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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Estelle Dhont-Peltrault; Etienne Pfister |
| Abstract: | This paper uses a survey of French firms active in R&D to identify the determinants of R&D outsourcing and of the ensuing trade-off between R&D subcontracting and R&D cooperation. Internal R&D expenditures increase both the probability of outsourcing and the number of R&D partners. Investment in fundamental R&D, group belonging, and the sector’s high R&D intensity positively influences the probability of R&D outsourcing but have less impact on the number of partners. R&D subcontracting is more likely than R&D cooperation when the relationship deals with generic, standardized R&D processes, as reflected in the influence of several qualitative proxies. |
| Keywords: | R&D cooperation, R&D subcontracting, organizational choices. |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2007-17&r=ipr |
| By: | Acharya, Viral V; Subramanian, Krishnamurthy |
| Abstract: | Do legal institutions governing financial contracts affect the nature of real investments in the economy? We develop a simple model and provide evidence that the answer to this question is yes. We consider a levered firm's choice of investment between innovative and conservative technologies, on the one hand, and of financing between debt and equity, on the other. Bankruptcy code plays a central role in these choices by determining whether the firm is continued or liquidated in case of financial distress. When the code is creditor-friendly, excessive liquidations cause the firm to shy away from innovation. In contrast, by promoting continuation upon failure, a debtor-friendly code induces greater innovation. This effect remains robust when the firm attempts to sustain innovation by reducing its debt under creditor-friendly codes. Employing patents as a proxy for innovation, we find support for the real as well as the financial implications of the model: (1) In countries with weaker creditor rights, technologically innovative industries create disproportionately more patents and generate disproportionately more citations to these patents relative to other industries; (2) This difference of difference result is further confirmed by within-country analysis that exploits time-series changes in creditor rights, suggesting a causal effect of bankruptcy codes on innovation; (3) When creditor rights are stronger, innovative industries employ relatively less leverage compared to other industries; and (4) In countries with weaker creditor rights, technologically innovative industries grow disproportionately faster compared to other industries. Finally, while overall financial development fosters innovation, stronger creditor rights weaken this effect, especially for highly innovative industries. |
| Keywords: | creditor rights; entrepreneurship; financial development; growth; law and finance; R&D; technological change |
| JEL: | G3 K2 O3 O4 O5 |
| Date: | 2007–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6307&r=ipr |
| By: | Mohnen, Pierre (UNU-MERIT and University of Maastricht); Tiwari, Amaresh (University of Maastricht); Palm, Franz (University of Maastricht); Schim van der Loeff, Sybrand (University of Maastricht) |
| Abstract: | Using direct information on financial constraints from questionnaires, rather than the commonly used balance sheet information, this paper presents evidence that, controlling for traditional factors as size, market share, cooperative arrangement, and expected profitability, financial constraints affect a firm's decision of how much to invest in R&D activities. Apart from these constraints, other hampering factors as market uncertainty and institutional bottlenecks, regulations and organizational rigidities also affect R&D investment. A semiparametric estimator of sample selection is employed to control for potential endogeneity of the regressors. The paper also shows that old firms and firms that belong to a group are less financially constrained when it comes to undertaking R&D activities. For the estimation a semiparametric binary choice model is used. |
| Keywords: | Research and Development, Investment, Financial Risk |
| JEL: | O32 G11 G32 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2007011&r=ipr |
| By: | Acharya, Ram C.; Keller, Wolfgang |
| Abstract: | While there is general agreement that technology differences must figure prominently in any successful account of the cross-country income variation, not much is known on the source of these technology differences. This paper examines cross-country income differences in terms of factor accumulation, domestic R&D, and foreign technological spillovers. The empirical analysis encompasses seventeen industrialized countries in four continents over three decades, at a level disaggregated enough to identify innovations in a number of key high-tech sectors. International technology transfer is found to play a crucial part in accounting for income differences. We also relate technology transfer to imports, showing that imports are often a major channel. At the same time, our analysis highlights that international technology transfer varies importantly across industries and countries. |
| Keywords: | cross-country income distribution; international technology spillovers; productivity growth; technical change |
| JEL: | F1 O3 |
| Date: | 2007–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6296&r=ipr |
| By: | Hoffmann, Magnus; Schmidt, Frederik |
| Abstract: | In the following, we examine a market of a digital consumption good with monopolistic supply. In this market, it is the ability of the consumer to bypass (”crack”) the copy-protection of the monopolist which induces a lower price of the digital good, compared to an uncontested monopoly (textbook case). We analyze the complex relationship between the cracking efforts of the consumer, the copy-protection efforts and the pricing decision of the monopolist, and the welfare of the economy. We find, for example, that the monopolist will deter piracy if the (exogenous) relative effectiveness of the consumer’s bypassing activity is low compared to the copy-protection technology. In this case welfare is lower than the welfare in the textbook case. On the contrary, welfare rises above the textbook case level if the relative effectiveness of cracking is sufficiently high. |
| Keywords: | Digital Products; Contests; Security of Property Rights; Endogenous Monopoly Price |
| JEL: | D42 C72 D23 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:3289&r=ipr |