nep-ict New Economics Papers
on Information and Communication Technologies
Issue of 2014‒04‒11
seven papers chosen by
Walter Frisch
University Vienna

  1. Wake up, FCC: The Internet Protocol transition is now By Richard Bennett
  2. How ICT Investment and Energy Use Influence the Productivity of Korean Industries By Khayyat, Nabaz T.; Lee, Jongsu; Heshmati, Almas
  3. The Determinants Of Online Merchant’s Price Premium: Evidence From Russia By Evgeny A. Antipov
  4. Private or Public Law Enforcement? The Case of Digital Piracy Policies with Non-monitored Illegal Behaviors By Éric Darmon; Thomas Le Texier
  5. Open Source, Dual Licensing and Software Competition By Éric Darmon; Dominique TORRE
  6. Welfare Effects of Endogenous Copyright Enforcement - the Case of Digital Goods By Markus Pasche
  7. Regulation of Network Sectors in the EU: A Federalist Perspective By Wolfgang Kerber; Julia Wendel

  1. By: Richard Bennett (American Enterprise Institute)
    Abstract: American citizens are far ahead of government agencies and holdout populations such as the elderly in transitioning to new networking technologies. The FCC should revise its Internet Protocol Technology Transitions Order to, among other things, accelerate the adoption of IP technologies in the realms of public safety, defense, and aviation.
    Keywords: network services,government,FCC,Broadband networks,Broadband access
    JEL: A O
    Date: 2014–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aei:rpaper:40736&r=ict
  2. By: Khayyat, Nabaz T. (Seoul National University); Lee, Jongsu (Seoul National University); Heshmati, Almas (Sogang University)
    Abstract: This empirical study examines changes in industrial productivity in Korea between 1980 and 2009, focusing on how investment in information and communication technology (ICT) and energy use, influence productivity levels. A dynamic factor demand model is applied in order to link inter-temporal production decisions by explicitly recognizing that the level of certain factors of production cannot be changed without incurring so-called adjustment costs, defined in terms of forgone output from current production. In particular, we investigate how the ICT–energy relationship affects total factor productivity growth in 30 industrial sectors. Describing industry-specific productivity levels is important for policymakers when the allocation of public investment and support is limited. The results presented herein show that ICT/non-ICT capital investment are substitutes for labor and energy use. We also find a high output growth rate in the sampled sectors, and increasing returns to scale, whose effects on the TFP component are higher than those of technological progress.
    Keywords: dynamic factor demand, panel data, ICT investment, energy use, productivity
    JEL: C32 C33 Q41
    Date: 2014–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8080&r=ict
  3. By: Evgeny A. Antipov (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    Abstract: Some Internet stores manage to charge prices that are significantly higher than market averages, therefore, obtaining some sort of price premium. This paper is dedicated to building a model that can be used to explain and predict a typical price premium that an Internet store charges for a specific product based on the information about the characteristics of the store and the features of the market for this product. Such models can provide support for pricing and assortment decisions: in particular, they allow detecting products that a store is likely to sell with the highest or the lowest markup based on price premia that are charged by stores with similar characteristics on similar markets
    Keywords: hierarchical linear modeling, e-Commerce, price dispersion
    JEL: L81
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:19man2014&r=ict
  4. By: Éric Darmon (CREM UMR CNRS 6211, University of Rennes 1, France); Thomas Le Texier (CREM UMR CNRS 6211, University of Rennes 1, France)
    Abstract: In the case of digital piracy should rights be publicly or privately enforced? The emergence of large-scale anti-piracy laws and the existence of non-monitored illegal channels raise important issues for the design of digital anti-piracy policies. In this paper, we study the impact of these two enforcement settings (public vs. private) in the presence of an illegal non-monitored outside option for users. Taking account of market outcomes, we show that in both cases, the optimal strategies of the legal seller and the monitoring authority leads to rejection of the outside option out while accommodating to the presence of illegal monitored channels. Compared to private enforcement, public enforcement generates higher monitoring levels and lower price levels. Public enforcement also generates greater (legal) welfare. However, we identify potential con ict of interests between the legal seller and the social planner when the eciency of non monitored networks is low. We provide some insights into the role of supply side anti-piracy policies.
    Keywords: copyright infringement, law enforcement, digital piracy, illegal file-sharing, illegal behavior deterrence
    JEL: D23 D78 K42
    Date: 2014–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201403&r=ict
  5. By: Éric Darmon (CREM UMR CNRS 6211, University of Rennes 1, France); Dominique TORRE (GREDEG CNRS, Universite Nice Sophia-Antipolis, France)
    Abstract: To distribute software, commercial vendors of proprietary software have the opportunity to use some dual licensing (DL) strategy i.e. to provide their software under two different licensing terms (proprietary and open source). We investigate the relevance and impacts of this distribution strategy in the presence of an incumbent open source software competitor. We determine the conditions for this strategy to be protable for the commercial rm and its impact on price, market shares and welfare. We show that dual licensing may be used as a complement for proprietary software when development spillovers are large. We examine how, in this case, a dual licensing strategy can be used to exclude the open source software from the market and how this is compatible with higher price and lower market share for the proprietary distribution. This situation can also generate conflicts of interests between proprietary software and users resulting in sub-optimal outcomes. Finally, our analysis reveals the key role played by development spillovers and software compatibility for the DL decision.
    Keywords: dual licensing, hybrid business model, software distribution strategy, open source spillover
    JEL: D23 D42 L86
    Date: 2014–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201405&r=ict
  6. By: Markus Pasche (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena)
    Abstract: In case of digital goods such like music, intellectual property rights are typically not exerted by the creators (artists) but by intermediaries. Their profits, and therefore also the income of the artists, are endangered by copyright infringements (piracy). It is well known from static welfare analysis that to some extent piracy reduces the deadweight loss by limiting monopoly power and could therefore increase welfare. This paper contributes to the discussion by including the costs of law enforcement into the welfare analysis. Most models in the literature assume that law is enforced by governmental activities. In contrast, this paper considers that law enforcement is exerted by agents (e.g. lawyer chancellories, provider of screening technologies) which are also seen as intermediaries. The enforcement effort is therefore endogenously determined. It is shown that this will lead to suboptimal welfare outcomes. A social planner has to regulate punishment and enforcement effort to a moderate level. A more rigorous fight against piracy could only be justified by negative dynamic welfare effects due to a loss of creativity. However, there is no empirical evidence for that.
    Keywords: digital goods, music, piracy, copyright, intermediation, law en- forcement, welfare
    JEL: D60 L12 K11 K42
    Date: 2014–03–31
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-008&r=ict
  7. By: Wolfgang Kerber (University of Marburg); Julia Wendel (University of Marburg)
    Abstract: The vertical allocation of regulatory powers within the European two-level system of network sector regulation is analysed from the perspective of the economic theory of legal federalism. The analysis shows that sophisticated combinations of harmonised European rules along with sufficient scope for decentralised decisions of national regulators seem to be optimal. Especially interesting is that networks of regulatory authorities (as BEREC in telecommunications) can play an important role in regard to balancing the advantages and disadvantages of (de)centralisation. Whereas in regard to telecommunication a further shifting of regulatory powers to the EU level cannot be recommended, both in energy and railway markets it might still be necessary to strengthen the regulatory power of the EU.
    Keywords: EU sector regulation, legal federalism, regulatory networks, telecommunication
    JEL: K23 H77 F15
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201422&r=ict

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