|
on Information and Communication Technologies |
| By: | Aristovnik, Aleksander |
| Abstract: | Information and communication technology (ICT) is one of the most important driving forces promoting economic growth in the economy. However, one puzzling question concerns the efficient and effective impact of ICT on educational outputs and outcomes. Therefore, the purpose of the paper is to discuss and review some previous research studies on development of the information society and its impact on educational outputs/outcomes at regional level. Respectively, a definition, measurements and the empirical application of the efficiency and effectiveness of the ICT at the regional (NUTS 2) level in the EU is considered (based on 2007–2011 average data). The research findings suggest that a wide range of NUTS 2 regions is characterized by a relatively low efficiency rate of transforming information society progress into educational outputs/outcomes, particularly in Eastern and Southern Europe. |
| Keywords: | information technology; education; efficiency; DEA; EU; NUTS-2 regions |
| JEL: | C6 I2 R1 |
| Date: | 2014–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:56455&r=ict |
| By: | Nestor Duch-Brown (European Commission – JRC - IPTS); Bertin Martens (European Commission – JRC - IPTS) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates price differences between online and offline retail channels in the EU Digital Single Market. Using price and sales data for ten different product categories sold both offline and online in 21 EU countries in 2009, and correcting for product characteristics, we find evidence that confirms the theory: online prices are lower than offline prices, price dispersion also tends to be lower online and online demand is more price-elastic than offline demand. In addition, from our demand estimates we compute the consumers' welfare effects of different scenarios. Our results indicate that a full price convergence across EU member states towards the lowest observed average price would significantly benefit consumers. Moreover, eliminating e-commerce would reduce consumer surplus in €34 billion while an increase in online sales between 10% and 25% would represent a change in consumer welfare in the range of €3.4 billion to €13 billion. |
| Keywords: | price dispersion; e-commerce; consumer welfare |
| JEL: | L11 L15 L68 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:decwpa:jrc89991&r=ict |
| By: | Azomahou T.T.; Opolot D. (UNU-MERIT) |
| Abstract: | We study the dynamics of individual beliefs and information aggregation when agents communicate via a social network. We provide a general framework of social learning that captures the interactive effects of three main factors on the structure of individual beliefs resulting from such a dynamic process; that is historical factorsprior beliefs, learning mechanismsrational and bounded rational learning, and the topology of communication structure governing information exchange. More specifically, we provide conditions under which heterogeneity and consensus prevail. We then establish conditions on the structures of the communication network, prior beliefs and private information for public beliefs to correctly aggregate decentralized information. The speed of learning is also established, but most importantly, its implications on efficient information aggregation. Keywords Learning, social networks, public beliefs, speed of learning, information aggregation. |
| Keywords: | Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory; |
| JEL: | C70 D83 D85 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2014034&r=ict |
| By: | Azomahou T.T.; Opolot D. (UNU-MERIT) |
| Abstract: | Learning and stochastic evolutionary models provide a useful framework for analyzing repeated interactions and experimentation among economic agents over time. They also provide sharp predictions about equilibrium selection when multiplicity exists. This paper defines three convergence measures, diffusion rate, expected waiting time and convergence rate, for characterizing the short-run, medium-run and long-run behavior of a typical model of stochastic evolution. We provide tighter bounds for each without making restrictive assumptions on the model and amount of noise as well as interaction structure. We demonstrate how they can be employed to characterize evolutionary dynamics for coordination games and strategic diffusion in networks. Application of our results to strategic diffusion gives insights on the role played by the network topology. For example we show how networks made up of cohesive subgroups speed up evolution between quasi-stable states while sparsely connected networks have the opposite effect of favoring almost global stability. Keywords Learning and evolution, networks, diffusion rate, convergence rate, expected waiting time |
| Keywords: | Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General; |
| JEL: | C73 D80 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2014035&r=ict |
| By: | Daniel Kaimann (University of Paderborn); Joe Cox (Portsmouth Business School) |
| Abstract: | Customers continuously evaluate the credibility and reliability of a range of signals both separately and jointly. However, existing econometric studies pay insufficient attention to the interactions and complex combinations of these signals, and are typically limited as a result of difficulties controlling for multicollinearity and endogeneity in their data. We develop a novel theoretical approach to address these issues and study different signaling effects (i.e., word-of-mouth, brand reputation, and distribution strategy) on customer perceptions. Using data on the US video games market, we apply a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to account for cause-effect relationships. The results of our study address a number of key issues in the economics and management literature. First, our results support the contention that reviews from professional critics act as a signal of product quality and therefore positively influence unit sales, as do the discriminatory effects of prices and restricted age ratings. Second, we find evidence to support the use of brand extension strategies as marketing tools that create spillover effects and support the launch of new products. |
| Keywords: | Signaling Theory, Information Asymmetry, Interactions, Fuzzy sets, Qualitative Comparative Analysis, Video Game Industry |
| JEL: | C18 D82 L10 L82 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pdn:ciepap:84&r=ict |
| By: | Ana Mauleon (Saint-Louis University — Brussels); Nils Roehl (University of Paderborn); Vincent Vannetelbosch (CORE, University of Louvain) |
| Abstract: | The objective of the paper is to analyze the formation of social networks where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted here as social networks. Each group is supposed to have specific rules or constitutions governing which members may join or leave it. Given these constitutions, we consider a social network to be stable if no group is modified any more. We provide requirements on constitutions and players’ preferences under which stable social networks are induced for sure. Furthermore, by embedding many-to-many matchings into our setting, we apply our model to job markets with labor unions. To some extent the unions may provide job guarantees and, therefore, have influence on the stability of the job market. |
| Keywords: | Social networks, Constitutions, Stability, Many-to-Many Matchings. |
| JEL: | C72 C78 D85 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pdn:ciepap:74&r=ict |
| By: | Dirk Bergemann (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Stephen Morris (Dept. of Economics, Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is characterized and shown to be equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibria which we dub Bayes correlated equilibria. A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game, given by actions sets and payoff functions, and an information structure. We introduce a partial order on many player information structures -- which we call individual sufficiency -- under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. We discuss the relation of the solution concept to alternative definitions of correlated equilibrium in incomplete information games and of the partial order on information structures to others, including Blackwell's for the single player case. |
| Keywords: | Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering |
| JEL: | C72 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1909r&r=ict |