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on Information and Communication Technologies |
| By: | Marie-Joëlle Browaeys,; Stephanus Eko Wahyudi (Nyenrode Business Universiteit) |
| Abstract: | E-learning should be approached via a new paradigm, one where instruction and information are involved in a recursive process, an approach which counters the concept of linearity. New ways of thinking about how people learn and new technologies favour the emergence of principles of e-learning that deliver both business and individual opportunities. In this paper we develop a vision of what learning will look like in the future and a clearer idea of technological opportunities for the promotion of new e-learning. |
| Keywords: | e-learning, learning, knowledge, technology, paradigm, complexity |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:nijrep:2006-01&r=ict |
| By: | Lee, Minkyu (Seoul National University); Heshmati, Almas (Ratio) |
| Abstract: | The paper introduces a dynamic, flexible partial-adjustment model and uses it to analyze the diffusion of Internet connectivity. It specifies and estimates desired levels of Internet diffusion and the speed at which countries achieve the target levels. The target levels and speed of adjustment are both country and time specific. Factors affecting Internet diffusion across countries are identified, and, using nonlinear least squares, the Gompertz growth model is generalized and estimated using data on Internet users for 59 countries observed over the years 1995 to 2002. The empirical results show that infrastructure variables such as personal computer ownership and telephone service increase the equilibrium level of internet diffusion. The speed of adjustment toward a target level decreases over time. Regarding model performance, the generalized dynamic Gompertz model that accounts for unobserved country heterogeneity effects outperforms other, simpler and static model specifications. |
| Keywords: | technology diffusion; Internet; panel data; technology adoption; Gompertz model |
| JEL: | C23 L86 L96 O33 O57 |
| Date: | 2006–05–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0099&r=ict |
| By: | Fabio Mendez; Facundo Sepulveda |
| Abstract: | We study an economy where agents are heterogeneous in entrepreneurial ability, and may decide to become workers or entrepreneurs. The government is motivated by a production externality to impose regulations on entrepreneurship, and sets a level of red tape -administered by public officials-to test regulation compliance. In an environment where some officials are corrupt, we study what are the optimal levels of regulations and red tape, and to what extent such policies reduce the welfare losses created by corruption. For each level of externalities, we find that high and low levels of corruption create qualitatively different distortions, which in turn changes the nature and reach of optimal policies. Under low levels of corruption and externalities, the government sets low levels of regulations and minimal red tape, and with these policies achieves the first best allocation. When externalities and corruption are above a threshold, only a second best allocation can be achieved. Moreover, when externalities are large, mandating higher levels of red tape is a Pareto improving policy. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, optimal policy, red tape, regulations. |
| JEL: | D73 D60 D63 H21 |
| Date: | 2006–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:auu:dpaper:515&r=ict |