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on Intellectual Property Rights |
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Issue of 2021‒09‒13
four papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Herz, Benedikt; Mejer, Malwina |
| Abstract: | The design right is a widely used but poorly understood intellectual property right that allows the protection of products’ aesthetics and outer appearances. We study the influence of design right protection on price by exploiting cross-country differences in the scope of protection in the European automotive spare parts market: In some countries, repair parts are exempted from design protection, while in others they are not. Based on detailed price data, our difference-in-differences estimates imply that design protection increases prices by about 5–8%, with large differences between carmakers. We then link our findings to the literature on deviations from the law of one price. We document large cross-country price deviations for identical spare parts and provide evidence that a part of these price deviations can be explained by the lack of harmonization of design right protection in combination with carmakers’ pricing-to-market strategies. |
| Keywords: | design right, design patent, repair clause, law of one price, price dispersion, European car market, automotive aftermarket, spare parts |
| JEL: | F15 K21 L11 L62 O34 |
| Date: | 2020–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:109645&r= |
| By: | Cristelli, Gabriele; Lissoni, Francesco |
| Abstract: | We study the innovation effects of the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons (AFMP), signed by Switzerland and the EU in 1999. Using geocoded patent data, complemented by matched inventor-immigrant-census records, we identify a large number of cross-border inventors (CBIs), commuters from neighbouring countries working in Swiss R&D labs. We show that, during the AFMP implementation phase, the influx of CBIs increased differentially across regions at different driving distances from the border, causing a 24% increase in patents, mostly due to large and medium patent holders (as opposed to very large ones) and to inventor teams mixing CBIs and natives. We do not detect any adverse effect on native inventors and show that Swiss incumbent inventors collaborating with CBIs increased their productivity. Our evidence suggests complementarity between CBIs’ and Swiss incumbents’ knowledge assets. |
| Keywords: | Immigration, Innovation, Patents, Inventors, Free Movement of Persons |
| JEL: | F22 J61 O31 O33 |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:107433&r= |
| By: | Pilar Beneito (University of Valencia and ERI-CES); María E. Rochina Barrachina (University of Valencia and ERI-CES); Amparo Sanchis (University of Valencia and ERI-CES) |
| Abstract: | Innovative firms use patents to signal the quality of their R&D teams in evaluation processes affected by asymmetric information. Examples of these processes occur when applying for finance from external sources or when searching for collaboration partners for innovation projects. In this paper we provide evidence that, in these cases, firms' external agents undervalue patents of female R&D teams as compared to patents of male R&D teams. We investigate this issue using data of Spanish innovating firms from PITEC, spanning 2005-2014, a panel database that follows the structure of the European Community Innovation Surveys (CIS). We interpret our results as consistent with an evaluation bias against female researchers, making them to be subject to a greater scrutiny as compared to their male counterparts, and thereby suggesting the existence of gender discrimination in R&D. |
| Keywords: | female R&D teams, patents, asymmetric information, quality signals |
| JEL: | O30 O34 C20 J16 |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eec:wpaper:2110&r= |
| By: | Sharat Ganapati; Rebecca McKibbin |
| Abstract: | There is wide dispersion in pharmaceutical prices across countries with comparable quality standards. Under monopoly, off-patent and generic drug prices are at least four times higher in the United States than in comparable English-speaking high income countries. With five or more competitors, off-patent drug prices are similar or lower. Our analysis shows that differential US markups are largely driven by the market power of drug suppliers and not due to wholesale intermediaries or pharmacies. Furthermore, we show that the traditional mechanism of reducing market power – free entry – is limited because implied entry costs are substantially higher in the US. |
| JEL: | F14 I11 L44 L65 |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29206&r= |