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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Guido Friebel (Goethe University of Frankfurt and CEPR and IZA); Matthias Heinz (University of Cologne and CEPR and Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Mitchell Hoffman (UC Santa Barbara and University of Toronto and NBER and CEPR and IZA); Tobias Kretschmer (LMU Munich and CEPR); Nick Zubanov (University of Konstanz and IZA) |
| Abstract: | In a large German bakery chain, many workers report negative perceptions of monitoring via checklists. We survey workers and managers about the value and time costs to all in-store checklists, leading the firm to randomly remove two of the most perceivedly time-consuming and low-value checklists in half of stores. Sales increase and store manager attrition substantially decreases, and this occurs without a rise in measurable workplace problems. Before random assignment, regional managers predict whether the treatment would be effective for each store they oversee. Ex post, beneficial effects of checklist removal are fully concentrated in stores where regional managers predict the treatment will be effective, reflecting substantial heterogeneity in returns that is well-understood by these upper managers. Effects of checklist removal do not appear to come from workers having more time for production, but rather due to improvements in employee trust and commitment. Following the RCT, the firm implemented firmwide reductions in monitoring, eliminating a checklist regarded as demeaning, but keeping a checklist that helps coordinate production. |
| Keywords: | Monitoring; checklists; respect; time use |
| JEL: | M5 C93 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:304&r= |
| By: | Cowgill, Bo (Columbia Business School); Davis, Jonathan (University of Chicago); Montagnes, B. Pablo (Emory University); Perkowski, Patryk (Yeshiva University) |
| Abstract: | A principal often needs to match agents to perform coordinated tasks, but agents can quit or slack off if they dislike their match. We study two prevalent approaches for matching within organizations: Centralized assignment by firm leaders and self-organization through market-like mechanisms. We provide a formal model of the strengths and weaknesses of both methods under different settings, incentives, and production technologies. The model highlights tradeoffs between match-specific productivity and job satisfaction. We then measure these tradeoffs with data from a large organization's internal talent market. Firm-dictated matches are 33% more valuable than randomly assigned matches within job categories (using the firm's preferred metric of quality). By contrast, preference-based matches (using deferred acceptance) are only 5% better than random but are ranked (on average) about 38 percentiles higher by the workforce. The self-organized match is positively assortative and helps workers grow new skills; the firm's preferred match is negatively assortative and harvests existing expertise. |
| Keywords: | internal labor markets, assortative matching, assignment mechanisms, team formation, matching |
| JEL: | M5 D47 J4 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16986&r= |
| By: | Grosch, Kerstin; Fischer, Sabine |
| Abstract: | This study examines gender differences in overconfidence, focusing on overestimation (individuals’ perception of their performance relative to their actual performance) and overplacement (individuals’ perception relative to the performance perception of others). Conducting large-scale lab experiments with over 1000 participants in Ghana, a non-WEIRD country, we measure overestimation and overplacement in an incentivized manner. Contrary to previous findings, our study reveals no significant gender differences in overestimation in a male-typed task where men outperform women and subjects anticipate this gender difference. Similarly, there are no significant gender differences in overplacement within the same gender. Moreover, individuals who overestimate their performance are more likely to believe they outperformed others, regardless of gender. Overall, results indicate gender equivalence in overconfidence. Notably, gender differences in overplacement emerge only when comparing performance estimates with the opposite gender, with women more inclined to view themselves as inferior to men. |
| Keywords: | Overconfidence; gender differences; lab experiment; Sub-Saharan Africa; null results |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wus055:62979319&r= |
| By: | Fabeienne Jedelhauser (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Raphael Flepp (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Pascal Flurin Meier (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Egon Franck (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | Outcome bias refers to the tendency to overweight the informativeness of observed outcomes in evaluations, consequently underestimating the influence of luck. However, observed outcomes that fall short of expectations simultaneously trigger performance pressure, potentially reinforcing outcome bias in evaluation decisions such as managerial dismissals. Using data from European football, we investigate whether managerial dismissal decisions are influenced by luck operationalized as opponent player injuries and whether this influence is more pronounced under performance pressure. Our findings reveal that luck significantly impacts dismissal decisions, particularly as performance pressure mounts. Importantly, this amplified outcome bias under performance pressure is predominantly driven by instances of bad luck. These results suggest that the extent of outcome bias has been underappreciated, especially in situations involving bad luck. |
| Keywords: | Outcome Bias, Luck, Performance Pressure, Managerial Dismissal, Principal-Agent Setting |
| JEL: | D81 D86 D91 J44 Z2 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zrh:wpaper:402&r= |
| By: | Muehlheusser, Gerd (University of Hamburg); Promann, Timo (University of Hamburg); Roider, Andreas (University of Regensburg); Wallmeier, Niklas (University of Hamburg) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies unethical behavior by groups and provides systematic evidence on how lying decisions are affected by group size and group gender composition. We conduct an online experiment with 1, 677 participants (477 groups) where group members can communicate with each other via a novel video chat tool. Our key findings are that (i) larger groups lie more, (ii) all-male groups stand out in their proclivity to lie, (iii) already the first female in a group causes an honesty shift, and (iv) group behavior cannot be fully explained by members' individual honesty preferences. |
| Keywords: | group decisions, unethical behavior, lying, gender differences, online experiment, group video chat |
| JEL: | C92 J16 D70 |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16954&r= |