|
on Intellectual Property Rights |
|
Issue of 2020‒02‒10
two papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Olena Ivus (Queen's University); Alireza Naghavi (University of Bologna); Larry D. Qiu (University of Hong-Kong) |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a North-South trade model with heterogeneous labour and horizontally differentiated products and compares the implications of two policies: Southern intellectual property rights (IPRs) and Northern immigration policy that aims to attract Southern talent as means of preempting imitation. Individuals self-select into becoming entrepreneurs and innovate (imitate) in the North (South). The likelihood of imitation depends on product quality, imitator’s ability, and strength of IPRs. Several interrelated channels of competition are identified. Allowing high-ability migration when IPRs protection in the South is weak shifts imitation to low-quality and innovation to high-quality products. The outcome is in stark contrast to the policy of strengthening IPRs, which limits low-quality imitation and encourages low-quality innovation. High-ability migration also increases the income of lowability entrepreneurs, as well as the average quality of products in the high-ability imitation sector in the South. |
| Keywords: | Intellectual propert yrights; High-skilled migration; Imitation; Innovation; Product quality; Entrepreneurability |
| JEL: | F22 O31 O34 J24 K37 O38 |
| Date: | 2019–12–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csl:devewp:457&r=all |
| By: | Jeffrey Clemens; Parker Rogers |
| Abstract: | We analyze wartime prosthetic device patents to investigate how procurement policy affects the cost, quality, and quantity of medical innovation. Analyzing whether inventions emphasize cost and/or quality requires generating new data. We do this by first hand-coding the economic traits emphasized in 1,200 patent documents. We then train a machine learning algorithm and apply the trained models to a century's worth of medical and mechanical patents that form our analysis sample. In our analysis of these new data, we find that the relatively stingy, fixed-price contracts of the Civil War era led inventors to focus broadly on reducing costs, while the less cost-conscious procurement contracts of World War I did not. We provide a conceptual framework that highlights the economic forces that drive this key finding. We also find that inventors emphasized dimensions of product quality (e.g., a prosthetic's appearance or comfort) that aligned with differences in buyers' preferences across wars. Finally, we find that the Civil War and World War I procurement shocks led to substantial increases in the quantity of prosthetic device patenting relative to patenting in other medical and mechanical technology classes. We conclude that procurement environments can significantly shape the scientific problems with which inventors engage, including the choice to innovate on quality or cost. |
| JEL: | H57 I1 O31 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26679&r=all |