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on Intellectual Property Rights |
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Issue of 2017‒04‒16
seven papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Chang, C-L.; McAleer, M.J.; Tang, J-T. |
| Abstract: | With the advent of globalization, economic and financial interactions among countries have become widespread. Given technological advancements, the factors of production can no longer be considered to be just labor and capital. In the pursuit of economic growth, every country has sensibly invested in international cooperation, learning, innovation, technology diffusion and knowledge, and outward direct investment. In this paper, we use a panel data set of 40 countries from 1981 to 2008 and a negative binomial model, using a novel set of cross-border patents and joint patents as proxy variables for technology diffusion, in order to investigate such diffusion. The empirical results suggest that, if it is desired to shift from foreign to domestic technology, it is necessary to increase expenditure on R&D for business enterprises and higher education, exports and technology. If the focus is on increasing bilateral technology diffusion, it is necessary to increase expenditure on R&D for higher education and technology. It is also found that outward foreign direct investment has no significant impact on either joint or cross-border patents, whereas inward foreign direct investment has a significant negative impact on cross-border patents but no impact on joint patents. Moreover, government expenditure on higher education has a significant impact on both cross-border and joint patents |
| Keywords: | International Technology Diffusion, Exports, Imports, Joint Patent, Cross-border Patent, R&D, Negative Binomial Panel Data |
| JEL: | F14 F21 O30 O57 |
| Date: | 2016–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ems:eureir:98656&r=ipr |
| By: | Neuhäusler, Peter; Frietsch, Rainer |
| Abstract: | Global innovations have been on the rise in the last decade. About 4.5% of all transnational patent filings are global innovations, i.e. research projects that are handled by teams in different continents, and the number has grown quite significantly since the 1990s. Global innovations have also gained importance in international cooperations per se. In 2013, nearly 70% of all international co-patents were global innovations. Global innovations also outperform the average patent in terms of patent quality, i.e. global innovations are significantly higher cited and are broader in terms of market coverage. Europe and North America show the highest numbers of global innovations in absolute terms. In relative terms, i.e. in shares of total filings, however, the countries from the "rest of the world" show the highest engagement in global innovations. German inventors are involved in more than 20% of all global innovations, i.e. every fifth global innovation stems from a cooperation with a German inventor, with North America being the most important "global" partner. Chemistry, pharmaceuticals and related fields show the largest shares of global innovations, from a technological as well as a sector-specific point of view. In mechanical engineering, especially automobiles and vehicles, global innovations play a minor role. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:efisdi:132017&r=ipr |
| By: | Helfrich, Magdalena; Herweg, Fabian |
| Abstract: | We provide an explanation for a frequently observed vertical restraint in e-commerce, namely that brand manufacturers partially or completely prohibit that retailers distribute their high-quality products over the internet. Our analysis is based on the assumption that a consumer's purchasing decision is distorted by salient thinking, i.e. by the fact that he overvalues a product attribute -- quality or price -- that stands out in a particular choice situation. In a highly competitive low-price environment like on an online platform, consumers focus more on price rather than quality. Especially if the market power of local (physical) retailers is low, price tends to be salient also in the local store, which is unfavorable for the high-quality product and limits the wholesale price a brand manufacturer can charge. If, however, the branded product is not available online, a retailer can charge a significant markup on the high-quality good. As the markup is higher if quality rather than price is salient in the store, this aligns the retailer's incentives with the brand manufacturer's interest to make quality the salient attribute and allows the manufacturer to charge a higher wholesale price. We also show that, the weaker are consumers' preferences for purchasing in the physical store and the stronger their salience bias, the more likely it is that a brand manufacturer wants to restrict online sales. Moreover, we find that a ban on distribution systems that prohibit internet sales increases consumer welfare and total welfare, because it leads to lower prices for final consumers and prevents inefficient online sales. |
| Keywords: | Internet competition; Relative thinking; Retailing; salience; Selective distribution; Vertical restraints |
| JEL: | D43 K21 L42 |
| Date: | 2017–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11948&r=ipr |
| By: | Alexandrov, Alexei; Pittman, Russell; Ukhaneva, Olga |
| Abstract: | Monopolists selling complementary products charge a higher price in a static equilibrium than a single multiproduct monopolist would, reducing both the industry profits and consumer surplus. However, firms could instead reach a Pareto improvement by lowering prices to the single monopolist level. We analyze administrative nationally-representative pricing data of railroad coal shipping in the U.S. We compare a coal producer that needs to ship from A to C,with the route passing through B, in two cases: (1) the same railroad owning AB and BC and (2) different railroads owning AB and BC. We find no price difference between the two cases, suggesting that the complementary monopolist pricing inefficiency is absent in this market. For our main analysis, we use a specification used by previous literature; however, we confirm our findings using propensity score blocking and machine learning algorithms. Finally, we confirm the results by using a difference-in-differences analysis to gauge the impact of a merger that made two routes wholly-owned (switched from case 2 to case 1). Our results have implications for royalty stacking and patent thickets, vertical mergers, tragedy of anti-commons, and mergers of firms selling complements. |
| Keywords: | Vertical mergers, complementary products mergers, railroads, end-to-end mergers, royalty stacking, patent thickets, Cournot, Coase |
| JEL: | D43 K21 L42 L92 O31 |
| Date: | 2017–03–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:78249&r=ipr |
| By: | Stefan Bechtold (ETH Zürich); Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | U.S. intellectual property law is firmly rooted in utilitarian principles. Copyright law is viewed as a means to give proper monetary incentives to authors for their creative effort. Many European copyright systems pursue additional goals: Authors have the right to be named as author, to control alterations and to retract their work in case their artistic beliefs have changed. Protecting these “moral rights” might be justified by the preferences of typical authors. We present the first field experiment on moral rights revealing the true valuation of these rights by over 200 authors from 24 countries. A majority of authors are not willing to trade moral rights in the first place. They demand substantial prices in case they decide to trade. The differences between authors from the U.S. and Europe are small. These results call into question whether moral rights protection should differ across the Atlantic and whether a purely profit-based theory of copyright law is sufficient to capture the complex relationship between human behavior and creativity. |
| Keywords: | intellectual property, copyright, creativity, invention, moral right, willingness to pay |
| JEL: | C93 D03 K11 L82 O31 O34 O38 |
| Date: | 2017–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2017_04&r=ipr |
| By: | Neuhäusler, Peter; Rothengatter, Oliver; Frietsch, Rainer; Feidenheimer, Alexander |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:efisdi:42017&r=ipr |
| By: | Andersson, David E. (Department of Business Studies, Uppsala University); Galaso, Pablo (Instituto de Economía, Universidad de la República); Saiz, Patricio (Departamento de Análisis Económico: Teoría Económica e Historia Económica. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) |
| Abstract: | Sweden and Spain have developed very distinct systems of innovation over the long term. The former has a highly innovative economy while the latter drags serious problems in science and technology. However, during the first half of the nineteenth century both countries were latecomers to the industrial revolution in the European periphery with similar economic, technological, and institutional challenges ahead. In this paper, we hypothesize that one possible reason for this long-term divergence lies in the different collaboration patterns that emerge from interactions among innovative agents. To analyse such cooperation patterns we apply social network analysis methods and study co-patent networks in Sweden and Spain during the second industrial revolution (1878-1914). The results demonstrate that collaboration among innovators and openness to foreign influence was greater in Sweden than in Spain. This research opens new paths for further studies both on economic history and innovation networks dynamics. |
| Keywords: | collaboration, innovation networks, patents, social network analysis, Sweden, Spain, second industrial revolution |
| JEL: | N01 N73 O30 O33 Z13 |
| Date: | 2017–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uam:wpapeh:201702&r=ipr |