual property rights resulting from illegal file sharing, or if governments should intervene to protect these rights. This chapter seeks to inform these questions by outlining what we do and do not know from existing academic research. We first discuss whether filesharing displaces sales of media goods and then discuss whether such displacement will lead to reduced incentives to produce new creative works. We continue by summarizing recent findings on what businesses can do to compete with piracy and the effectiveness of anti-piracy interventions on encouraging consumers to migrate from illegal to legal consumption channels. We conclude by demonstrating that without additional empirical evidence, it will be difficult to determine the socially optimal set of strategies and government copyright policies in the digital era.
    JEL: D69 L1 L11 L8 L82 M31 O30
    Date: 2013–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19150&r=iue

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