nep-ias New Economics Papers
on Insurance Economics
Issue of 2010‒08‒21
five papers chosen by
Soumitra K Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Bussiness Management

  1. Health Insurance Competition: The Effect of Group Contracts By Boone, J.; Douven, R.C.M.H.; Droge, C.; Mosca, I.
  2. Herausbildung erster Wesenszüge des Normalarbeitsverhältnisses in Deutschland By Kendzia, Michael J.
  3. Two Risk-aware Resource Brokering Strategies in Grid Computing:Broker-driven vs. User-driven Methods By Junseok Hwang; Jihyoun Park; Jorn Altmann
  4. Capital Requirements and Credit Rationing By Itai Agur
  5. Les comportements de rachat en Assurance Vie en régime de croisière et en période de crise By Xavier Milhaud; Marie-Pierre Gonon; Stéphane Loisel

  1. By: Boone, J.; Douven, R.C.M.H.; Droge, C.; Mosca, I. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: In countries like the US and the Netherlands health insurance is provided by private firms. These private firms can offer both individual and group contracts. The strategic and welfare implications of such group contracts are not well understood. Using a Dutch data set of about 700 group health insurance contracts over the period 2007-2008, we estimate a model to determine which factors explain the price of group contracts. We find that groups that are located close to an insurers’ home turf pay a higher premium than other groups. This finding is not consistent with the bargaining argument in the literature as it implies that concentrated groups close to an insurer’s home turf should get (if any) a larger discount than other groups. A simple Hotelling model, however, does explain our empirical results.
    Keywords: health insurance;health-plan choice;managed competition
    JEL: I11 L13
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:201055&r=ias
  2. By: Kendzia, Michael J. (IZA)
    Abstract: The paper provides a historical overview of the development of the initial characteristics of the standard employment contract in Germany from the middle of the 19th century until the beginning of World War I. The beginning of the welfare state in Germany took place during the 1880s on the basis of dependent employment. For the analysis of this type of employment, the model of the standard employment contract is used, and the specific factors which determined the rise of the standard employment contract are examined. In the 19th century, wage labour became more and more common and finally displaced the pre-modern allocation of work. After being freed from feudal dependence, the familiar social question arose. In this context, the main driving forces as well as different approaches in solving this question are surveyed. State regulations were implemented to protect the workforce against exploitation by industrial entrepreneurs. Later on, a social insurance system was created to protect workers against basic risks. The paper finds that prior to the establishment of the social insurance system, a number of insurance funds had existed which were financed by worker contributions. Moreover, these insurance funds already contained the essential structural elements of the later Bismarckian welfare system. The paper concludes that at the end of the observed period, dependent, full-time employment subject to social insurance contributions can be identified.
    Keywords: Abhängiges Beschäftigungssystem, Normalarbeitsverhältnis, Soziale Frage, Soziale Sicherung, Bismarck, Sozialversicherungsgesetzgebung
    JEL: J50 J40
    Date: 2010–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5107&r=ias
  3. By: Junseok Hwang; Jihyoun Park; Jorn Altmann (Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program (TEMEP), Seoul National University)
    Abstract: Grid computing evolves toward an open computing environment, which is characterized by highly diversified resource providers and systems. As the control of each computing resource becomes difficult, the security of users¡¯ job is often threatened by various risks occurred at individual resources in the network. This paper proposes two risk-aware resource brokering strategies: self-insurance and risk-performance preference specification. The former is a broker-driven method and the latter a user-driven method. Two mechanisms are analyzed through simulations. The simulation results show that both methods are effective for increasing the market size and reducing risks, but the user-driven technique is more cost-efficient.
    Keywords: Grid Computing, Risk Management, Self-Insurance, Risk-Performance Preference Specification
    JEL: C02 C15 C61 C63 D83 L11 L15 L86 L99 M21
    Date: 2010–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:snv:dp2009:201063&r=ias
  4. By: Itai Agur
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the trade-off between financial stability and credit rationing that arises when increasing capital requirements. It extends the Stiglitz-Weiss model of credit rationing to allow for bank default. Bank capital structure then matters for lending incentives. With default and rationing endogenous, optimal capital requirements can be analyzed. Introducing bank financiers, the paper also shows that uninsured funding raises the sensitivity of rationing to capital requirements. In a world with much wholesale finance, capital requirements have a stronger impact on the real economy. But wholesale finance also amplifies capital requirements’ effect on default rates.
    Keywords: Rationing; Capital requirements; Regulation; Wholesale finance; Deposit Insurance
    JEL: G21 G28
    Date: 2010–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:257&r=ias
  5. By: Xavier Milhaud (SAF - Laboratoire de Sciences Actuarielle et Financière - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I : EA2429, Axa Global Life - AXA); Marie-Pierre Gonon (Actuaris - Actuaris); Stéphane Loisel (SAF - Laboratoire de Sciences Actuarielle et Financière - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I : EA2429)
    Abstract: Nous nous attachons dans cet article à décrire de manière précise le risque de rachat de contrat d'Assurance Vie, plus particulièrement sur le marché des contrats d'épargne. Après avoir proposé un panorama du rachat en France, nous nous attardons sur les enjeux sous-jacents à ce risque et les aspects Solvabilité II en termes de réglementation et d'estimation. Le comportement de rachat des assurés joue un rôle essentiel dans le résultat d'une ligne de produit et sa compréhension permet à l'assureur d'anticiper des possibles vagues de rachats/non-rachat qui peuvent lui être fortement préjudiciables. Ces vagues sont le reflet de l'apparition d'une corrélation naissante entre les comportements des assurés, due à un contexte économique et des conditions financières difficiles. La prise en compte de ces crises de corrélation est un élément clef dont l'assureur doit être conscient dans l'optique d'une bonne gestion du risque de rachat en calculant des provisions techniques prudentielles adaptées.
    Date: 2010–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00502851_v1&r=ias

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