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on Industrial Organization |
| By: | Mathias Dewatripont (ULB - Université libre de Bruxelles); Jean Tirole (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | Scholars and civil society have argued that competition erodes supplier morality. This paper establishes a robust irrelevance result, whereby intense market competition does not crowd out consequentialist ethics; it thereby issues a strong warning against the wholesale moral condemnation of markets and procompetitive institutions. Intense competition, while not altering the behavior of profitable suppliers, may, however, reduce the standards of highly ethical suppliers or not-for-profits, raising the potential need to protect the latter in the marketplace. |
| Keywords: | Competition, Consequentialism, Replacement logic, Non-profits, Corporate social responsability, Race to the ethical bottom |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04695298 |
| By: | Jinglei Huang (Tsinghua University, School of Social Science, Mingzhai Building, Haidian District, Beijing, China); Guofu Tan (University of Southern California, 3620 South Vermont Avenue KAP Hall, 300, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0253, United States); Tat-How Teh (Nanyang Technological University, Division of Economics, 48 Nanyang Ave, 639818 Singapore); Junjie Zhou (Tsinghua University, School of Economics and Management, 30 Shuangqing Road, Haidian District, Beijing, China) |
| Abstract: | Network interoperability between platforms often comes in various possible configurations, including industry-wide, coalition-based, and pairwise interoperability arrangements. We present an approach to incorporate generalized configurations of network interoperability into the analysis of price competition among any number of symmetric platforms. Specifically, the network benefit received by consumers on each platform increases with the effective network size of the platform, which is determined by an interoperability matrix reflecting the connections between platforms. Four key factors—the strength of interoperability, the shape of the network externality function, the interoperability configuration, and the number of platforms—jointly determine the equilibrium prices. Our findings show, among other things, that increased interoperability strength tends to reduce prices and benefit consumers when: (i) the network externality function exhibits strong increasing returns to scale, or (ii) the interoperability configuration includes multiple coalitions. |
| Keywords: | platforms, interoperability, interconnectivity, compatibility, data sharing, learning curve, coalitions |
| JEL: | D43 L15 L20 L50 |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:2403 |
| By: | Tsuritani, Ryosuke |
| Abstract: | In a vertical market, the price of the final good is high if a seller has strong bargaining power. Thus, a policy that strengthens the bargaining power of sub-suppliers may be desirable from a fairness perspective while undesirable from an efficiency perspective. We consider a vertical market with one sub-supplier, focal supplier, and manufacturer. The focal supplier purchases inputs from the sub-supplier and sells its products to the manufacturer. Suppliers' selling prices are determined through Nash bargaining. We find that although suppliers' vertical separation induces triple-markup inefficiency in vertical relations, if the focal supplier has weak bargaining power over the manufacturer or strong bargaining power over the sub-supplier, the suppliers have the incentive to remain separated. This is because suppliers' vertical separation may be a price-increasing commitment and transfer the bargaining surplus from the manufacturer to the suppliers. Therefore, a policy that strengthens the bargaining power of sub-suppliers may also be justified from an efficiency perspective because it may encourage vertical integration. |
| Keywords: | Vertical market; Vertical integration; Three-tier supply chain; Bargaining; Subcontracting Act |
| JEL: | D42 L23 L40 |
| Date: | 2024–09–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:122071 |
| By: | Yair Antler ad Ran Spiegler |
| Abstract: | We develop a market model in which products generate state-dependent potential hidden charges. Firms differ in their ability to realize this potential. Unlike firms, consumers do not observe the state. They try to infer hidden charges from market prices, using idiosyncratic subjective models. We show that an interior competitive equilibrium is uniquely given by what is formally a Bellman equation. We leverage this representation to characterize equilibrium headline prices, add-on charges and welfare. Market responses to shocks display patterns that are impossible under rational expectations. For example, equilibrium prices can be fully revealing and yet vary with consumers' private information. |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2409.14885 |
| By: | Tajika, Tomoya |
| Abstract: | We model a protest against a firm aiming to remove a product that causes negative externalities. Both the firm and consumers are uncertain about the product’s value, but consumers receive noisy signals. Price plays a key role in aggregating information. When prices are high, consumers with both good and bad signals derive almost the same utility from the product being sold, making protests uninformative. By endogenizing the price, we show that as consumer signals improve, protests become less informative, reducing social welfare. This suggests that consumer ignorance may play a role in protest success. |
| Keywords: | Protest, boycotts, information aggregation, ethical voters, monopoly pricing |
| JEL: | D42 D72 D81 D82 |
| Date: | 2024–09–19 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:122143 |
| By: | Sarit Markovich (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA); Yaron Yehezkel (Coller School of Management, Tel-Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv, Israel) |
| Abstract: | We consider platform competition when platforms can either 1) commercialize users’ data and in return offer their services for free (data-based business model); 2) protect users’ privacy and charge users for participation (subscription-based model); or 3) offer both options (the hybrid model). We find that competition does not always motivate the incumbent platform to protect users’ privacy. When network effects are strong, competition can motivate the incumbent to shift from the subscription-based model to the hybrid model; thereby, increasing data commercialization. Yet, the opposite case occurs when network effects are weak. Moreover, allowing the incumbent to adopt the hybrid model is welfare enhancing when network effects are strong, and welfare reducing (or neutral) otherwise. |
| Keywords: | platforms with network effects; business models; data commercialization |
| JEL: | L1 |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:2402 |
| By: | Lane, Nathan |
| Abstract: | I study the impact of industrial policy on industrial development by considering an important episode during the East Asian miracle: South Korea's heavy and chemical industry (HCI) drive, 1973--1979. Based on newly assembled data, I use the introduction and termination of industrial policies to study their impacts during and after the intervention period. (1) I reveal that the heavy-chemical industrial policies promoted the expansion and dynamic comparative advantage of directly targeted industries. (2) Using variation in exposure to policies through the input-output network, I demonstrate that policy indirectly benefited downstream users of targeted intermediates. (3) The benefits of HCI persisted even after it ended, some of which took time to manifest. These findings suggest that the temporary drive shifted Korean manufacturing into more advanced markets and supported durable change. This study helps clarify the lessons drawn from the East Asian growth miracle. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:303480 |
| By: | Bernardo Caldarola; Luca Fontanelli |
| Abstract: | Recent empirical evidence finds positive associations between digitalisation and industry concentration. However, ICT may not be all alike. We investigate the effect of the purchase of cloud services on the long run size growth rate of French firms. Our findings suggest that cloud services positively impact firm growth rates, with smaller firms experiencing more significant benefits compared to larger firms. This evidence suggests that the diffusion of cloud technologies may help mitigate concentration in the era of the digital transition by favouring the digitalisation and growth of smaller firms, especially when the cloud services provided are more advanced. |
| Keywords: | cloud, ICT, concentration, firm growth rate, firm performance |
| Date: | 2024–10–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2024/25 |