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on Insurance Economics |
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Issue of 2013‒09‒24
eight papers chosen by Soumitra K Mallick Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management |
| By: | International Monetary Fund. European Dept. |
| Keywords: | Financial institutions;Banks;Insurance;Bank supervision;Insurance supervision;Financial Sector Assessment Program;Belgium; |
| Date: | 2013–05–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:13/138&r=ias |
| By: | International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department |
| Keywords: | Financial Sector Assessment Program;European Union;Insurance supervision;Pension supervision;Stress testing;European Economic and Monetary Union;Europe; |
| Date: | 2013–03–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:13/73&r=ias |
| By: | International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department |
| Keywords: | Financial Sector Assessment Program;Deposit insurance;Banking sector;Islamic banking;Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes;Malaysia; |
| Date: | 2013–03–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:13/60&r=ias |
| By: | International Monetary Fund. Asia and Pacific Dept |
| Keywords: | Financial sector;Banks;Islamic banking;Financial institutions;Bank supervision;Bank resolution;Liquidity management;Deposit insurance;Risk management;Anti-money laundering;Combating the financing of terrorism;Financial system stability assessment;Malaysia; |
| Date: | 2013–02–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:13/52&r=ias |
| By: | International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department |
| Keywords: | Bank resolution;Central bank role;Bank supervision;Deposit insurance;Risk management;Crisis prevention;International cooperation;Financial Sector Assessment Program;France; |
| Date: | 2013–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:13/186&r=ias |
| By: | Craig, Steven G.; Hemissi, Wided; Mukherjee, Satadru; Sørensen, Bent E |
| Abstract: | This paper successfully fits a model of forward looking government savings behavior to data from the U.S. state Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs 1976-2008. Specifically, we find states do not perfectly smooth tax rates in Barro's sense, but follow behavior consistent with a buffer stock model where politicians trade-off their desire to immediately expend all savings against the fear of running out of funds. We find that states increase benefits or lower taxes when savings balances are high. State UI budgets, as rationalized by the buffer stock model, display surpluses that are more pro-cyclical than Barro's model would imply but substantially less cyclical than contemporaneous budget balance. |
| Keywords: | forward looking politicians; impatience; precautionary saving |
| JEL: | E21 H11 H74 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9520&r=ias |
| By: | Pashchenko, Svetlana; Porapakkarm, Ponpoje |
| Abstract: | Having low income is one of the requirements for Medicaid eligibility. Given that earning ability is unobservable, once an individual with high labor income stops working it is impossible to distinguish him from those whose potential labor income is low. This can affect the ability of Medicaid to target the most disadvantaged people given that a large fraction of its beneficiaries do not work. In this paper we ask two questions: 1) Does Medicaid significantly distort work incentives? 2) Can the insurance-incentives trade-off of Medicaid be improved without changing the size of the redistribution in the economy? Our tool is a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents calibrated using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Dataset to match the life-cycle patterns of employment and insurance take-up behavior as well as the key aggregate statistics. We find that around 20% of Medicaid enrollees do not work in order to be eligible. These distortions are costly for the economy: if Medicaid eligibility could be linked to (unobservable) productivity the resulting ex-ante welfare gains are equivalent to 1.5% of the annual consumption. We show that asset testing can achieve a similar outcome but only if asset limits are allowed to be different for workers and non-workers. |
| Keywords: | health insurance, Medicaid, labor supply, asset testing, general equilibrium, life-cycle models |
| JEL: | D52 D91 E21 H53 I13 I18 |
| Date: | 2013–09–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:49730&r=ias |
| By: | Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul |
| Abstract: | Today’s regulatory rules, especially the easily-manipulated measures of regulatory capital, have led to costly bank failures. We design a robust regulatory system such that (i) bank losses are credibly borne by the private sector (ii) systemically important institutions cannot collapse suddenly; (iii) bank investment is counter-cyclical; and (iv) regulatory actions depend upon market signals (because the simplicity and clarity of such rules prevents gaming by firms, and forbearance by regulators, as well as because of the efficiency role of prices). One key innovation is “ERNs” (equity recourse notes--superficially similar to, but importantly distinct from, “cocos”) which gradually "bail in" equity when needed. Importantly, although our system uses market information, it does not rely on markets being “right”. |
| Keywords: | bail-in; bank; bank capital; bank crisis; capital requirements; contingent capital; contingent convertible bond; debt overhang; deposit insurance; living wills; regulatory capital; regulatory forbearance; SIFI; systemically important financial institution; too-big-to-fail |
| JEL: | G10 G21 G28 G32 |
| Date: | 2013–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9618&r=ias |