nep-ias New Economics Papers
on Insurance Economics
Issue of 2005‒12‒01
eight papers chosen by
Soumitra K Mallick
Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Bussiness Management
  1. Income Redistribution and Disability Insurance By Juan Carlos Hatchondo; Hugo Hopenhayn
  2. Informal Insurance in Social Networks By Francis Bloch; Garance Genicot
  3. Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment:Public versus Private Provision By Tim Worall; Jonathan P Thomas
  4. Insurance and Opportunities: The Welfare Implications of Rising Wage Dispersion By Jonathan Heathcote; Kjetil Storesletten
  5. Stabilization versus Insurance: Welfare Effects of Procyclical Taxation Under Incomplete Markets By James Costain; Michael Reiter
  6. The demand for health insurance in a multirisk context By Mohamed Anouar Razgallah
  7. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND HUMAN CAPITAL POLICIES By Carlos E. da Costa; Lucas Maestri
  8. Risk Sharing By Martin Gervais; Paul Klein
  1. By: Juan Carlos Hatchondo; Hugo Hopenhayn
    Keywords: Social insurance
    JEL: H21 H31 I38
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:129&r=ias
  2. By: Francis Bloch; Garance Genicot
    Keywords: social networks, informal insurance.
    JEL: D85 D80
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:156&r=ias
  3. By: Tim Worall; Jonathan P Thomas
    Keywords: Social Insurance, Moral Hazard, Limited Commitment, Unemployment Insurance, Crowding Out.
    JEL: D61 H31 H55 J65
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:158&r=ias
  4. By: Jonathan Heathcote (Department of Economics New York University); Kjetil Storesletten
    Keywords: Insurance, Labor supply, Productivity, Wage dispersion, Welfare.
    JEL: D31 D58 D91
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:107&r=ias
  5. By: James Costain (Economics Universidad Carlos III de Madrid); Michael Reiter
    JEL: E32 E62 H21
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:704&r=ias
  6. By: Mohamed Anouar Razgallah (GATE CNRS)
    Abstract: Using a model of bivariate decision under risk, we analyse the health insurance demand when there are two sources of risk: a health risk and an uninsurable one. We examine how the uninsurable risk affects the coverage of the health risk. We show that the determinants of the demand for health insurance are not only the correlation between the health and uninsurable risks as shown by Doherty and Schlesinger (1983a) and the variation of the marginal utility of wealth with respect to the health status (Rey, 2003) but also the way in which the occurrence of the uninsurable risk affects the marginal utility of wealth.
    Keywords: Correlated risks, Health insurance, State-dependent utility
    JEL: D81 I11 I18
    Date: 2005–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:0504&r=ias
  7. By: Carlos E. da Costa; Lucas Maestri
    Abstract: In the presence of an optimally designed unemployment bene.t system we show that it is optimal for the government to encourage human capital acquisition. The driving force of this result is the complementarity between human capital and labor-market- oriented behavior. If policy includes inter-temporal transfers, the optimal level of investment in human capital is given at the point where, at the margin, expected return to human capital is identical to the risk free rate even though there is no full insurance at the optimum.
    JEL: J65 I28
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2005:089&r=ias
  8. By: Martin Gervais; Paul Klein
    Keywords: Risk Sharing; Income Risk; Consumption Risk; Projection
    JEL: C13 C8 D12 E21
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed005:323&r=ias
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