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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Zoltan J. Acs; Mark Sanders |
| Abstract: | We develop a model in which stronger protection of intellectual property rights has an inverted U-shaped effect on innovation. Intellectual property rights protection allows the incumbent firms to capture part of the rents of commercial exploration that would otherwise accrue to the entrepreneurs. Stronger patent protection will increase the incentive to do R&D and generate new knowledge. This has a positive impact on entrepreneurship and innovation. However, after some point, further strengthening patent protection will reduce the returns to entrepreneurship sufficiently to reduce overall economic growth. |
| Keywords: | Intellectual Property Rights, Endogenous Growth, Entrepreneurship, Incentives, Knowledge Spillovers, Rents |
| JEL: | J24 L26 M13 O3 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:0823&r=ipr |
| By: | Chu, Angus C.; Peng, Shin-Kun |
| Abstract: | What are the effects of the WTO's TRIPS Agreement on growth, welfare and income inequality? To analyze this question, we develop an open-economy R&D-driven endogenous-growth model with wealth heterogeneity. Under TRIPS, the North experiences higher growth and welfare at the expense of higher income inequality. As for the South, it experiences higher growth at the expense of lower welfare and higher income inequality. Also, there exists a critical degree for the domestic importance of foreign goods below which global welfare decreases under TRIPS. In light of our findings, we discuss policy implications on China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. |
| Keywords: | endogenous growth; heterogeneity; income inequality; patent policy; TRIPS |
| JEL: | D31 F13 O34 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:10956&r=ipr |
| By: | Paul de Bijl; Martin Peitz |
| Abstract: | The introduction of packet-switched telephony in the form of VoIP raises concerns about current regulatory practice. Access regulation has been designed for traditional telephony on PSTN networks. In this paper, we analyze the effect of access regulation and retail price regulation of PSTN networks on the adoption of a new technology in the form of VoIP. In particular, we show that with endogenous consumer choice between PSTN and VoIP telephony, higher prices for terminating access to the PSTN network make VoIP less likely to succeed and lead to lower profits of operators that offer VoIP telephony exclusively |
| Keywords: | telecommunications; voice over broadband (VoB); voice over Internet protocol (VoIP); entry; access; regulation; imperfect competition |
| JEL: | L96 L51 L13 |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:discus:109&r=ipr |
| By: | Michele Boldrin; David K Levine |
| Date: | 2008–10–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000002371&r=ipr |
| By: | Bruno S. Frey; Katja Rost |
| Abstract: | Publication and citation rankings have become major indicators of the scientific worth of universities and countries, and determine to a large extent the career of individual scholars. We argue that such rankings do not effectively measure research quality, which should be the essence of evaluation. For that reason, an alternative ranking is developed as a quality indicator, based on membership on academic editorial boards of professional journals. It turns out that especially the ranking of individual scholars is far from objective. The results differ markedly, depending on whether research quantity or research quality is considered. Even quantity rankings are not objective; two citation rankings, based on different samples, produce entirely different results. It follows that any career decisions based on rankings are dominated by chance and do not reflect research quality. Instead of propagating a ranking based on board membership as the gold standard, we suggest that committees make use of this quality indicator to find members who, in turn, evaluate the research quality of individual scholars. |
| Keywords: | Rankings, Universities, Scholars, Publications, Citations |
| JEL: | H43 L15 O38 |
| Date: | 2008–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:iewwpx:390&r=ipr |
| By: | James Bessen (Research on Innovation, Boston University School of Law); Michael J. Meurer |
| Abstract: | Do patents provide critical incentives to encourage investment in innovation? Or, instead, do patents impose legal risks and burdens on innovators that discourage innovation, as some critics now claim? This paper reviews empirical economic evidence on how well patents perform as a property system. |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:roi:wpaper:0801&r=ipr |
| By: | Alireza Naghavi; Dermot Leahy |
| Abstract: | We study the effect of the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime of a host country (South) on a multinational's decision between serving a market via greenfield foreign direct investment to avoid the exposure of its technology or a North-South joint venture (JV) with a local firm, which allows R&D spillovers under imperfect IPRs. JV is the equilibrium market structure when R&D intensity is moderate and IPRs strong. The South can gain from increased IPR protection by encouraging a JV, whereas policies to limit foreign ownership in a JV gain importance in technology intensive industries as complementary policies to strong IPRs. |
| Keywords: | North-South Joint Ventures, Intellectual Property Rights, FDI Policy, Technology Transfer, R&D Spillovers |
| JEL: | O34 F23 O32 F13 L24 O24 |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:recent:017&r=ipr |