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on Industrial Organization |
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Issue of 2016‒10‒02
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Gilbert Cette (Centre de recherche de la Banque de France - Banque de France); Jimmy Lopez (LEDi - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dijon - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Centre de recherche de la Banque de France - Banque de France); Jacques Mairesse (CREST-ENSAE - Centre de Recherche en Économie et STatistique (CREST), UNU-MERIT - UNU-MERIT - United Nations University - Maastricht University, Centre de recherche de la Banque de France - Banque de France) |
| Abstract: | This study is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to infer the consequences on productivity entailed by anticompetitive regulations in product and labor markets through their impacts on production prices and wages. Results show that changes in production prices and wages at country*industry levels are informative about the creation of rents impeding productivity in different ways and to different extents. A simulation based on OECD regulation indicators suggests that nearly all countries could expect sizeable gains in multifactor productivity from the implementation of large structural reform programs changing anticompetitive regulation practices on product and labor markets. |
| Keywords: | rents, anti-competitive regulations,Productivity, market imperfections |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01344484&r=ind |
| By: | Athey, Susan (Stanford University); Calvano, Emilio (University of Bologna); Gans, Joshua S. (University of Toronto) |
| Abstract: | We develop a model of advertising markets in an environment where consumers may switch (or "multi-home") across publishers. Consumer switching generates inefficiency in the process of matching advertisers to consumers, because advertisers may not reach some consumers and may impress others too many times. We find that when advertisers are heterogeneous in their valuations for reaching consumers, the switching-induced inefficiency leads lower-value advertisers to advertise on a limited set of publishers, reducing the effective demand for advertising and thus depressing prices. As the share of switching consumers expands (e.g., when consumers adopt the internet for news or increase their use of aggregators), ad prices fall. We demonstrate that increased switching creates an incentive for publishers to invest in quality as well as extend the number of unique users, because larger publishers are favored by advertisers seeking broader "reach" (more unique users) while avoiding inefficient duplication. |
| JEL: | L11 L82 |
| Date: | 2016–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:3407&r=ind |
| By: | Gérard Mondello (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS); Evens Salies (OFCE) |
| Abstract: | This article extends the unilateral accident standard model to allow for Cournot competition. Assuming risk-neutrality for the regulator and injurers, it analyzes three liability regimes: strict liability, negligence rule, and strict liability with administrative authorization or permits systems. Under competition the equivalence between negligence rule and strict liability no longer holds, and negligence insures a better level of social care. However, enforcing both a permit system and strict liability restores equivalence between liability regimes. However, whatever the current regime, competition leads to lower the global safety level of industry. Indeed, the stronger firm may benefit from safety rents, which they may use to increase production rather that maintaining a high level of safety. |
| Keywords: | Tort Law, Strict Liability, Negligence rule, Imperfect Competition, Oligopoly, Cournot Competition |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L52 K13 |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2016-29&r=ind |