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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Reggiani, Tommaso G. (Cardiff University); Rilke, Rainer Michael (University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the effects of substitutability of social incentives on the labor supply of gigworkers (N=944) in a natural field experiment. In our treatments, we vary the proportion of the worker's wage that is donated to a social cause. Our experimental design allows us to observe the decision to accept a job (extensive margin) and different dimensions of productivity (intensive margin). The results show that when the worker has to donate small or moderate parts to a prosocial organization, labor supply on the extensive margin remains unaffected, but productivity on the intensive margin increases; when workers have to give larger portions of their wages, labor supply and productivity decrease. When workers have to donate parts of their wages to an antisocial cause, labor supply on the extensive and intensive margin is negatively affected. We discuss the implications of these results for the understanding of social incentives and corporate social responsibility on labor supply. |
| Keywords: | social incentives, labor supply, CSR, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D23 M52 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12905&r=all |
| By: | Nikolaos Theodoropoulos (University of Cyprus); John Forth (Cass Business School, City University of London); Alex Bryson (University College London, National Institute of Social and Economic Research and Institute for the Study of Labor) |
| Abstract: | Using matched employer-employee data from the 2004 and 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS) for Britain we find a raw gender wage gap (GWG) in hourly wages of around 0.18-0.21 log points. The regression-adjusted gap is around half that. However, the GWG declines substantially with the increasing share of female managers in the workplace. The gap closes because women’s wages rise with the share female managers in the workplace while men’s wages fall. Panel and instrumental variables estimates suggest the share of female managers in the workplace has a causal impact in reducing the GWG. The role of female managers in closing the GWG is more pronounced when employees are paid for performance, consistent with the proposition that women are more likely to be paid equitably when managers have discretion in the way they reward performance and those managers are women. These findings suggest a stronger presence of women in managerial positions can help tackle the GWG. |
| Keywords: | gender wage gap; female managers; performance pay |
| JEL: | J16 J31 M52 M54 |
| Date: | 2019–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qss:dqsswp:1907&r=all |
| By: | Brice Corgnet (Univ Lyon, emlyon business school, GATE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France); Brian Gunia (Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University, 100 International Drive Baltimore, MD 21202, USA); Roberto Hernán González (CEREN EA 7477, Burgundy School of Business, Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté, Dijon, France) |
| Abstract: | We study several solutions to shirking in teams that trigger social incentives by reshaping the workplace social context. Using an experimental design, we manipulate social pressure at work by varying the type of workplace monitoring and the extent to which employees engage in social interaction. This design allows us to assess the effectiveness as well as the popularity of each solution. Despite similar effectiveness in boosting productivity across solutions, only organizational systems involving social interaction (via chat) were at least as popular as a baseline treatment. This suggests that any solution based on promoting social interaction is more likely to be embraced by workers than monitoring systems alone. |
| Keywords: | Social Incentives, Social Pressure, Moral Hazard in Teams, Laboratory Experiments |
| JEL: | C92 D23 D91 M54 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2006&r=all |
| By: | Heather Joshi (University College London); Alex Bryson (University College London, National Institute of Social and Economic Research and Institute for the Study of Labor); David Wilkinson (University College London); Kelly Ward (University College London) |
| Abstract: | Using data tracking all those born in a single week in Great Britain in 1958 through to their mid-50s we observe an inverse U-shaped gender wage gap (GWG) over their life-course: an initial gap in early adulthood widened substantially during childrearing years, affecting earnings in full-time and part-time jobs. In our descriptive approach, education related differences are minor. Gender differences in work experience are the biggest contributor to that part of the gender wage gap we can explain in our models. Family formation primarily affects the GWG through its impact on work experience. Family composition is similar for male and female workers but attracts opposite wage premia. Not all of the GWG however is linked to family formation. There was a sizeable GWG on labour market entry and there are some otherwise unexplained gaps between the pay of men and women who do not become parents. |
| Keywords: | family formation, gender wage gap; work experience; life course; NCDS birth cohort |
| JEL: | J16 J31 |
| Date: | 2019–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qss:dqsswp:1909&r=all |
| By: | Poland, Michelle (University of Otago); Sin, Isabelle (Motu Economic and Public Policy Research Trust); Stillman, Steven (Free University of Bozen/Bolzano) |
| Abstract: | Research consistently finds more workplace injuries occur on Mondays than on other weekdays. One hypothesis is that workers fraudulently claim that off-the-job weekend sprains and strains occurred at work on the Monday in order to receive workers' compensation. We test this using data from New Zealand, where compensation is virtually identical whether or not an injury occurs at work. We still find that work claims, especially sprains and strains, occur disproportionately on Mondays, although less than in other jurisdictions. This suggests fraudulent claims in other countries are just one part of the story. Furthermore, we find work claims remain high on Tuesdays, and that workers' sprains and strains that occur off-the-job also disproportionately fall on Mondays. Sprains and strains treated at hospitals, which are not closed over the weekend, are also elevated on Mondays. However, Monday lost-time injuries are less severe than injuries on other days. Our findings are consistent with a physiological mechanism contributing to elevated Monday injury claims in New Zealand, but do not suggest doctors' offices being closed over the weekend, ergonomic explanations, or work being riskier on Mondays play important roles. |
| Keywords: | monday effect, workers compensation, accidents, incentives |
| JEL: | I18 I13 J38 |
| Date: | 2019–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12850&r=all |
| By: | Catarina Alexandra Neves Proença (Ph.D. Student at Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra); Mário António Gomes Augusto (Centre for Business and Economics CeBER and Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra); José Maria Ruas Murteira (Centre for Business and Economics CeBER and Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra) |
| Abstract: | The present study investigates the effect of gender diversity on the impact of board members' political connections on banking performance. Using panel data on 83 banks supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) for the period 2013-2017, our results suggest that when gender diversity is high, there is a U-shaped nonlinear relationship between political connections and banking performance. Empirical evidence also indicates that differentiating characteristics of women, such as greater ethical concern and risk aversion, help mitigate the negative effects of political connections on banking performance, safeguarding the institutions’ interests from the adverse effects of personal agendas. In addition, our results also suggest that a minimum of 14% gender diversity can actually contribute to a greater social justice and beneficial structural change. Overall, these general conclusions seem fairly robust, being drawn from several versions of the regression model adopted in the study, using different sets of control variates and different gender diversity measures. |
| Keywords: | Political connections, Gender diversity, Bank performance, ECB, GMM; Bitcoin, USD/EUR, Exchange rates, Cointegration, Forecasting. |
| JEL: | G21 G34 J16 |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gmf:papers:2020-03&r=all |
| By: | Deepak Dhayanithy (Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode) |
| Abstract: | This paper employs player level online cash and tournament poker performance data to examine empirically whether there is indeed performance persistence and hence evidence of skill in online cash and tournament poker, in the India context. The paper is novel in two respects. First is in its use of long term performance data (return on investment, RoI), of a year, to rank players and subsequent examination of whether top player perform better than the rest. Second is in its examination of effects size of the differences in RoI between top players and others. Top decile (per base year RoI) players do indeed out-perform the rest of the active field in the performance year (measured using RoI). Difference between top decile players’ RoI performance and others is‘very large’ in the case of online cash games, and this difference is ‘small’ in the case of online poker tournaments. Through this examination of effects sizes in the India online poker context of a well established poker operator, the expert view of tournaments being inherently high variance formats is supported. In both cohorts, the hypothesis that poker is a game of skill is supported through the t-tests of average RoI. |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iik:wpaper:344&r=all |
| By: | Salvador Barberà; Geoffroy de Clippel; Alejandro Neme; Kareen Rozen |
| Abstract: | Each period, a principal must assign one of two agents to a new task. Profit is stochastically higher when the agent is qualified for the task, but the principal cannot observe qualification. Her only decision is which of the two agents to assign, if any, given the public history of selections and profits, but she cannot commit to any rule. While she maximizes expected discounted profits, each agent maximizes his expected discounted selection probabilities. We fully characterize when the principal’s firstbest payoff is attainable in equilibrium, and identify a simple, belief-free, strategy profile achieving this first-best whenever feasible. Additionally, we provide a partial characterization of the case with many agents and discuss how our analysis extends to other variations of the game. |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2020-11&r=all |