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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Rey, Patrick (TSE); Salant, David (TSE) |
| Abstract: | We examine the impact of the licensing policies of one or more upstream owners of essential intellectual property (IP hereafter) on the variety offered by a downstream industry, as well as on consumers and social welfare. When an upstream monopoly owner of essential IP increases the number of licenses, it enhances product variety, adding to consumer value, but it also intensifies downstream competition, and thus dissipates profits. As a result, the upstream IP monopoly may want to provide too many or too few licenses, relatively to what maximizes consumer surplus or social welfare. With multiple owners of essential IP, royalty stacking increases aggregate licensing fees and thus tends to limit the number of licensees, which can also reduce downstream prices for consumers. We characterize the conditions under which these reductions in downstream prices and variety is beneficial to consumers or society. |
| Keywords: | Intellectual property, licensing policy, vertical integration, patent pools. |
| JEL: | L4 L5 O3 |
| Date: | 2012–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:25793&r=ipr |
| By: | Berndt, Ernst; Dubois, Pierre |
| Abstract: | Cross-country variability in regulatory frameworks, industrial policy, physician/pharmacy autonomy, brand/generic distinctions, and in the practice of medicine contributes to ambiguous interpretations of pharmaceutical cost comparisons. Here we report cross-country comparisons that: (i) focus on 11 therapeutic classes experiencing patent expiration and loss of exclusivity 2004-2010 in eight industrialized countries; (ii) convert revenues and unit sales to cost per day of treatment and number patient days treated using the World Health Organizations’ Defined Daily Dosage metrics; (iii) compare patterns in costs per day of treatment with price index measures based on average price per day of treatment for each molecule computed over all molecule versions; (iv) utilizing econometric methods, model and quantify various factors affecting variations in daily treatment price indexes such as national regulatory and reimbursement policy changes, physician/pharmacy autonomy, and other factors; and (v) simulate changes in expenditures by country and therapeutic class had counterfactual policies been implemented. |
| JEL: | D4 I11 I18 L11 L65 O34 |
| Date: | 2012–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:25744&r=ipr |
| By: | Viju, Crina; Yeung, May T.; Kerr, William A. |
| Abstract: | Public policy makers in Canada should expect the US to object to the extension of protection to EU GIs in the CETA. The expected gains made in other areas of the CETA for agreeing to protect EU GIs need to be weighed carefully against the potential cost of trade actions through NAFTA. The NAFTA has relatively strong commitments pertaining to intellectual property, although they remain largely untested. In the case of geographical indicators, the NAFTA commitments are structured around the trademark system used by the US and Canada. Other aspects of the NAFTA, such as the investment provisions, may also be used to challenge the negative impact of Canada granting intellectual property protection to GIs. |
| Keywords: | GIs, market access, EU, PTA, Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, International Relations/Trade, |
| Date: | 2012–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:catptp:122743&r=ipr |