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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Alessandro Nuvolari; Michelangelo Vasta |
| Abstract: | In this paper we examine the phenomenon of independent invention in Italy during the liberal age (1861-1913). We make use of a new dataset comprising all patents granted in Italy in five benchmark years: 1864-65, 1881, 1891, 1902 and 1911. We carry out the following exercises. First we examine the relative shares of independent, corporate and foreign inventions and their evolution over time and across industries. Second, by exploiting the peculiarities of Italian patent legislation which established a maximum patent length of fifteen years and a flexible renewal scheme which allowed inventors to maintain a patent "alive" for almost any specific duration, we assess the relative quality of independent and corporate patents. Our results indicate that in Italy independent inventors provided an important contribution to technological change but the quality of their patents was significantly lower than that of firms and of foreign patentees. |
| Date: | 2013–09–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2013/20&r=ipr |
| By: | Doh-Shin Jeon (Toulouse School of Economics); Yassine Lefouili (Toulouse School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We study bilateral cross-licensing agreements among N(> 2) firms that engage in competition after the licensing phase. It is shown that the most collusive cross-licensing royalty, i.e. the one that allows the industry to achieve the monopoly profit, is sustainable as the outcome of bilaterally efficient agreements. When the terms of the agreements are not observable to third parties, the monopoly royalty is the unique symmetric bilaterally efficient royalty. However, when the terms of the agreements are public, the most competitive royalty (i.e. zero) can also be bilaterally efficient. Policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross-licensing agreements are derived from these results. |
| Keywords: | Cross-Licensing, Collusion, Antitrust and Intellectual Property |
| JEL: | L44 O33 O34 |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:1311&r=ipr |
| By: | Manuel Portugal Ferreira (Instituto Politécnico de Leiria); Fernando Ribeiro Serra (Uninove – Universidade Nove de Julho); Emerson Maccari (Uninove – Universidade Nove de Julho) |
| Abstract: | Innovating firms face the dilemma of knowing when they will be able to appropriate the rents accruing from their innovations. Only the future value of the rents creates an incentive to innovate, and all innovations that are either imitated or improved upon by competitors preempt the innovator firms from capturing their rents. In this conceptual paper, we observe boundary conditions under which protection guarantees appropriation. A paradox emerges in that innovators benefit from networking and bandwagon effects but not from total diffusion of the knowledge. While networks are excellent vehicles for innovation, the business and social ties connecting firms deepen the hazards associated to the appropriation of rents. |
| Keywords: | innovation, innovation rent, network ties, diffusion of knowledge, bandwagon effects, complementary assets |
| JEL: | M0 M1 |
| Date: | 2013–09–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pil:wpaper:101&r=ipr |
| By: | Piotr Ćwiakowski (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Marek Giergiczny (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Michał Krawczyk (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw) |
| Abstract: | We report a laboratory experiment aimed at investigating factors affecting choice between different versions of a full-length movie. In particular, we estimate the willingness to pay for a legal, rather than pirated copy and compare it to the impact of such characteristics as picture quality or delay in delivery. We find a modest but highly significant preference for the authorized version. By conducting otherwise identical choice experiments both with and without actual experiential and monetary consequences, we conclude that the method does not seem to suffer from hypothetical bias. We also find that when the proceeds from legal sale are transferred to a good cause, willingness to pay for the unauthorized copy is reduced. |
| Keywords: | digital piracy, choice experiments |
| JEL: | D01 D12 C91 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:war:wpaper:2013-25&r=ipr |
| By: | Wojciech Hardy (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Michał Krawczyk (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Joanna Tyrowicz (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw; National Bank of Poland) |
| Abstract: | This study employs a vignette experiment to inquire, which features of online “piracy†make it ethically discernible from a traditional theft. This question is pertinent since the social norm concerning traditional theft is starkly different from the evidence on ethical evaluation of online “piracyâ€. We specifically distinguish between contextual features of theft, such as for example the physical loss of an item, breach of protection, availability of alternatives, emotional proximity to the victim of theft, etc. We find that some of these dimensions have more weight in ethical judgment, but there are no clear differences between online and traditional theft which could explain discrepancy in the frequency of commitment. |
| Keywords: | vignette experiment, illegal downloading, digital piracy, illegal download, downloading behaviour, P2P network |
| JEL: | A13 C93 D12 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:war:wpaper:2013-24&r=ipr |