|
on Innovation |
| By: | Charles D. Kolstad |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a simple model of a polluting industry and an innovating firm. The polluting industry is faced with regulation and costly abatement. Regulation may be taxes or marketable permits. The innovating firm invests in R&D and develops technologies which reduce the cost of pollution abatement. The innovating firm can patent this innovation and use a licensing fee to generate revenue. In a world of certainty, the first best level of innovation and abatement can be supported by either a pollution tax or a marketable permit. However, the returns to the innovator from innovation are not the same under the two regimes. A marketable permit system allows the innovator to capture all of the gains to innovation; a tax system involves sharing the gains of innovation between the innovator and the polluting industry. |
| JEL: | L51 Q55 Q58 |
| Date: | 2010–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16303&r=ino |
| By: | Tomohiro MACHIKITA (Inter-Disciplinary Studies Center, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan); Shoichi MIYAHARA (School of Economics, Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan); Masatsugu TSUJI (Graduate School of Applied Informatics, University of Hyogo, Japan.); Yasushi UEKI (Bangkok Research Center-Japan External Trade Organization, Thailand) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the effects of internal and external sources of knowledge on the introduction of new products based on new technologies or information at firms which responded to a questionnaire survey conducted in four Southeast Asian countries. The results confirm that local firms make full use of locally available sources of new technology or information to achieve product innovation. On the other hand, foreign-owned firms depend mainly on internal R&D capacities and also possibly upon cooperation with local universities. These findings highlight the fact that local firms complement their lack of internal resources for product innovation with external knowledge sources. Foreign-owned firms utilize their international production networks to concentrate their resources on innovative activities. |
| Date: | 2010–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:era:wpaper:dp-2010-08&r=ino |
| By: | Braunerhjelm, Pontus (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology); Parker, Simon (University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada.) |
| Abstract: | This article describes the academic contributions of the 2010 recipient of the Global Award for Entrepreneurship Research, Professor Josh Lerner of the Harvard Business School. Lerner’s empirical research on the inter-relationship between venture capital, innovation and entrepreneurship has greatly extended and improved our understanding of one of the major drivers of growth in modern economies. The first part of this article explains Lerner’s contributions as regards the structure and organization of the venture capital industry. Later, his most important publications on entrepreneurship, innovation and intellectual property rights are surveyed. Several aspects of Lerner’s policy-oriented work are then outlined, before the article closes with a brief conclusion. |
| Keywords: | Global Award; Venture capital; Patent; Entrepreneurship; Innovation |
| JEL: | G24 L26 O31 |
| Date: | 2010–08–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0233&r=ino |
| By: | Julian M. Alston |
| Abstract: | This report contains a review of the literature on the role of agricultural research and development in fostering innovation and productivity in agriculture. The review seeks to clarify concepts and terminology used in the area, provide a critical assessment of approaches found in the literature, report main results, and draw inferences. A key finding is that the social rate of return to investments in agricultural R&D has been generally high. Specific findings differ depending on methods and modelling assumptions, particularly assumptions concerning the research lag distribution, the nature of the research-induced technological change, and the nature of the markets for the affected commodities. |
| Keywords: | productivity growth, innovation, Agricultural R&D, agricultural productivity |
| Date: | 2010–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:agraaa:31-en&r=ino |
| By: | Ullberg, Eskil (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | We are well familiar with the economic analysis of a patent system in terms of a temporary monopoly on products, benefitting from marginal process inventions, formulated under conditions of certain future demands. This article develops an experimental and dynamic microeconomic model useful for studying the patent system as a trade system, where patented technology is exchanged in organized competitive markets, under uncertain future demands. An economic system design is developed to study transparent prices of patents, dynamic gains from using a patent in multiple industries and the coordination of invention, intermediary and innovation activities using a linear contract on patents (fixed fee plus royalty on revenues). A trader is introduced together with inventor and innovator agents in order to multiply the value (use) of the technology. Three mechanism designs and two levels of presumption of validity of the underlying patent right are proposed. The analysis differs from previous work on patents, trade and economics in that the focus is on the competitive pricing of the rights themselves, using demand side bidding. An informal theory is outlined to price the dual values of a patent (investing and blocking). Based on this proposition tentative hypothesis are outlined for two initial experiments using the outlined economic system design. |
| Keywords: | patents; organized markets; trade; licensing; technology |
| JEL: | D02 D23 L14 L24 O32 O34 |
| Date: | 2010–08–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0239&r=ino |
| By: | Ullberg, Eskil (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | The patent system makes organized markets in patents with transparent prices possible. Such prices are here investigated as “signals” for inventors and innovators alike ofv aluable “technology areas”, in an experimental study. They inform decisions of specialized “firms” on allocation of resources for invention given a search space of induced technology values. The traditional hierarchical model of coordinating invention and innovation in a vertically integrated firm is replaced by coordination of these activities among specialized firms through a market with prices. The experimental study builds on a study focusing on price mechanisms with exogenous technology values to a study of an economic environment with “endogenous” technology values. The results suggest that coordination clearly takes place but differs considerably between the institutions and patent validity tested (a 3 x 2 design). As with the price study, demand-side bidding in both dimensions of the linear contract appears to yield the broadest search scope, and thus the best chances for the allocation of resources for invention. Multiple end-states are observed, especially for institutions with less demand-side bidding, indicating imprecise price signals for institutions similar to today’s personal exchange. Coordination with prices appears to increase the dynamic gains of the patent system through price information to reduce or better inform about the risk in investments in new technology. |
| Keywords: | patents; intellectual property; trade; licensing; experiments |
| JEL: | D02 D23 L14 L24 O32 O34 |
| Date: | 2010–08–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0231&r=ino |
| By: | Philipp Weinscheink (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | We explore how the threat of entry influences the innovation activity of an incumbent. We show that the incumbent’s investment is hump-shaped in the entry threat. When the entry threat is small and increases, the incumbent invests more to deter entry, or to make it unlikely. This is due to the entry deterrence effect. However, when the threat becomes huge, entry can no longer profitably be deterred or made unlikely and the investment becomes small. Then the Schumpeterian effect dominates. These results turn out to be very robust. |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_17&r=ino |
| By: | Cunha-e-Sa, Maria Antonieta; Leitao, Alexandra; Reis, Ana Balcao |
| Abstract: | We study a two sector endogenous growth model with environmental quality with two goods and two factors of production, one clean and one dirty. Technological change creates clean or dirty innovations. We compare the laissez-faire equilibrium and the social optimum and study first- and second-best policies. Optimal policy encourages research toward clean technologies. In a second-best world, we claim that a portfolio that includes a tax on the polluting good combined with optimal innovation subsidy policies is less costly than increasing the price of the polluting good alone. Moreover, a discriminating innovation subsidy policy is preferable to a non-discriminating one. JEL codes: H23; O3; O41 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp548&r=ino |
| By: | Michael Fritsch (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena); Holger Graf (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena) |
| Abstract: | We compare two leading regional innovation systems (RIS) in East Germany with two RIS in West Germany of about the same size and internal settlement structure. Our analyses show that differences in the performance between the regions cannot easily be related to the structural properties of the respective innovation networks because divergent general economic conditions in the two parts of the country as well as the integration of regions into their neighboring spatial environment play a rather dominant role. Overall, our analysis clearly shows that an analysis of RIS should account for the general economic conditions as well as for the position of a region in its spatial environment. Focusing just on the respective region is not enough. |
| Keywords: | Regional innovation systems, national innovation systems, innovator networks, gatekeeper, social network analysis |
| JEL: | O31 Z13 R11 |
| Date: | 2010–08–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-054&r=ino |
| By: | Jaya Prakash Pradhan |
| Abstract: | The liberalization of economic policies in the last two decades and intensifying market competition tend to be a cause of policy concern for the survival of SMEs in emerging economies like India. These SMEs account for the largest chunk of industrial units and employment in the national economy. Yet, most of them are competing with deeply inadequate resources, especially by means of weak technological capabilities. The present study has provided not only preliminary estimates on SME R&D investments in Indian manufacturing and their broad trends and patterns, but also contributed to the understanding of factors driving the SME in-house R&D activities. It shows that Indian SMEs continue to be vulnerable among all firms as they have the lowest incidence of doing in-house R&D and their R&D intensities have fallen in the last decade. Based on the results from three-step Censored Quantile Regression, this study has suggested a set of useful policy implications for enhancing SME R&D. |
| Keywords: | SMEs; R&D; Business Groups; Foreign Firms. |
| JEL: | L11 L22 F23 |
| Date: | 2010–08–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eei:rpaper:eeri_rp_2010_14&r=ino |
| By: | Ullberg, Eskil (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | The question of how prices on patents rights should be determined in impersonal exchanges is examined in a laboratory environment. Dynamic gains from such organized trade with public prices are recorded. The experiment introduces a competitive market with impersonal exchange mechanisms and prices in the traditionally hierarchical and personal exchange of patents. A tradable linear contract (fixed fee plus royalty)is investigated with three mechanism designs for demand-side bidding and two levels of presumed legal validity of the underlying patent. A “trader” can split contracts useful for multiple “industries,” creating dynamic gains, potentially increasing the use of technology in the economic system. Previous research on licensing has mostly been limited to one-dimensional auction mechanisms or static environments. The results indicate that agents appear to price the blocking value in the fixed fee and the investment value, net what is paid in fixed, in the royalty component, supporting a proposed theory of prices. Risks are thereby shifted from the invention to the consumer by means of this producer market, increasing the incentives for investment in invention, potentially resulting in a more competitive technology being developed and a more efficient economic system. The results give indications on proper integration of information and rules for mechanisms for organized market on patents with transparent prices. It also shows that intermediaries (traders) are critical to achieve dynamic gains from the system as are high presumed validity of patents. |
| Keywords: | patents; trade; licensing; intellectual property; experiments |
| JEL: | D02 D23 L14 L24 O32 O34 |
| Date: | 2010–08–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0230&r=ino |