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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Taehyun Jung; John P. Walsh |
| Abstract: | This study examines the factors affecting modes of commercializing patented inventions using a novel dataset based on a survey of U.S. inventors. We find that technological uncertainty and possessing complementary assets raise the propensity for internal commercialization. We find that R&D collaboration with firms in a horizontal relationship is likely to increase the propensity to license the invention. In addition, the paper shows that macro-level environment conditions that affect exchange conditions, such as technology familiarity, influence the effects of capabilities on governance choice. |
| Keywords: | transaction cost economics; knowledge-based view; collaboration ties; commercialization; innovation; patent |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:icr:wpicer:04-2011&r=ipr |
| By: | Bruno van Pottelsberghe |
| Abstract: | In this paper, Bruegel senior Fellow Bruno van Pottelsberghe develops a methodology to compare the quality of examination services in different patent offices. Quality is defined as the extent to which patent offices comply with their patentability conditions in a transparent way. The methodology consists of a two-layer analytical framework encompassing 'legal standards' and their 'operational design', which includes several interdependent components that affect the stringency and transparency of the filtering process. |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bre:wpaper:422&r=ipr |
| By: | Dirk Rübbelke (Basque Centre for Climate Change (BC3) and IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for Science); Pia Weiss (Nottingham University Business School) |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of environmental regulations on the patent activities for wind turbines between 1980 and 2008. We explicitly control for energy market liberalisation and take a potential interaction between liberalisation and policy instruments into account. We find a strong and highly significant effect of environmental tax revenues, which we regard as a proxy for the extent to which energy prices changed in favour of renewable energies, as well as foreign demand for wind turbines on innovation activities. In addition, we find that price-based policy instruments are more effective in fostering innovations in the wind turbine technology when energy markets are fully open to competition. In contrast, non-price-based policy instruments such as grants or low interest rate loans are largely independent from whether or not energy markets are liberalised. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Policy, Renewable Energy, Market Structure, Wind Turbines, Innovation, Patents, Technological Change |
| JEL: | Q55 Q58 O34 O38 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2011.32&r=ipr |
| By: | Nicola Lacetera; Lorenzo Zirulia |
| Abstract: | Understanding the organization of R&D activities requires the simultaneous consideration of scientific workers' talent and tastes, companies' organizational choices, and the characteristics of the relevant industry. We develop a model of the provision of incentives to corporate scientists, in an environment where (1) scientists engage in multiple activities when performing research; (2) knowledge is not perfectly appropriable; (3) scientists are responsive to both monetary and non-monetary incentives; and (4) firms compete on the product market. We show that both the degree of knowledge spillovers and of market competition affect the incentives given to scientists, and these effects interact. First, high knowledge spillovers lead firms to soften incentives when product market competition is high, and to strengthen incentives when competition is low. Second, the relationship between the intensity of competition and the power of incentives is U-shaped, with the exact shape depending on the degree of knowledge spillovers. We also show that the performance-contingent pay for both applied and basic research increases with the non-pecuniary benefits that scientists obtain from research. We relate our findings to the existing empirical research, and also discuss their implications for management and public policy. |
| JEL: | L1 L22 M12 O31 O32 |
| Date: | 2011–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17031&r=ipr |
| By: | Link, Albert N. (University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of Economics); Welsh, Dianne H. B. (University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Many researchers have studied correlates of business formations. Through the case-based and statistical literature several broad categories of influence on the entrepreneurial decision to start a new business have been identified. We contribute to this literature though our statistical analysis of a unique database of young inventive scientists and engineers and their propensity toward a new business formation. Our particular focus is on young inventors starting a business based on their creative achievements. Among this group do not find empirical support for the influence of traditional variables—such as age, education, and gender—on the propensity to start a new business. Rather, we find that their entrepreneurial experience as a new business proprietor is driven by dimensions of their university laboratory research experience. |
| Keywords: | Entrepreneurship; business formation; patents |
| JEL: | L26 |
| Date: | 2011–05–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:uncgec:2011_011&r=ipr |
| By: | Tirole, Jean (University of Toulouse); Weyl, Glen (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | What is the best way to reward innovation? While prizes avoid deadweight loss, intellectual property screens out projects generating low consumer surplus per unit sold. We build a model that formalizes this trade-off and develop tools for solving the resulting multidimensional screening problem. Optimal policy generally calls for some market power but never full monopoly pricing. The appropriate degree of market power is determined by a value-weighted average of the innovation supply elasticity multiplied by the log-variance of innovation quality. This quantifies the value of the materialistic genius long associated with entrepreneurship, opening it to empirical calibration. Our results also apply to the pricing of platforms and public infrastructure. |
| Date: | 2010–08–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:23108&r=ipr |
| By: | Mathias Dewatripont; André Sapir; Bruno van Pottelsberghe; Reinhilde Veugelers |
| Abstract: | Innovation is key to the future of Europe. This Policy Contribution, written together by Mathias Dewatripont, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management; Bruno van Pottelsberghe and André Sapir, Senior Fellows at Bruegel and professors at ULB; and Reinhilde Veugelers, senior fellow at Bruegel and professor at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, makes suggestions based on three principles: to give primacy to merit-based selection of projects at the European level, to strengthen the single market to make it conducive for research and innovation and to remove barriers that hinder dynamic restructuring. This paper is addressed to the July 2010 informal Competitiveness Council (Research) under the Belgian Presidency. |
| Date: | 2010–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bre:polcon:414&r=ipr |
| By: | Marco Marini (Department of Economics, Society & Politics, Università di Urbino "Carlo Bo"); Maria Luisa Petit (Department of Computer and System Sciences "Antonio Ruberti", Università di Roma "La Sapienza"); Roberta Sestini (Department of Computer and System Sciences "Antonio Ruberti", Università di Roma "La Sapienza") |
| Abstract: | We present a model of endogenous formation of R&D agreements among firms in which also the timing of R&D investment is made endogenous. The purpose is to bridge two usually separate streams of literature, the noncooperative formation of R&D alliances and the endogenous timing literature. Our approach allows to consider the formation of R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are sufficiently low, firms may find difficult to maintain a stable R&D agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In such a case, to be stable a R&D agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, avoiding any delay. When instead R&D spillover rates are sufficiently high, the cooperation in R&D constitutes a profitable option, although firms also possess the incentive to sequence their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and the knowledge leaks mainly from the leader to the follower, to invest as follower becomes extremely profitable, making R&D alliances hard to sustain unless firms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D. |
| Keywords: | R&D investment, Spillovers, Endogenous Timing. |
| JEL: | C72 D43 L11 L13 O30 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:urb:wpaper:11_04&r=ipr |
| By: | Vásquez Urriago, Ángela Rocio; Barge-Gil, Andrés; Modrego Rico, Aurelia; Paraskevopoulou, Evita |
| Abstract: | Science and Technology Parks (STP) are one of the most important and extensive innovation policy initiatives introduced in recent years. This work evaluates the impact of STP on firm product innovation in the Spanish context. Spain is less developed than most of the advanced countries, and regional and national governments are prioritizing STP initiatives. The large firm sample for our study is from the Spanish Technological Innovation Survey, provided by the National Statistical Institute. We focus on average treatment effects for firms located in 22 Spanish STP. Our results show that Spanish STP have a strong and positive impact on the probability and amount of product innovation achieved by STP located firms. These results hold for different assumptions about the mechanisms underlying location in a STP. |
| Keywords: | Science and Technology Parks; product innovation; treatment effects; regional development policies. |
| JEL: | R53 L25 O25 O18 L38 O30 H76 |
| Date: | 2011–02–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:30555&r=ipr |