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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Carret, Vincent |
| Abstract: | In this letter to the editor of the Journal of the History of Economic Thought, I present my results on Ragnar Frisch's rocking horse model published in the same journal and detail why the comments by Ginoux and Jovanovic on my paper have no grounding. I explain the role of initial conditions on the amplitude of cycles and trend in Frisch's solution, and emphasize that my contribution was to show that Frisch built a model where cycles and growth came from the same economic mechanism. |
| Date: | 2023–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:xt4qd&r=hpe |
| By: | Medema, Steven G |
| Abstract: | Review of “Law and the Invisible Hand: A Theory of Adam Smith’s Jurisprudence” by Robin Paul Malloy. |
| Date: | 2023–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:d4fnu&r=hpe |
| By: | Tribe, Keith |
| Abstract: | Review of “Religion and the Rise of Capitalism” by Benjamin M. Friedman |
| Date: | 2023–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:utgah&r=hpe |
| By: | Bankovsky, Miriam |
| Abstract: | Review of “Gender and the Dismal Science: Women in the Early Years of the Economics Profession” by Ann Mari May. |
| Date: | 2023–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:azv5y&r=hpe |
| By: | Aspromourgos, Anthony |
| Abstract: | Review of Andreas Ortmann and Benoît Walraevens' "Adam Smith’s System: a Re-Interpretation Inspired by Smith’s Lectures on Rhetoric, Game Theory, and Conjectural History". |
| Date: | 2023–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:ec7t2&r=hpe |
| By: | Karintha, Sunilkumar |
| Abstract: | Review of “Home in the World” by Amartya Sen. |
| Date: | 2023–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:c458n&r=hpe |
| By: | Mottironi, Henri-Pierre |
| Abstract: | Review of “Trade and Nation: How Companies and Politics Reshaped Economic Thought” by Emily Erikson. |
| Date: | 2023–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:9zcfe&r=hpe |
| By: | Klausinger, Hansjoerg |
| Abstract: | Review of “A Political Economy of Power: Ordoliberalism in Context, 1932–1950” by Raphaël Fèvre. |
| Date: | 2023–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:w2gpj&r=hpe |
| By: | Curi, Luiz Felipe Bruzzi |
| Abstract: | Review of “Os homens do cofre: o que pensavam os Ministros da Fazenda do Brasil republicano (1889-1985)” edited by Ivan Colangelo Salomão. |
| Date: | 2023–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:97fcb&r=hpe |
| By: | Luca Fontanelli (Université Côte d'Azur; GREDEG CNRS) |
| Abstract: | We provide a survey of the main mechanisms of market selection used in economics. We gather them in three theoretical paradigms (rational equilibrium, Simonesque and evolutionary), that we try to reconcile in terms of underlying laws of selection. We show that the three paradigms have been converging in their focus on firm heterogeneity and increasing returns. These selection mechanisms are however fostered by theories which differ in terms of sources of increasing returns, generating mechanisms of firm heterogeneity, firm rationality and emphasis on equilibrium states vis-Ã -vis out-of-equilibrium dynamics. Our discussion suggests that the convergence between the three theoretical paradigms is taking place in the direction of research, which is aimed at the replication of empirical patterns related to firm heterogeneity, rather than in the theory underlying selection mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | Selection, competition, monopolistic competition, quasi-replicator, Gibrat’s Law |
| JEL: | L10 D20 D40 |
| Date: | 2023–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2023-08&r=hpe |
| By: | Alexis Akira Toda |
| Abstract: | In a series of papers, Ole Peters and his collaborators claim that the 'conceptual basis of mainstream economic theory' is 'flawed' and that the approach they call 'ergodicity economics' gives 'reason to hope for a future economic science that is more parsimonious, conceptually clearer and less subjective' (Peters, 2019). This paper argues that 'ergodicity economics' is pseudoscience because it has not produced falsifiable implications and should be taken with skepticism. |
| Date: | 2023–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2306.03275&r=hpe |
| By: | Calcagno, Adriana |
| Abstract: | This paper focuses on the intellectual path through which Raúl Prebisch placed industrialization at the center of his economic thought and policy recommendations. It shows how the changing international context of the 1930s and 1940s made him depart from laissez-faire and adopt counter-cyclical policies, gradually abandoning the agrarian export-led growth model and finally embracing industrialization as the new growth strategy for Argentina and Latin America. |
| Date: | 2023–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:hxv2b&r=hpe |
| By: | Macve, Richard |
| Abstract: | It has long been argued that double-entry bookkeeping (‘DEB’) was important for enabling capitalism’s development in the West and heralded the beginning of ‘modern accounting’. However, these claims remain contested so it is important to understand the history of DEB’s emergence about 700 years ago and its underlying rationale. Sangster (2018a) [Pacioli's Lens: God, Humanism, Euclid, and the Rhetoric of Double Entry. The Accounting Review, 93(2): 299-314] argues that, in the first printed manual on DEB in 1494, Pacioli presented a novel ‘axiomatic’ approach to explaining DEB that requires a corresponding ‘paradigmatic shift’ in our appreciation of his contribution. This paper challenges Sangster’s interpretation of Pacioli’s mathematical contribution and calls for deeper understanding of the historical development of DEB in the West by comparison with accounting developments in the East. |
| Keywords: | Pacioli; double-entry bookkeeping (DEB); algebraic axioms; comparative international accounting history |
| JEL: | B11 C00 M40 P52 |
| Date: | 2021–12–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:112170&r=hpe |
| By: | Gouverneur, Virginie |
| Abstract: | From the JHET Interviews series, a professional interview of Evelyn L. Forget by Virginie Gouverneur. |
| Date: | 2023–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:yg27z&r=hpe |
| By: | Cunha, Alexandre Mendes |
| Abstract: | Review of “El desafío del desarrollo: Trayectorias de los grandes economistas latinoamericanos del siglo XX” edited by Marcelo N. Rougier and Juan Odisio. |
| Date: | 2023–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:buhcf&r=hpe |
| By: | Everton Sotto Tibiriçá Rosa (FACE-UFG); Tiago Camarinha Lopes (FACE-UFG) |
| Abstract: | As teorias econômicas de Keynes e Marx possuem muitas similaridades considerando o padrão do pensamento econômico neoclássico mainstream. Mesmo que ambos os autores entendam o papel central do dinheiro e do capital em um sistema econômico, eles divergem nitidamente no campo político. Para fazer uma comparação adequada entre Marx e Keynes é necessário relembrar a obra de Silvio Gesell, economista da virada do século 19 para o século 20 pouco lembrado na história do pensamento econômico. Este artigo questiona o que se poderia aprender do espírito de Gesell hoje como maneira de apreender o entendimento de Keynes sobre o Marxismo e o sistema econômico que deriva dessa doutrina. Keynes discordava principalmente da teoria do dinheiro de Marx, pois ela não seria construtiva no sentido de uma reforma monetária para controlar o movimento de acumulação do capital. Concluímos que as propostas de política econômica de Keynes funcionam como uma reforma sistêmica para atingir um sistema econômico não-Marxista, o que difere da linha de Gesell de buscar um caminho de transformação econômica e social que pode ser caracterizado como anti-Marxista. |
| Keywords: | Keynes, Gesell, Marx, moeda, juros, teoria do capital |
| JEL: | B00 E11 E12 |
| Date: | 2022–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ufb:wpaper:094&r=hpe |
| By: | Malthouse, Eugene (University of Warwick); Pilgrim, Charlie (University College London); Hills, Thomas (University of Warwick); Sgroi, Daniel (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | Many of our most pressing challenges, from combating climate change to dealing with pandemics, are collective action problems: situations in which individual and collective interests conflict with each other. In such situations people face a dilemma about making individually costly but collectively beneficial contributions to the common good. Understanding which factors influence people's willingness to make these contributions is vital for the design of policies and institutions that support the attainment of collective goals. In this study we investigate how inequalities, and different causes of inequalities, impact individual-level behaviour and group-level outcomes. First, we find that what people judged to be fair was not enough to solve the collective action problem: if they acted according to what they thought was fair, they would collectively fail. Second, the level of wealth (rich vs. poor) altered what was judged to be a fair contribution to the public good more than the cause of wealth (merit vs. luck vs. uncertain). Contributions during the game reflected these fairness judgements, with poorer individuals consistently contributing a higher proportion of their wealth than richer participants, which further increased inequality – particularly in successful groups. Finally, the cause of one's wealth was largely irrelevant, mattering most only when it was uncertain, as opposed to resulting from merit or luck. We discuss implications for policymakers and international climate change negotiations. |
| Keywords: | public goods, collective action, cooperation, meritocracy |
| JEL: | C92 D91 D63 |
| Date: | 2023–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16179&r=hpe |
| By: | Gérard Mondello (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS) |
| Abstract: | This article analyzes Coase's notion of "legal rights" in "The Social Cost Problem" and focuses on the part devoted to zero transaction costs. "Legal rights" cover different types of civil rights that Coase groups together in a common understanding in order to facilitate transactions between agents. This article reintroduces the specificity of civil rights in the theoretical examples and case law analyzed by Coase. As a result, neither the effectiveness nor the invariance of Coase's theorem can be proved any more. |
| Keywords: | Legal rights, property rights, Coase, Social Cost, Case law, Coase theorem |
| JEL: | D62 K13 K23 K32 Q52 Q58 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2023-04&r=hpe |
| By: | Martin F. Hellwig (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | This expository note uses Hilbert's "infinite hotel", a hotel where one can always find place for another guest even if the hotel is already full, to illustrate the failure of the First Welfare Theorem in "large-square" economies that have infinitely many participants as well as infinitely many goods. Hilbert's hotel with infinitely many guests has a similar mathematical structure as the overlapping-generations model of Allais (1947) and Samuelson (1958). The phenomenon of "dynamic inefficiency" in such models represents a failure of the First Welfare Theorem in "large-square" economies, rather than frictions from the sequential nature of markets. |
| Keywords: | HilbertÂ’s hotel, overlapping-generations models, dynamic inefficiency, First Welfare Theorem |
| JEL: | D15 D61 E62 |
| Date: | 2023–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2023_05&r=hpe |
| By: | Ernst Fehr; Gary Charness |
| Abstract: | We review the vast literature on social preferences by assessing what is known about their fundamental properties, their distribution in the broader population, and their consequences for important economic and political behaviors. We provide, in particular, an overview of the empirically identified characteristics of distributional preferences and how they are affected by merit, luck, and risk considerations as well as by concerns for equality of opportunity. In addition, we identify what is known about belief-dependent social preferences such as reciprocity and guilt aversion. The evidence indicates that the big majority of individuals have some sort of social preference while purely self-interested subjects are a minority. Our review also shows how the findings from laboratory experiments involving social preferences provide a deeper understanding of important field phenomena such as the consequences of wage inequality on work morale, employees’ resistance to wage cuts, individuals’ self-selection into occupations and sectors that are more or less prone to morally problematic behaviors, as well as issues of distributive politics. However, although a lot has been learned in recent decades about social preferences, there are still many important, unresolved, yet exciting, questions waiting to be tackled. |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10488&r=hpe |