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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Hottenrott, Hanna; Lopes-Bento, Cindy |
| Abstract: | This study shows for a large sample of R&D-active manufacturing firms over the period 2000-2009 that knowledge alliances have a positive effect on patenting in terms of both quantity and quality. However, when distinguishing between alliances that aim at joint creation of new knowledge and alliances that aim at the exchange of knowledge, results suggest that creation alliances lead to more valuable patents as they receive significantly more forward citations per patent. Knowledge exchange alliances, on the other hand, are associated with patent quantity, but not quality. -- |
| Keywords: | Knowledge Alliances,Patents,Innovation,R&D,Count Data Models |
| JEL: | O31 O32 O33 O34 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:122&r=ipr |
| By: | Asongu, Simplice A.; Andrés, Antonio R.; Amavilah, Voxi S. H. |
| Abstract: | Using Kauffman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi governance indicators, this article analyzes the impact of formal institutions on the knowledge economy- by assessing how the enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) through good governance mechanisms affects the knowledge economy. The article also employs the World Bank’s four components of the knowledge economy index characteristic of its knowledge for development (K4D) framework. We estimate panel data models for 22 Middle East & North African and Sub-Sahara African countries over the period 1996-2010. The results show that for this group of countries the enforcement of IPR laws (treaties), although necessary, is not a sufficient condition for a knowledge economy. The results also suggest that other factors are more likely to determine the knowledge economies of these nations. Overall these findings have important implications for both policy and further research. |
| Keywords: | Formal institutions; Knowledge economy; Panel data; Principal component analysis (PCA) |
| JEL: | O10 O34 O38 P00 P48 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:52206&r=ipr |
| By: | Thierry Pénard (University of Rennes 1, CREM CNRS UMR 6211 and IDEC); Mourad Zeroukhi (Foundation of the University of Rennes 1, CREM CNRS UMR 6211 and IDEC) |
| Abstract: | For many applications, open source software (OSS) can o¤er a high-quality alternative to proprietary software (e.g. Linux, Apache, Android,...). But even if OSS is usually free of charge, its installation and use require some skills. Should the government intervene to promote the di¤usion of OSS and provide some learning or nancial support to potential adopters? This paper examines whether public subsidies towards open source software is socially desirable and how the extent of compatibility between open source software and proprietary software can infuence the amount of subsidies. We consider a mixed duopoly model in which a proprietary software (PS) company competes with an open source software (OSS) community. Users are heterogeneous in their ability to use OSS, and their utility depends on the number of users who have adopted the same software or a compatible software (existence of network externalities). Four situations are distinguished: full compatibility between OSS and PS, full incompatibility, and one-way compatibility (either only OSS or PS is compatible). We show that if the government only takes care of consumer surplus, public subsidies are welfare-enhancing. But the optimal level of subsidies is larger with full compatibility and PS compatibility than full incompatibility and OSS compatibility. These results suggest that government policy towards OSS must be conditional to the degree of compatibility between PS and OSS. |
| Keywords: | Open source software, Public subsidy, Network compatibility |
| JEL: | L11 L15 L17 L38 |
| Date: | 2013–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201339&r=ipr |