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on Industrial Organization |
| By: | Jeremy Pearce; Liangjie Wu |
| Abstract: | We study the interaction of customer capital and productivity through brand reallocation across firms. We develop a firm dynamics model with brands as transferable customer capital, heterogeneous firm productivity, and variable markups. We study the matching process between transferable brand capital and core productivity, which can be inefficient with significant welfare implications. We link USPTO trademark data with Nielsen sales data to study the prevalence of brand reallocation and the response of sales and prices to reallocation. Quantitatively, brand reallocation reduces welfare. Optimal policies deviate substantially from the literature due to the complementarity between brand capital and productivity. |
| Keywords: | firm dynamics; productivity; market concentration; product innovation; reallocation; Mergers & acquisitions; brands; Trademarks; intangible assets |
| JEL: | O31 O32 O34 O41 D22 D43 L11 L13 L22 |
| Date: | 2024–08–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fednsr:98772 |
| By: | Lauren Cohen; Umit Gurun; Katie Moon; Paula Suh |
| Abstract: | Analyzing millions of patents granted by the USPTO between 1976 and 2020, we find a pattern where specific patents only rise to prominence after considerable time has passed. Amongst these late-blooming influential patents, we show that there are key players (patent hunters) who consistently identify and develop them. Although initially overlooked, these late-blooming patents have significantly more influence on average than early-recognized patents and are associated with significantly more new product launches. Patent hunters, as early detectors and adopters of these late-blooming patents, are also associated with significant positive rents. Their adoption of these overlooked patents is associated with a 6.4% rise in sales growth (t = 3.02), a 2.2% increase in Tobin’s Q (t = 3.91), and a 2.2% increase in new product offerings (t = 2.97). We instrument for patent hunting, and find strong evidence that these benefits are causally due to patent hunting. The rents associated with patent hunting on average exceed those of the original patent creators themselves. Patents hunted are closer to the core technology of patent hunters, more peripheral to writers, and in less competitive spaces. Lastly, patent hunting appears to be a persistent firm characteristic and to have an inventor-level component. |
| JEL: | L1 O31 O33 |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32965 |
| By: | Hirose, Kosuke; Matsumura, Toshihiro |
| Abstract: | This study theoretically investigates energy-saving investment incentives in duopolies. First, we investigate a binary choice model in which each firm chooses whether to make an energy-saving investment and then they face Cournot competition. We focus on the incentive to become the leading firm by the investment, when the rival does not engage in this project. We find the private incentive to be insufficient for welfare (thereby requiring promotion through policies), if Pigouvian tax is imposed. However, this incentive can be excessive when the emission tax rate is lower than the Pigouvian level. Next, we investigate a model in which firms can choose energy-saving investment levels continuously. We find that the equilibrium investment can be (is not) excessive for welfare when the emission tax rate is lower than (equal to) the Pigouvian. These results suggest a risk of policy formation combining a low emission tax and subsidies for promoting energy-saving investments. |
| Keywords: | emission tax; investment subsidy; policy combination; energy-conservation; production substitution |
| JEL: | L13 Q38 Q58 |
| Date: | 2024–08–27 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121836 |
| By: | Sara Calligaris; Chiara Criscuolo; Josh De Lyon; Andrea Greppi; Oliviero Pallanch |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a taxonomy of 151 industries, mainly defined at the 3-digit level, indicating at which geographical level competition takes place. It classifies 40 industries as competing at the domestic level, 85 at the European level, and 26 at the global level. First, this paper creates a novel dataset that combines production and international trade data for both goods and services industries, defined at a detailed level of industry aggregation for 15 European countries (based on data availability). Then, by comparing domestic sales with international trade flows, and their source/destination, it identifies the geographic level of competition of each industry. The proposed classification can be used in numerous applications, from the design of trade policies to the assessment of competition by antitrust authorities. The paper shows that the taxonomy is broadly consistent with external data sources that provide alternative ways of inferring the degree of internationalisation of each industry. |
| Keywords: | Competition, International Trade, Market Boundaries, Trade Costs |
| JEL: | F14 F60 L11 |
| Date: | 2024–09–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:stiaaa:2024/05-en |
| By: | Sara Calligaris; Chiara Criscuolo; Josh De Lyon; Andrea Greppi; Oliviero Pallanch; Miguel Chavez |
| Abstract: | Concentration – the share of an industry’s output accounted for by its largest firms and a frequently used proxy of competition – has increased in European countries. This paper provides evidence about this development by introducing several methodological refinements in the cross-country measurement of concentration: it defines industries at a disaggregated level, mostly 3-digit; it takes into account the geographic level at which competition takes place - domestic, European or global; and it accounts for linkages between firms within the same domestic and multinational business group in the relevant geographic region of competition. It then applies these improvements to representative data for fifteen European countries, showing that average concentration increased by about 5 percentage points over the period 2000-2019, from 26% to more than 31%. Third, the paper investigates how each of the methodological improvements affects the levels and trends of concentration. |
| Keywords: | Competition, Concentration, Market power |
| JEL: | F14 F60 L11 L22 D22 |
| Date: | 2024–09–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:stiaaa:2024/06-en |