nep-ino New Economics Papers
on Innovation
Issue of 2011‒02‒12
twelve papers chosen by
Steffen Lippert
Massey University, Albany

  1. Innovation, antidumping and retaliation By MIYAGIWA, Kaz; SONG, Huasheng; VANDENBUSSCHE, Hylke
  2. Product innovation and market acquisition of firms By GABSZEWICZ, Jean; TAROLA, Ornella
  3. Family Firms and Regional Innovation Activity: Evidence from the German Mittelstand By Block, Joern; Spiegel, Frank
  4. Research Risk and Public Policy: The Relative Research Efficiency of Government versus University Labs By Leyden, Dennis; Link, Albert
  5. An Analysis of Unilateral and Cross-licensing Based on an Inventor Survey in Japan: Effects of uncertainty, rent dissipation and a bundle of patents on corporate licenses By NAGAOKA Sadao
  6. Evaluating Innovation and Moral Hazard in Pharmaceuticals By Paris Cleanthous
  7. Efficiency Improving Fossil Fuel Technologies for Electricity Generation: Data Selection and Trends By Elisa Lanzi; Elena Verdolini; Ivan Hašcic
  8. Exaptation, Degeneracy and Innovation By Giovanni Bonifati
  9. What Economists Know about Open Source Software - Its Basic Principles and Research Results By Sebastian von Engelhardt
  10. Research Data: Who will share what, with whom, when, and why? By Christine L. Borgman
  11. Bargaining and delay in patent licensing By MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent; VERGARI, Cecilia
  12. Digital piracy : theory By BELLEFLAMME, Paul; PEITZ, Martin

  1. By: MIYAGIWA, Kaz (Emory University, USA); SONG, Huasheng (CRPE and College of Economics, Zhejiang University, China; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium); VANDENBUSSCHE, Hylke (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE and IRES, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium; KULeuven-LICOS & CEPR)
    Abstract: We study the effect of contingency trade policy in a multi-country oligopoly model with and without R&D opportunities. We show that firms benefit from unilateral protection but initiate antidumping (AD) only against the targets domiciled in substantially smaller countries. Also, AD filings are more likely when firms face R&D opportunities. These results are consistent with recent empirical findings, namely, (1) actions are mostly between industrial and developing countries, (2) developing countries use AD to retaliate against industrial countries, and (3) AD is concentrated in R&D-intensive industries. Interestingly, intellectual property rights violations in developing countries have no connection to AD filings.
    Keywords: F12, F13, L13
    Date: 2010–10–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2010064&r=ino
  2. By: GABSZEWICZ, Jean (Professor Emeritus, Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium); TAROLA, Ornella (University of Rome "La Sapienza", Italy)
    Abstract: The paper explores the incentives for an incumbent firm to acquire an entrant willing to sell a product innovation, rather than openly compete with this entrant and, in case of acquisition, the incentives to sell simultaneously both the existing products and the new one, rather than specializing on a single variant. We prove that, in some circumstances, an incumbent firm can find it profitable to make an acquisition proposal to the entrant in order to deter entry. Nevertheless, in this acquisition scenario, a product proliferation strategy is never observed at equilibrium. Rather, the incumbent restricts itself to offer either its own variant or the product innovation produced by the entrant, depending on the quality differential existing between them. It follows that, while being available for sale, sometimes the innovation simply remains unexploited
    Date: 2010–12–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2010078&r=ino
  3. By: Block, Joern; Spiegel, Frank
    Abstract: Family firms are important not only for a region but for the economy as a whole. In particular, the long-term orientation and the local embeddedness of family firms suggest a positive effect on regional innovation activity. Yet, despite the widely acknowledged importance of family firms for the economy, little research exists on this issue. This paper analyses the effect of family firms on regional innovation. Using a dataset of 326 German regions, our regressions show that regions with a higher share of family firms also show higher levels of innovation activity, as measured by the number of successful patent applications. The implications of these findings for policy and research are discussed.
    Keywords: innovation; family firms; geography; Mittelstand; patents
    JEL: L26 O3
    Date: 2011–02–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28604&r=ino
  4. By: Leyden, Dennis (University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of Economics); Link, Albert (University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: Motivated by the question of which institutions within our, or any nation’s, national innovation system will leverage economic growth in the greatest amount for a given investment in innovation, we compare and contrast the behavior of two types of research institutions: government research laboratories (hereafter, labs) and university research labs. Because of a unique blend of institutional structures and rewards, we argue that universities are in a better position than government labs to provide the research necessary to stimulate economic growth. We then test and validate our model empirically using a unique database on the research output from university and government information retrieval (IR) labs.
    Keywords: R&D; university labs; government labs; information retrieval
    JEL: H40 O31
    Date: 2011–02–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:uncgec:2011_003&r=ino
  5. By: NAGAOKA Sadao
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of uncertainty, rent dissipation, and a bundle of patents on corporate licenses. We use a newly developed data set, based on a large-scale survey (4,000 patents) of Japanese inventors, which uniquely covers the nature of the underlying research projects. Our major findings are the following. First, consistent with a theoretical prediction of our model, uncertainty of the licensing value of the patent increases significantly the licensorfs willingness to license, for a given license possibility. This effect significantly accounts for a substantial part of the observed gap between unilateral and cross-licensing for upstream inventions. Second, a higher quality patent is more likely to be offered for a license and more likely to be licensed once offered for a license. Third, the positive effect of the importance of the first mover advantage upon the licensorfs willingness to license is no weaker when the patent is used internally by the licensor. This suggests that the rent dissipation effect is significantly controlled contractually or is weak due to competition in the technology market. Fourth, the size of the bundle of the complementary patents enhances cross licenses and reduces unilateral licenses, with the former effect becoming increasingly dominant, and that inventions related to the core business of a licensor are more likely to be cross licensed.
    Date: 2011–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:11004&r=ino
  6. By: Paris Cleanthous
    Abstract: This paper formulates an empirical methodology that evaluates pharmaceutical innovation in the American antidepressant market by quantifying patient welfare benefits from innovation. While evaluating pharmaceutical innovation in antidepressants, I uncover and address the moral hazard issue that arises due to the existence of prescription drug insurance coverage. A combination of market-level data, drug and patient characteristics are used to estimate demand for all antidepressants between 1980 and 2001. The paper estimates large and varied patient welfare gains due to innovation and helps explain a detected divergence between social and private patient benefits by the existence of insurance.
    Keywords: Health, Innovation, Moral Hazard, Pharmaceuticals, Welfare
    Date: 2011–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucy:cypeua:03-2011&r=ino
  7. By: Elisa Lanzi (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei); Elena Verdolini (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and Università Cattolica di Milano); Ivan Hašcic (OECD Environment Directorate)
    Abstract: This paper studies innovation dynamics in efficiency improving electricity generation technologies as an important means of mitigating climate change impacts. Relevant patents are identified and used as an indicator of innovation. We find that patenting in efficiency improving technologies has mostly been stable over time, with a recent decreasing trend. We also find that majority of patents are first filed in OECD countries and only then in non-OECD or BRIC countries. Conversely, non-OECD and BRIC countries apply for patents that are mostly marketed domestically. This result shows that there is significant technology transfer in the field of efficiency improving technologies for electricity production. This flow of know-how is likely to contribute to mitigation of greenhouse gases emissions in emerging economies in the long run.
    Keywords: Climate Change, Technological Innovation, Energy, Patents, Fossil Fuels
    JEL: Q32 Q4 Q55
    Date: 2011–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2011.10&r=ino
  8. By: Giovanni Bonifati
    Abstract: In innovation processes, exaptations are innovation-development processes through which an initial attribution of new functionality to existing artifacts leads to new artifacts and eventually new markets. In this article I focus on the theoretical foundations of these processes, proposing a theoretical framework to analyze them. The essay provides a contribution in the following two directions: • a discussion of the different levels of organization through which exaptations emerge in a market system; • an analysis of the complex links between exaptation and degeneracy (a many-tomany rather than one-to-one map between structure and function). Using this theoretical framework, I focus on the need for an analysis of the consequences of exaptations, arguing that exaptations may contribute to emerging degeneracy, which, in turn, may trigger further exaptations. In market systems one form of degeneracy is the coexistence of many structurally different artifacts providing at least in part the same functionality. I present historical examples that suggest that degeneracy increases the complexity of the system: the attribution of functionality previously provided by existing artifacts to new artifacts potentially able to provide them in a new way is a significant process giving raise to new artifacts and new markets
    Keywords: Innovation; Exaptation; Degeneracy; Adaptation;
    JEL: O30 O33 D20
    Date: 2010–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:depeco:0638&r=ino
  9. By: Sebastian von Engelhardt (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena)
    Abstract: For a decade, economists have been fascinated by the phenomenon of open source software (OSS). OSS is marked by free access to the software and its source code. It is developed in a public, collaborative manner by thousands of non-paid volunteers as well as profit seeking firms. Today, OSS is well established in the ICT sector and represents a new intellectual property paradigm. This paper provides an introduction into the topic OSS versus closed source software (CSS, also called 'proprietary' software). After a brief history of OSS and CSS, the differences between the open and the closed source principles and the basic logic of OSS business models are explained. Next, the paper presents what economists know about the OSS phenomena, i.e. gives an overview of the motives of the (non-paid) OSS developers, the institutions of OSS, the effects of OSS on competition, the incentives and role of firms, and finally of open source principle beyond software.
    Keywords: open source, open source software, intellectual property rights, information and communications technologies
    JEL: L17 O34 L86
    Date: 2011–02–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-005&r=ino
  10. By: Christine L. Borgman
    Abstract: The deluge of scientific research data has excited the general public, as well as the scientific community, with the possibilities for better understanding of scientific problems, from climate to culture. For data to be available, researchers must be willing and able to share them. The policies of governments, funding agencies, journals, and university tenure and promotion committees also influence how, when, and whether research data are shared. Data are complex objects. Their purposes and the methods by which they are produced vary widely across scientific fields, as do the criteria for sharing them. To address these challenges, it is necessary to examine the arguments for sharing data and how those arguments match the motivations and interests of the scientific community and the public. Four arguments are examined: to make the results of publicly funded data available to the public, to enable others to ask new questions of extant data, to advance the state of science, and to reproduce research. Libraries need to consider their role in the face of each of these arguments, and what expertise and systems they require for data curation.
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rsw:rswwps:rswwps161&r=ino
  11. By: MAULEON, Ana (Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, CEREC, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium and Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium); VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium); VERGARI, Cecilia (Department of Economic Sciences, University of Bologna, I-40125 Bologna, Italy)
    Abstract: We consider a model of licensing of a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside innovator) negotiates either up-front fixed fees or per-unit royal- ties with two firms producing horizontally differentiated brands and competing à la Cournot. We investigate how licensing schemes (fixed fee or per-unit royalty) and the number of licenses sold (exclusive licensing or complete technology diffusion) affect price agreements and delays in reaching an agreement. We show that the patent holder prefers to license by means of up-front fixed fees except if market competition is mild and the innovation size is small. Once there is private information about the relative bargaining power of the parties, the patent holder may prefer licensing by means of per-unit royalties even if market competition is strong. Moreover, the delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the patent holder chooses to negotiate up-front fixed fees instead of per-unit royalties.
    Keywords: patent licensing, fixed fee, royalty, bargaining, private information
    JEL: C78 D43 D45 L13
    Date: 2010–12–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2010077&r=ino
  12. By: BELLEFLAMME, Paul (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE and Louvain School of Management, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium); PEITZ, Martin (Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany)
    Abstract: This article reviews recent theoretical contributions on digital piracy. It starts by elaborating on the reasons for intellectual property protection, by reporting a few facts about copyright protection, and by examining reasons to become a digital pirate. Next, it provides an exploration of the consequences of digital piracy, using a base model and several extensions (with consumer sampling, network effects, and indirect appropriation). A closer look at market-structure implications of end-user piracy is then taken. After a brief review of commercial piracy, additional legal and private responses to end-user piracy are considered. Finally, a quick look at emerging new business models is taken.
    Keywords: information good, piracy, copyright, IP protection, internet, peer-to-peer, software, music
    JEL: L11 L82 L86
    Date: 2010–10–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2010060&r=ino

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