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on Industrial Organization |
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Issue of 2005‒07‒11
three papers chosen by |
| By: | José Ramón Ruiz-Tamarit; Manuel Sánchez-Moreno |
| Abstract: | In this paper we revisit the dual approach to comparative statics in competitive markets, allowing for the essential results to arise from a comprehensive and unified framework. We study, for both the long-run and the short-run, the response of all the endogenous variables to price factor changes in a way that captures the outputprice effects arising from market-firm interactions. We show that it is necessary a richer characterization of the nature of factors with respect to output, connected with marginal cost and output demand elasticities, for completely determining such responses. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2005-13&r=ind |
| By: | Juan M.C. Larrosa (CONICET-Universidad Nacional del Sur) |
| Abstract: | Noncooperative network-formation games in oligopolies analyze optimal connection structures that emerge when linking represent the appropriation of cost-reducing one-way externalities. These models reflect situations where one firm access to another firm’s (public or private) information and this last cannot refuse it. What would happen if decisions are sequential? A model of exogenous Stackelberg leadership is developed and first-mover advantages are observed and commented. |
| Keywords: | non cooperative games, network formation strategies, Stackelberg equilibrium. |
| JEL: | C70 D43 L13 |
| Date: | 2005–07–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0507003&r=ind |
| By: | Fonseca,Miguel A.; Mueller,Wieland; Normann,Hans-Theo (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ. Beh., 1990). Firms bindingly announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence. Theory predicts simultaneous production in period one but we find that a substantial proportion of subjects choose the second period. |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D43 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200577&r=ind |