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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Christophe MULLER; Christophe NORDMAN |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:003304:330400044&r=hrm |
| By: | Jesús López-rodríguez; J.Andres Faina Medin |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:002721:272100053&r=hrm |
| By: | Lilian DE MENEZES |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:002596:259600043&r=hrm |
| By: | Nabil ANNABI; Simon HARVEY; Yu LAN |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:000238:23800004&r=hrm |
| By: | Pollrich, Martin; Schmidt, Robert C. |
| Abstract: | A unilateral policy intervention by a country (such as the introduction of an emission price) can induce firms to relocate to other countries. We analyze a dynamic game where a regulator offers contracts to avert relocation of a firm in each of two periods. The firm can undertake a location-specific investment (e.g., in abatement capital). Contracts can be written on some contractible productive activity (e.g., emissions), but the firm's investment is not contractible. A moral hazard problem arises under short-term contracting that makes it impossible to implement outcomes with positive transfers in the second period. The regulator resorts to high-powered incentives in the first period. The firm then overinvests and a lock-in effect prevents relocation in both periods. Paradoxically, the distortion in the firstperiod contract can be so severe that higher transfers are needed to avert relocation compared to a (hypothetical) situation without the investment opportunity. |
| Keywords: | moral hazard; contract theory; limited commitment; firm mobility; abatement capital |
| JEL: | D82 D86 L51 Q58 |
| Date: | 2014–09–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:480&r=hrm |
| By: | Zahniser, Steven; Hertz, Tom |
| Keywords: | Labor and Human Capital, Production Economics, |
| Date: | 2013–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iats13:182512&r=hrm |
| By: | A. Preston |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uwa:wpaper:96-18&r=hrm |
| By: | Marco Cucculelli (Universit… Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Scienze economiche e sociali); Lidia Mannarino (University of Calabria, Department of Economics and Statistics); Valeria Pupo (University of Calabria, Department of Economics and Statistics); Fernanda Ricotta (University of Calabria, Department of Economics and Statistics) |
| Abstract: | Using Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as a measure of corporate performance, we find that Italian family-run firms are less productive than firms run by outside managers and the result is robust to potential endogeneity of management regime. This difference tends to vanish when the age of the firms is taken into account. |
| Keywords: | Family firms, Management, TFP |
| JEL: | D24 G34 |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anc:wmofir:99&r=hrm |
| By: | António Morgado (ISCAL - IPL. Polithecnic Institute of Lisbon); Tiago Neves Sequeira (Departamento de Gestão e Economia and CEFAGE-UBI); Marcelo Santos (Departamento de Gestão e Economia and CEFAGE-UBI); Alexandra Ferreira Lopes (Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, ISCTE-IUL, ISCTE); Ana Balcão Reis (Nova School of Business and Economics) |
| Abstract: | We calculate aggregate measures of mismatch in the labour market for 30 European countries. These indicators measure vertical mismatch (related to the level of education, e.g. overeducation, and undereducation) and horizontal mismatch (related to the eld of education) and are comparable across countries and through time. We obtain that in European countries between 15% to nearly 35% of workers have a job for which they have more (or less) qualications than the usual level. Approximately 20% to nearly 50% work in a job for which they do not have the usual eld qualication. There is a great variability on mismatch incidence across European labour markets. Undereducation affects more workers than overeducation in most European countries. Low correlations between mismatch and unemployment indicate that mismatch should be regarded as an additional informative variable, useful to characterize labour markets. We also study the in uence of the different measures of mismatch on the evolution of per capita output in both the short and long-run. We nd evidence of strong short-run effects of mismatch. |
| Keywords: | Education; Human Capital; Mismatch; Labour Market. |
| JEL: | J24 O50 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfe:wpcefa:2014_13&r=hrm |
| By: | Dusan Paredes Araya (IDEAR - Department of Economics, Universidad Católica del Norte - Chile); Tomothy M Komarek (IDEAR - Department of Economics, Universidad Católica del Norte - Chile) |
| Abstract: | The spatial income inequality in Latin American countries is a recent academic affair. Particularly, the case of Chile highlights around the world because it has one of the highest individual and spatial inequality rates. This article analyzes the spatial income inequality in Chile during 1992 2011 evaluating the role of the spatial labor sorting through multilevel models. The findings show that human capital doesn't allocate randomly across the space but its spatial concentration at the biggest urban centers impacts significantly the income inequality between counties. These findings motivate the discussion about spatial dimension of the inequality and suggest that policymakers should consider ways to spread human capital throughout the nation as an alternative to reduce spatial inequality. |
| Keywords: | Spatial income inequality, spatial labor sorting, human capital, multilevel regression. |
| JEL: | O15 O18 R12 R23 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cat:dtecon:dt201316&r=hrm |
| By: | Bratton, C.A.; Eschler, R.E.; Field, G.C.; How, R.B.; Maloney, T.R.; Quinn, W.M. |
| Keywords: | Farm Management, Labor and Human Capital, |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:cudaeb:184881&r=hrm |