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on Insurance Economics |
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Issue of 2020‒09‒21
27 papers chosen by Soumitra K. Mallick Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management |
| By: | Van der Aa, Maartje J.; Paulus, Aggie T.G.; Klosse, Saskia; Evers, Silvia M.A.A.; Maarse, Johannes A. M. |
| Abstract: | Context: Throughout Europe, the financial risks of health and long-term care are covered to varying degrees through models of national (health) insurance. Such insurance draws upon the principle of solidarity. Much is unknown on the solidarity-effects of reforms in national insurance schemes. Objective: To present an empirical analysis of the effects of recent reforms in national health insurance on solidarity in one country. Methods: We conducted a comparative analysis of the 2006 health care insurance reform and the 2015 long-term care insurance reform in the Netherlands. A multidimensional analytical framework of solidarity was developed to study the solidarity-effects of both reforms. Findings: Reforms of health care and long-term care insurance in the Netherlands had some solidarity effects, but they should not be overstated. We found evidence for increased and decreased solidarity. Health care insurance seems more ‘immune’ to reductions in solidarity than long-term care insurance. Limitations: The present case study involves reforms in the Netherlands. The solidarity framework is specifically designed for the study of solidarity-effects of reforms on national health and long-term care insurance. Effects on informal arrangements for care are beyond the scope of this study. More detailed and quantitative research is required to investigate how the reforms played out for specific groups, for instance the frail elderly, people with a disability and people with rare conditions. Similarly, long-term effects require further investigation. Implications: Given the limited scope of our analysis, more comparative research (including on an international scale) is required to develop systematic insight into the solidarity-effects of reforms in national health and long-term care insurance. |
| Keywords: | solidarity; health care insurance; long-term insurance; Netherlands |
| JEL: | E6 |
| Date: | 2019–11–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:106225&r=all |
| By: | Falilou Fall; Andre Steenkamp |
| Abstract: | South Africa has an incomplete social protection system without a mandatory pension savings scheme. Designing a universal insurance pension system would allow to reduce the important government funded pension grant system and ensure that the old-age population has decent income. Only 40% of employees are contributing to a form of saving-retirement scheme, with often a low pension. Moreover, South Africa has a dual, public and private, health care system. Half of the country’s health-care spending goes to the private sector, which covers only 16% of the population. Moreover, the health care system fails to deliver affordable quality services. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the unequal distribution of health care services between public and private health providers. Around 70% of critical care beds available were in the private health care sector. Finally, the sizeable unconditional cash transfer system though reaching a large share of the population fail to lift many children in the poorest families above the poverty line. |
| Keywords: | Health, Pension, Social Protection, Unemployment Insurance |
| JEL: | H51 H55 I13 I18 I38 J32 J65 |
| Date: | 2020–09–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:1620-en&r=all |
| By: | Guinnane, Timothy; Streb, Jochen |
| Abstract: | Economists have long argued that introducing social insurance will reduce fertility. The hypothesis relies on standard models: if children are desirable in part because they provide security in case of disability or old age, then state programs that provide insurance against these events should induce couples to substitute away from children in the allocation of wealth. We test this claim using the introduction of social insurance in Germany in the 1880s and 1890s. Bismarck's social-insurance system provided health insurance, workplace-accident insurance, and old age pensions to a majority of the working population. The German case appeals because the social insurance program started on a large scale and was compulsory for covered classes of workers, and because fertility in Germany in this period was still relatively high. Focusing on the state of Prussia, we estimate differences-in-differences models that ask whether marriage and marital fertility reacted to the introduction or extension of the main social insurance programs. For Prussia as a whole we find little impact. |
| Keywords: | fertility transition,marriage pattern,old-age pension,health insurance,accident insurance |
| JEL: | J13 H55 N33 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:pp1859:13&r=all |
| By: | Priyanka Anand; Yonatan Ben-Shalom; Eric Schone |
| Abstract: | The authors use data from the 2012-2015 TRICARE Standard Survey to examine factors that affect civilian health care providers’ acceptance of patients covered by the U.S. Department of Defense’s TRICARE insurance program and Medicare. |
| Keywords: | TRICARE, Medicare, provider acceptance, health care provider survey |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:8c01fca965c04e89b8b6851924b9ab1e&r=all |
| By: | Gibson, Matthew (Williams College); Mullins, Jamie (University of Massachusetts Amherst) |
| Abstract: | Applying a difference-in-differences framework to a census of residential property transactions in New York City 2003-2017, we estimate the price effects of three flood risk signals: 1) the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act, which increased premiums; 2) Hurricane Sandy; and 3) new floodplain maps reflecting three decades of climate change. Estimates are negative for all three signals and some are large: properties included in the new floodplain after escaping flooding by Sandy experienced 11 percent price reductions. We investigate possible mechanisms, including selection of properties into the market and residential sorting. Finding no evidence for these, we develop a parsimonious theoretical model that allows decomposition of our reduced-form estimates into the effects of insurance premium changes and belief updating. Results suggest the new maps induced belief changes comparable to those from insurance reform. |
| Keywords: | beliefs, updating, climate change, flood risk |
| JEL: | Q54 Q58 R30 G22 |
| Date: | 2020–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13553&r=all |
| By: | David Alary (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Catherine Bobtcheff (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Carole Haritchabalet (CATT - Centre d'Analyse Théorique et de Traitement des données économiques - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores how insurance companies can coordinate to extend their joint capacity for the coverage of new and undiversifiable risks. The undiversifiable nature of such risks causes a shortage of insurance capacity and their limited knowledge makes learning and information sharing necessary. We develop a unified theoretical model to analyse co-insurance agreements. We show that organizing this insurance supply amounts to sharing a common value divisible good between capacity constrained and privately informed insurers with a reserve price. Coinsurance via the creation of an insurance pool turns out to operate as a uniform price auction with an "exit/re-entry" option. We compare it to a discriminatory auction for which no specific agreements are needed. Both auction formats lead to different coverage/premium tradeoffs. If at least one insurer provides an optimistic expertise about the risk, the pool offers higher coverage. This result is reversed when all insurers are pessimistic about the risk. Static comparative results with respect to the severity of the capacity constraints and the reserve price are provided. In the case of completely new risks, a regulator aiming at maximizing the expected coverage should promote the pool when the reserve price is low enough or when competition is high enough. |
| Keywords: | reserve price,competition,common value divisible good auctions,undiversifiable and new risks,Coinsurance |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-02928816&r=all |
| By: | David Alary (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Catherine Bobtcheff (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Carole Haritchabalet (CATT - Centre d'Analyse Théorique et de Traitement des données économiques - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores how insurance companies can coordinate to extend their joint capacity for the coverage of new and undiversifiable risks. The undiversifiable nature of such risks causes a shortage of insurance capacity and their limited knowledge makes learning and information sharing necessary. We develop a unified theoretical model to analyse co-insurance agreements. We show that organizing this insurance supply amounts to sharing a common value divisible good between capacity constrained and privately informed insurers with a reserve price. Coinsurance via the creation of an insurance pool turns out to operate as a uniform price auction with an "exit/re-entry" option. We compare it to a discriminatory auction for which no specific agreements are needed. Both auction formats lead to different coverage/premium tradeoffs. If at least one insurer provides an optimistic expertise about the risk, the pool offers higher coverage. This result is reversed when all insurers are pessimistic about the risk. Static comparative results with respect to the severity of the capacity constraints and the reserve price are provided. In the case of completely new risks, a regulator aiming at maximizing the expected coverage should promote the pool when the reserve price is low enough or when competition is high enough. |
| Keywords: | reserve price,competition,common value divisible good auctions,undiversifiable and new risks,Coinsurance |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02928816&r=all |
| By: | Bastian Schulz; Fabian Siuda |
| Abstract: | Marriage and divorce decisions are influenced by the institutional environment they are made in. One example is the social insurance system, which acts as a substitute for within-household insurance against economic shocks. In this paper, we quantify the importance of household-level insurance for marriage and divorce by exploiting an exogenous increase in the need for risk sharing: in January 2003, a German labor market reform sharply reduced means-testing exemptions in the unemployment insurance system and thereby increased the extent to which spouses have to insure each other against unemployment. Using social security register data, we show that the extent to which (potential) spouses were affected by this reform varies with nationality. We them follow a differences-in-differences identification strategy and use data on all marriages and divorces in Germany between 1997 and 2013 to show that increased means testing made the formation of interethnic marriages significantly less attractive. At the same time, the reform increased the stability of newly-formed interethnic marriages. |
| Keywords: | marriage, divorce, interethnic marriage, risk sharing, unemployment insurance, labor market reforms, EU expansion |
| JEL: | J10 J12 J15 J64 J65 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8508&r=all |
| By: | Michael Geruso; Timothy J. Layton; Jacob Wallace |
| Abstract: | Exploiting random assignment of Medicaid beneficiaries to managed care plans, we identify plan-specific effects on healthcare utilization. Auto-assignment to the lowest-spending plan generates 30% lower spending than if the same enrollee were assigned to the highest-spending plan, despite identical cost-sharing. Effects via quantities, rather than differences in negotiated prices, explain these patterns. Rather than reducing “wasteful” spending, low-spending plans cause broad reductions in the use of medical services—including low-cost, high-value care—and worsen beneficiary satisfaction and health. Supply side tools circumvent the classic trade-off between financial risk protection and moral hazard, but give rise instead to a cost/quality trade-off. |
| JEL: | H75 I11 I13 |
| Date: | 2020–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27762&r=all |
| By: | Asongu, Simplice A; Odhiambo, Nicholas M |
| Abstract: | In this study, we examine how insurance affects income inequality in sub-Saharan Africa, using data from 42 countries during the period 2004-2014. Three inequality variables are used, namely: the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson index and the Palma ratio. Two insurance premiums are employed, namely: life insurance and non-life insurance. The empirical evidence is based on the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Life insurance increases the Gini coefficient and increasing life insurance has a net positive effect on the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson index. Non-life insurance reduces the Gini coefficient and increasing non-life insurance has a net positive effect on the Palma ratio. The analysis is extended to establish policy thresholds at which increasing insurance premiums completely dampen the net positive effects. From the extended analysis, 7.500 of life insurance premiums (% of GDP) is the critical mass required for life insurance to negatively affect inequality, while 0.855 of non-life insurance premiums (% of GDP) is the threshold required for non-life insurance to negatively affect inequality. Policy thresholds are provided at which insurance penetration decreases income inequality in sub-Saharan Africa. |
| Keywords: | Insurance; Inclusive development; Africa; Sustainable Development |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uza:wpaper:26634&r=all |
| By: | Asongu, Simplice A; Odhiambo, Nicholas M |
| Abstract: | In this study, we assess the relevance of decreasing information asymmetry on life and non-life insurance consumption, by using data from 48 African countries during the period 2004-2014. Reduced information asymmetry is proxied by information sharing offices, namely: public credit registries and private credit bureaus. The empirical evidence is based on the Generalised Method of Moments. The findings show that information sharing offices increase insurance consumption with a comparatively higher magnitude in life insurance penetration, relative to non-life insurance penetration. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed. |
| Keywords: | Insurance; Information Asymmetry |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uza:wpaper:26639&r=all |
| By: | Delia Coculescu; Freddy Delbaen |
| Abstract: | We use the theory of cooperative games for the design of fair insurance contracts. An insurance contract needs to specify the premium to be paid and a possible participation in the benefit (or surplus) of the company. It results from the analysis that when a contract is exposed to the default risk of the insurance company, ex-ante equilibrium considerations require a certain participation in the benefit of the company to be specified in the contracts. The fair benefit participation of agents appears as an outcome of a game involving the residual risks induced by the default possibility and using fuzzy coalitions. |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2009.04408&r=all |
| By: | Zhao, Shuoli; Skevas, Teo; Chai, Yuan; Tack, Jesse B. |
| Keywords: | Risk and Uncertainty, Production Economics, Agricultural and Food Policy |
| Date: | 2020–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea20:304574&r=all |
| By: | Andrew E. Clark (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Conchita d'Ambrosio (University of Luxembourg [Luxembourg]); Anthony Lepinteur (University of Luxembourg [Luxembourg]) |
| Abstract: | Job insecurity is one type of risk that workers face on the labour market. As with any risk, individuals can choose to insure against it. We consider marriage as potential insurance against labour-market risk. The 1999 rise in the French Delalande layoff tax for older workers produced an exogenous rise in job insecurity for younger workers. A difference-in-differences estimation in panel data reveals that this greater job insecurity for the under-50s led to a significant rise in their probability of marriage, and especially with partners who had greater job security, consistent with marriage providing insurance on the labour market. |
| Keywords: | Marriage,Insurance,Employment Protection,Perceived Job Security,Difference-in-Differences |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02933888&r=all |
| By: | Andrew E. Clark (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Conchita d'Ambrosio (University of Luxembourg [Luxembourg]); Anthony Lepinteur (University of Luxembourg [Luxembourg]) |
| Abstract: | Job insecurity is one type of risk that workers face on the labour market. As with any risk, individuals can choose to insure against it. We consider marriage as potential insurance against labour-market risk. The 1999 rise in the French Delalande layoff tax for older workers produced an exogenous rise in job insecurity for younger workers. A difference-in-differences estimation in panel data reveals that this greater job insecurity for the under-50s led to a significant rise in their probability of marriage, and especially with partners who had greater job security, consistent with marriage providing insurance on the labour market. |
| Keywords: | Marriage,Insurance,Employment Protection,Perceived Job Security,Difference-in-Differences |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-02933888&r=all |
| By: | Ganglmair, Bernhard; Helmers, Christian; Love, Brian J. |
| Abstract: | We analyze the extent to which private defensive litigation insurance deters patent assertion by non-practicing entities (NPEs). We study the effect that a patent-specific defensive insurance product, offered by a leading litigation insurer, had on the litigation behavior of insured patents' owners, all of which are NPEs. We first model the impact of defensive litigation insurance on the behavior of patent enforcers and accused infringers. We show that the availability of defensive litigation insurance can have an effect on how often patent enforcers will assert their patents. We confirm this result empirically showing that the insurance policy had a large, negative effect on the likelihood that a patent included in the policy was subsequently asserted relative to other patents held by the same NPEs and relative to patents held by other NPEs with portfolios that were entirely excluded from the insurance product. Our findings suggest that market-based mechanisms can deter so-called "patent trolling." |
| Keywords: | NPEs,patents,insurance,litigation |
| JEL: | G22 K41 O34 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:20037&r=all |
| By: | Lu, Pin; Hennessy, David A.; Feng, Hongli; Yu, Cindy L. |
| Keywords: | Risk and Uncertainty, Agricultural Finance, Demand and Price Analysis |
| Date: | 2020–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea20:304251&r=all |
| By: | Yonatan Ben-Shalom; Megan McIntyre; Jia Pu; Marisa Shenk; Wenjia Zhu; William Shaw |
| Abstract: | This environmental scan identifies existing policies, strategies, and practices for opioid prescription management and evidence on their effectiveness. It covers approaches implemented in workers’ compensation and other health care settings, such as health insurance programs and health care systems. |
| Keywords: | opioids, prescription management, workers’ compensation, environmental scan |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:47a571e0762b43389e5f8e2b3ff2222b&r=all |
| By: | Isaac Swensen ⓡ; Jason M. Lindo ⓡ; Krishna Regmi |
| Abstract: | We document the effect of unemployment insurance generosity on divorce and fertility, using an identification strategy that leverages state-level changes in maximum benefits over time and comparisons across workers who have been laid off and those that have not been laid off. The results indicate that higher benefit levels reduce the probability of divorce and increase the probability of having children for laid-off men. In contrast, for laid-off women we find little evidence of effects of unemployment insurance generosity on divorce and we find suggestive evidence that it reduces their fertility. |
| JEL: | H53 I38 J12 J13 J16 J65 |
| Date: | 2020–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27753&r=all |
| By: | Lima Miquelluti, Daniel; Ozaki, Vitor; Miquelluti, David J. |
| Keywords: | Agricultural Finance, Risk and Uncertainty, Research Methods/Statistical Methods |
| Date: | 2020–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea20:304288&r=all |
| By: | Dietz, Simon; Niehörster, Falk |
| Abstract: | Ambiguity about the probability of loss is a salient feature of catastrophe risk insurance. Evidence shows that insurers charge higher premiums under ambiguity, but that they rely on simple heuristics to do so, rather than being able to turn to pricing tools that formally link ambiguity with the insurer’s underlying economic objective. In this paper, we apply an α-maxmin model of insurance pricing to two catastrophe model data sets relating to hurricane risk. The pricing model considers an insurer who maximises expected profit, but is sensitive to how ambiguity affects its risk of ruin. We estimate ambiguity loads and show how these depend on the insurer’s attitude to ambiguity, α. We also compare these results with those derived from applying model blending techniques that have recently gained popularity in the actuarial profession, and show that model blending can imply relatively low aversion to ambiguity, possibly ambiguity seeking. |
| Keywords: | ambiguity; catastrophe modelling; insurance; model blending; natural disasters; ES/R009708/1 |
| JEL: | D81 G22 Q54 |
| Date: | 2020–08–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:106116&r=all |
| By: | Stefan Gerhold |
| Abstract: | We study large and moderate deviations for a life insurance portfolio, without assuming identically distributed losses. The crucial assumption is that losses are bounded, and that variances are bounded below. From a standard large deviations upper bound, we get an exponential bound for the probability of the average loss exceeding a threshold. A counterexample shows that a full large deviation principle does not follow from our assumptions. |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2009.01644&r=all |
| By: | Christodoulakis, Nicos |
| Abstract: | Despite deep cuts in pensions recently implemented in Greece, the social insurance system is still characterized by a multitude of problems—financial, social, and organizational. These make it counterproductive in improving intragenerational inequality and intergenerational fairness, while its bureaucratic complexity makes the planning and implementation of reforms a difficult task. The aim of the paper is, first, to describe the long-term adverse dynamics and, second, to suggest a road map of changes that ensure a fairer treatment among the various categories of pensioners as well as between them and current generation employees. |
| JEL: | F3 G3 |
| Date: | 2018–09–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:100289&r=all |
| By: | Tzougas, George |
| Abstract: | This article presents the Poisson-Inverse Gamma regression model with varying dispersion for approximating heavy-tailed and overdispersed claim counts. Our main contribution is that we develop an Expectation-Maximization (EM) type algorithm for maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of the Poisson-Inverse Gamma regression model with varying dispersion. The empirical analysis examines a portfolio of motor insurance data in order to investigate the efficiency of the proposed algorithm. Finally, both the a priori and a posteriori, or Bonus-Malus, premium rates that are determined by the Poisson-Inverse Gamma model are compared to those that result from the classic Negative Binomial Type I and the Poisson-Inverse Gaussian distributions with regression structures for their mean and dispersion parameters. |
| Keywords: | poisson-inverse gamma distribution; em algorithm; regression models for mean and dispersion parameters; motor third party liability insurance; ratemaking |
| JEL: | C1 |
| Date: | 2020–09–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:106539&r=all |
| By: | Costa-Font, Joan; Zigante, Valentina |
| Abstract: | The design of public subsidies for long-term care (LTC) programmes to support frail, elderly individuals in Europe is subject to both tight budget constraints and increasing demand preassures for care. However, what helps overcoming the constraints that modify LTC entitlements? We provide a unifying explanation of the conditions that facilitate the modifcation of public fnancial entitlements to LTC. We build on the concept of ‘implicit partnerships’, an implicit (or ‘silent’) agreement, encompassing the fnancial co-participation of both public funders, and families either by both allocating time and/or fnancial resources to caregiving. Next, we provide suggestive evidence of policy reforms modifying public entitlements in seven European countries which can be classifed as either ‘implicit user partnerships’ or ‘implicit caregiver partnerships’. Finally, we show that taxpayers attitudes mirror the specifc type of implicit partnership each country has adopted. Hence, we conclude that the modifcation of long-term care entitlements require the formation of some type of ‘implicit partnership’. |
| Keywords: | implicit partnership; user partnership; caregiver partnership; partial insurance; cost sharing; long-term care; financial sustainability; family; Europe; Springer |
| JEL: | E6 |
| Date: | 2020–09–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:106099&r=all |
| By: | COSAERT Sam; THELOUDIS Alexandros; VERHEYDEN Bertrand |
| Abstract: | Spending time together with a spouse is a major gain from marriage. We extend the classical collective model of the household to allow for togetherness between spouses. Togetherness takes the form of joint leisure and joint care for children. Using revealed preferences conditions, we find that Dutch households are willing to pay €1.2 per hour -10% of the average wage- to convert private leisure to joint, and €2.1 per hour to convert private childcare to joint. Our results suggest that togetherness is an important component of household time use despite it being overlooked in the economics literature. |
| Keywords: | Joint leisure; joint childcare; private time use; collective model; irregular work; family labor supply; revealed preferences; LISS |
| JEL: | D11 D12 D13 J22 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irs:cepswp:2020-01&r=all |
| By: | Tambakis, D. |
| Abstract: | This study nests historical evidence for credit growth-fuelled financial instability in a 2-state non-homogeneous Markov chain with logistic crisis incidence. A long-run frequency measure is defined and calibrated for 17 advanced economies from 1870-2016. It is found that historical (implied) crisis frequencies display a V (J )-pattern over time. A key implication is that policies strengthening capital adequacy contribute more to systemic stability than expanding deposit insurance or curbing credit booms. |
| Keywords: | Credit cycle, Systemic banking crises, Markov chain |
| JEL: | C15 E30 E58 G01 |
| Date: | 2020–09–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2083&r=all |