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on Intellectual Property Rights |
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Issue of 2014‒01‒24
three papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Universita' del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro |
| By: | Andrea Morescalchi (IMT Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies); Fabio Pammolli (IMT Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies); Orion Penner (IMT Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies); Alexander M. Petersen (IMT Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies); Massimo Riccaboni (IMT Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies) |
| Abstract: | Recent studies on the geography of knowledge networks have documented a negative impact of physical distance and institutional borders upon research and development (R&D) collaborations. Though it is widely recognized that geographic constraints and national borders impede the diffusion of knowledge, less attention has been devoted to the temporal evolution of these constraints. In this study we use data on patents filed with the European Patent Office (EPO) for OECD countries to analyze the impact of physical distance and country borders on inter-regional links in four different networks over the period 1988-2009: (1) co-inventorship, (2) patent citations, (3) inventor mobility and (4) the location of R&D laboratories. We find the constraint imposed by country borders and distance decreased until mid-1990s then started to grow, particularly for distance. We further investigate the role of large innovation "hubs" as attractors of new collaboration opportunities and the impact of region size and locality on the evolution of cross-border patenting activities. The intensity of European cross-country inventor collaborations increased at a higher pace than their non-European counterparts until 2004, with no significant relative progress thereafter. Moreover, when analyzing networks of geographical mobility, multinational R&D activities and patent citations we cannot detect any substantial progress in European research integration above and beyond the common global trend. |
| Keywords: | Geography of knowledge, Networks of Innovators, European integration, Spatial proximity, Cross-border collaboration, Gravity model |
| JEL: | O31 O38 R12 R23 D89 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ial:wpaper:1/2014&r=ipr |
| By: | Evers, Lisa; Miller, Helen; Spengel, Christoph |
| Abstract: | 11 European countries now operate IP Box regimes that provide substantially reduced rates of corporate tax for income derived from important forms of intellectual property. We incorporate these policies into forward-looking measures of the cost of capital, effective marginal tax rates and effective average tax rates. We show that the treatment of expenses relating to IP income is particularly important in determining the effective tax burden. A key finding is that regimes that allow expenses to be deducted at the ordinary corporate income tax rate, as opposed to the IP Box tax rate, may result in negative effective average tax rates and can thereby provide a subsidy to unprofitable projects. We assess the specific design features of different regimes against the possible policy aim of improving the incentives to undertake R&D investment in a country. While some countries have tried to tie the policy to real activities, others have designed a policy targeted at the income streams associated with intellectual property. A key concern is the role that IP Boxes may play in increased, and possibly harmful, tax competition between European countries. -- |
| Keywords: | corporate taxation,effective tax rate,tax incentive,patent box,innovation box,preferential tax rate |
| JEL: | H25 H32 H87 K34 O38 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13070r&r=ipr |
| By: | Ding, Yucheng |
| Abstract: | A durable good monopolist sells its branded product over two periods. In period 2, when there is entry of a counterfeiter, the branded firm may charge a high price to signal its quality. Counterfeit competition thus enables the branded firm to commit to high future price in period 2, alleviating the classic time-inconsistency problem under durable good monopoly. This can increase the branded firm's profit by encouraging consumer purchase without delay, despite the revenue loss to the counterfeiter. Total welfare can also increase, because early purchase eliminates delay cost and consumers enjoy the good for both periods. |
| Keywords: | Counterfeits, Coase Conjecture, Quality Signaling |
| JEL: | D82 L11 L13 |
| Date: | 2014–01–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:52933&r=ipr |