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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
By: | Archawa Paweenawat |
Abstract: | This paper studies the effects of hidden savings on the relative benefits of two optimal incentive contracts, namely, relative performance contracts and group contracts. As an analysis framework, this paper develops a dynamic moral hazard model in which agents can secretly save. The results from the model suggest that hidden savings affect relative performance contracts more than they affect group contracts. In addition, under group contracts, agents rely more on risk-sharing networks and less on own savings than they do under relative performance contracts. To test the model’s predictions, this paper uses a unique data set with detailed information on households’ characteristics, their choices of loans, and their responses to liquidity shocks. The empirical results confirm that, in the areas where hidden savings problem is likely to be more severe, households are more likely to choose group loans. In addition, the results also show that households with group loans rely more on networks to prevent themselves from future liquidity shocks. |
Keywords: | Incentive contracts; Unobserved savings; Relative performance; Group lending; Microfinance |
JEL: | D86 G21 G51 |
Date: | 2022–03 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pui:dpaper:176&r= |
By: | Mikhail Drugov (New Economic School and CEPR); Dmitry Ryvkin (Department of Economics, Florida State University); Jun Zhang (Economics Discipline Group, School of Business, University of Technology Sydney) |
Abstract: | We study tournaments where winning a rank-dependent prize requires passing a reserve---a minimum performance standard. Agents' performance is determined by effort and noise. For log-concave noise distributions the optimal reserve is at the modal performance, and the optimal prize scheme is winner-take-all. In contrast, for log-convex noise distributions the optimal reserve is at the lower bound of the distribution of performance, which is passed with probability one in equilibrium, and it is optimal to award equal prizes to all qualifying agents. These pay schemes are optimal in a general class of symmetric monotone contracts that may depend on cardinal performance. |
Keywords: | tournament, reserve performance, prize sharing |
JEL: | C72 D72 D82 |
Date: | 2022–03 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2022_03_01&r= |
By: | Subhadarsini Parida (Curtin University [Perth] - PATREC - Planning and Transport Research Centre, University of South Australia [Adelaide]); Subramaniam Ananthram (Curtin University [Perth] - PATREC - Planning and Transport Research Centre); Christopher Chan (York University [Toronto], ACU - Australian Catholic University, UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes, IGR-IAE Rennes - Institut de Gestion de Rennes - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Rennes - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes); Kerry Brown (ECU - Edith Cowan University) |
Abstract: | Green buildings are synonymous with environmental sustainability; however, it is unclear what role its occupants, specifically employees, play in promoting sustainability in green office buildings. This paper proposes that Green Human Resource Management (HRM), underpinned by Social Identity Theory (SIT), can maximize the potential of green behaviors to improve employees' outcomes (e.g., job satisfaction and work-related flow) in green office buildings by creating positive workplace behaviors (i.e., green behaviors). We collected multisource data from 549 employees and 91 managers working in 17 organizations in green office buildings across Australia. We confirm the double mediation effects of Green HRM, green behaviors and organizational identification on the relationships between organizational readiness, job satisfaction and work-related flow. The paper makes theoretical contributions by advancing the concept of Green HRM and green behaviors within the realm of SIT, thus taking a multidisciplinary stance in the built environment and sustainability literatures. |
Keywords: | Green HRM,Green behaviors,Sustainability,Organizational identification,Job satisfaction and work-related flow |
Date: | 2021–12–20 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03516261&r= |
By: | Hirsch, Boris; Lentge, Philipp; Schnabel, Claus |
Abstract: | In Germany, employers used to pay union members and non-members in a plant the same union wage in order to prevent workers from joining unions. Using recent administrative data, we investigate which workers in firms covered by collective bargaining agreements still individually benefit from these union agreements, which workers are not covered anymore, and what this means for their wages. We show that about 9 percent of workers in plants with collective agreements do not enjoy individual coverage (and thus the union wage) anymore. Econometric analyses with unconditional quantile regressions and firm-fixed-effects estimations demonstrate that not being individually covered by a collective agreement has serious wage implications for most workers. Low-wage non-union workers and those at low hierarchy levels particularly suffer since employers abstain from extending union wages to them in order to pay lower wages. This jeopardizes unions' goal of protecting all disadvantaged workers. |
Keywords: | collective bargaining,union wage,uncovered workers,Germany |
JEL: | J31 J53 |
Date: | 2022 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwqwdp:022022&r= |
By: | Gianluca Busilacchi; Giovanni Gallo; Matteo Luppi |
Abstract: | Over the last two decades, involuntary part-time (IPT) employment has become a more and more pressing issue in Europe, especially in the southern countries, where IPT today constitutes most part-time employment. The dualistic nature of voluntary and involuntary employment creates an opportunity to investigate this type of occupation by looking at the intersection between dualisation and gender. Using INAPP-PLUS data and Probit estimations, this paper aims to shed light on whether the determinants of IPT – at the individual, household and labour market levels – follow the trend of labour dualisation, compared to part-timers in voluntary arrangements. In particular, we aim to determine how dualisation related to these determinants varies according to gender and labour market structural changes. Our results confirm that individual and household characteristics count more than professional ones in determining IPT status, especially concerning the well-known gender differences. However, differentiating the analysis by workers' gender highlights interesting differences pointing at a growing polarisation for female workers driven not only by inequality in the work-family balance distribution but also by structural elements in the labour market. |
Keywords: | Involuntary part-time; gender inequality; dualisation; job determinants; labour market |
JEL: | J16 J40 Z13 |
Date: | 2022–02 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:cappmo:0177&r= |
By: | Alexander Bick; Adam Blandin; Richard Rogerson |
Abstract: | We document two robust features of the cross-sectional distribution of usual weekly hours and hourly wages. First, usual weekly hours are heavily concentrated around 40 hours, while at the same time a substantial share of total hours come from individuals who work more than 50 hours. Second, mean hourly wages are non-monotonic across the usual hours distribution, with a peak at 50 hours. We develop and estimate a model of labor supply to account for these features. The novel feature of our model is that earnings are non-linear in hours, with the extent of nonlinearity varying over the hours distribution. Our estimates imply significant wage penalties for individuals that deviate from 40 hours in either direction, leading to a large mass of individuals that work 40 hours and are not very responsive to shocks. This has important implications for the role of labor supply as a mechanism for self-insurance in a standard heterogeneous agent-incomplete markets model and for empirical strategies designed to estimate labor supply parameters. |
Keywords: | weekly hours; hourly wages |
JEL: | D31 E24 H31 J22 J31 |
Date: | 2021–12 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedlwp:93848&r= |