|
on Intellectual Property Rights |
|
Issue of 2018‒03‒26
two papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Giovanni Marin (Università di Urbino 'Carlo Bo', Italy); Antonello Zanfei (Università di Urbino 'Carlo Bo', Italy) |
| Abstract: | This paper evaluates the effect of host-country environmental policy stringency on the offshoring of environmental patents for 2000 top world R&D performers. It is shown that a more stringent environmental regulation triggers both the extensive and intensive margin of patent offshoring in the field of environmental technologies. Results are robust to various different specifications, alternative definitions of regulation restrictions and to the consideration of possible endogeneity of regulation. It is suggested inter alia that R&D subsidies and non-market based instrument are more important than market-based instruments as drivers of cross-border environmental innovation. |
| Keywords: | MNE, environmental policy, patent data |
| Date: | 2018–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:srt:wpaper:0518&r=ipr |
| By: | Carlo Capuano; Iacopo Grassi |
| Abstract: | In recent years, the increasing awarding of patents has captured the attention of scholars operating in di?erent fields. Economic literature has studied the causes of this proliferation; we propose an entry game focusing on one of the consequences, showing how an incumbent may create a patent portfolio in order to control market entry and to collude. The incumbent fixes the level of patent protection and the threat of denunciation reduces the entrant’s expected profits; moreover, if the entrant deviates from collusion, the incumbent can strengthen punishment suing the competitor for patent infringement, reducing her incentive to deviate. Our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should pay attention to the level of patent protection implemented by the incumbent and note whether the holder of a patent reacts to entry by either suing or not suing the competitor. In the model, we use completely general functional forms in analyzing the is- sues, and this allows us to obtain general results not depending on the assumptions about the kind of oligopolistic competition. |
| Keywords: | Patents, patent portfolio, litigation, collusion, foreclosing, entry game. |
| JEL: | D43 K21 L13 |
| Date: | 2018–03–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eei:rpaper:eeri_rp_2018_03&r=ipr |