|
on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Bruno S. Frey |
| Abstract: | There is a fundamental difference between the natural and the social sciences due to reactivity. This difference remains even in the age of Artificially Intelligent Learning Machines and Big Data. Many academic economists take it as a matter of course that economics should become a natural science. Such a characterization misses an essential aspect of a social science, namely reactivity, i.e. human beings systematically respond to economic data, and in particular to interventions by economic policy, in a foreseeable way. To illustrate this finding, I use three examples from quite different fields: Happiness policy, World Heritage policy, and Science policy. |
| Keywords: | Economics; Social; Natural Science; Reactivity; Data; Happiness; Economic Policy |
| JEL: | A10 B40 C70 C80 D80 Z10 |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2017-10&r=hpe |
| By: | Alice Solda (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Marie Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | The existing literature on ostracism in social dilemma games has focused on the impact of the threat of exclusion on cooperation within groups but so far, little attention has been paid to the behavior of the excluded members after their reintegration. This paper studies the effect of exclusion by peers followed by reintegration on cooperation once excluded individuals are readmitted in their group. Using a negatively framed public good game, we manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed ex-ogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators although it is not an equilibrium strategy. Exclusion has a positive impact on cooperation and compliance to the group norm of withdrawal after reintegration when exclusion is followed by a quick rather than a slow reintegration and that the length of exclusion is chosen by the group. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. Post-exclusion cooperation and forgiveness de end not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish. Abstract The existing literature on ostracism in social dilemma games has focused on the impact of the threat of exclusion on cooperation within groups but so far, little attention has been paid to the behavior of the excluded members after their reintegration. This paper studies the effect of exclusion by peers followed by reintegration on cooperation once excluded individuals are readmitted in their group. Using a negatively framed public good game, we manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed ex-ogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators although it is not an equilibrium strategy. Exclusion has a positive impact on cooperation and compliance to the group norm of withdrawal after reintegration when exclusion is followed by a quick rather than a slow reintegration and that the length of exclusion is chosen by the group. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. Post-exclusion cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish. |
| Keywords: | Ostracism, exclusion, reintegration, social dilemma, cooperation, experiment |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01579216&r=hpe |
| By: | Jakob Kapeller (Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria) |
| Abstract: | This paper first presents a series of epistemological rationales for pluralism as a guiding concept in economic research. In doing so, it highlights the inherent uncertainty of (scientific) knowledge as well as the complex and dynamic nature of socio-economic relationships to indicate how the discussion of theoretical and applied problems in economics might benefit from a pluralist approach. Eventually, I apply the notion of pluralism in economics to questions of economic teaching and curricular design in economics. |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ico:wpaper:68&r=hpe |
| By: | Stéphane Gonzalez (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Alain Marciano (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM3 - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - INRA Montpellier - Institut national de la recherche agronomique [Montpellier] - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier) |
| Abstract: | This paper is a contribution to the literature which uses the theory of cooperative game in order to show the non validity of the Coase Theorem in a 3-player game. We examine new situations which give rise to the refinement of the conditions under which the core of a game with three players is (non)empty and put forward three main results. First, we demonstrate that the nonemptiness of the core depends on the liability rules and the allocation of rights. Second, we show that when the externality is non transferable, the core is nonempty if the polluter is not liable but also that the core is always nonempty when the negotiations over a pollution level require unanimity. We provide a counterexample of the nonemptiness of the core in all other situations. Third, we show that, if the externality is non transferable, then an agent who does not negotiate can nevertheless influence the outcome of the negociation. |
| Abstract: | Cet article contribue à la littérature sur les conditions de validité du théorème de Coase. En modélisant sous la forme d'un jeu coopératif des situations de négociations entre un pollueur et deux pollués, nous affinons les conditions sous lesquelles le coeur associé est non vide. Premièrement, nous montrons que la (non)vacuité du coeur dépend des règles de responsabilités et de la répartition des droits. Deuxièmement, nous montrons que lorsque l'externalité est non-transférable, le coeur est non vide si le pollueur est non responsable mais que le coeur est toujours non vide lorsque le pollueur est responsable et ne peut polluer qu'après avoir obtenu l'accord unanime de ses victimes. Nous construisons des contre-exemples à la non-vacuité du coeur dans toutes les autres situations. Enfin, nous montrons que si l'externalité est non-transférable, alors un individu qui ne participe pas à une négociation peut malgré tout en influencer le résultat. |
| Keywords: | Coase theorem, externality, negociation, cooperative game, core,Théorème de Coase, externalités, jeux coopératifs, coeur |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01544892&r=hpe |
| By: | Andrés Salamanca (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we introduce a solution concept generalizing the Harsanyi non-transferable utility (NTU) value to cooperative games with incomplete information. The so-defined H-solution is characterized by virtual utility scales that extend the Harsanyi-Shapley fictitious weighted-utility transfer procedure. We construct a three-player cooperative game in which Myerson's [Cooperative games with incomplete information. Int. J. Game Theory, 13, 1984, pp. 69-96] generalization of the Shapley NTU value does not capture some "negative" externality generated by the adverse selection. However, when we explicitly compute the H-solution in this game, it turns out that it prescribes a more intuitive outcome taking into account the informational externality mentioned above. |
| Keywords: | incomplete information,virtual utility,Cooperative games |
| Date: | 2016–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01579898&r=hpe |
| By: | Guillaume Daudin (LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris-Dauphine) |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses Gelderblom’s hypothesis that urban competition (including a large number of competing cities, footloose foreign traders and municipal autonomy) was central to the rise of inclusive trade institutions in Europe. The first part discusses the precise behaviour of traders, town authorities and sovereigns underlying Gelderblom’s explanatory framework. The second part presents some challenges to the generalisation of the book’s thesis to the history of Europe, including Italy and Britain. The last part advances a short econometric exercise to check this generalisation. Urban competition combined with starting institutional quality does not emerge as a positive factor for the growth of European cities in general: this is interpreted as a call for more research rather a decisive counter-argument. |
| Abstract: | Cet article discute l’hypothèse de Gelerblom selon laquelle la compétition urbaine (incluant un grand nombre de villes concurrentes entre elles, des négociants se déplaçant facilement, et l’autonomie urbaine) a été centrale pour la généralisation d’institutions de commerce ouvertes à tous en Europe. La première partie examine le comportement précis des négociants, autorités municipales et souverains qui sont au coeur du schéma explicatif de Gelderblom. La deuxième partie présente quelques difficultés qui s’opposent à la généralisation de la thèse de l’ouvrage à l’ensemble de l’histoire européenne, notamment en Italie et en Grande-Bretagne. La dernière partie propose un petit exercice économétrique pour tester cette généralisation. La compétition urbaine combinée à des institutions de bonne qualité n’apparaît pas comme un facteur de croissance pour les villes urbaines dans leur ensemble : ce résultat est interprété plus comme un appel à plus de recherche qu’un contre-argument décisif. |
| Keywords: | urbanisation,modern history,Europe,institutions |
| Date: | 2017–03–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01494926&r=hpe |
| By: | Doll, Monika; Seebauer, Michael; Tonn, Maren |
| Abstract: | We implement waiting time as a currency in an ultimatum game in an experimental laboratory study. Subjects had to split 60 minutes of waiting time. We analyze bargaining behavior in varying situations connected to waiting time as well as gain and loss framing. Different situations that follow waiting time have no influence on bargaining behavior. Regarding gain and loss framing, we do not find differences in proposers' behavior. Responders show less willingness to wait when the bargaining outcome is framed as a loss compared to being framed as a gain of time. Displaying less willingness to wait, responders show a higher propensity to risk a rejection of the proposers' offers. |
| Keywords: | Ultimatum Game,Waiting Time,Experimental Currency,Leaving the Laboratory,Framing |
| JEL: | C91 C70 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwqwdp:152017&r=hpe |
| By: | Chatterjee, Sidharta |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this study is to elucidate and appreciate the growing importance of social knowledge in economic systems. It is thoroughly evident that socially available information as a variable is being employed in economic modeling—and, social concepts and principles are being increasingly employed to model economic systems. Despite the growing importance of social elements in economic theory and modeling, there appears to be a general lack of appreciation and understanding effected by fallacy of about what constitutes social knowledge in particular, and social information in general, and then, why there should be social elements included in economic systems. The goal of this paper, therefore, is to undertake a formal analysis of the theory of social knowledge based on Kenneth Arrow's (1994) paper, and to explain why this is so relevant in modern economic systems. This study, therefore, attempts to demonstrate understanding of the concept of social knowledge in its present context—the digital age, with the aim of advancing knowledge in this field. Finally, the study also provides general knowledge about the subject of social knowledge in the context of economic growth. |
| Keywords: | Social knowledge, knowledge externalities, social information, innovation |
| JEL: | Z13 |
| Date: | 2017–08–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:81105&r=hpe |
| By: | Armand Hatchuel (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Baptiste Rappin a eu la courtoisie de m’inviter à commenter son article consacré à un examen de la « théorie de l’action collective », connue aussi sous le nom d’« axiomatique savoirs-relations »99. Cette théorie - que je développe, avec quelques collègues- introduit la notion de « métaphysique de l’action » pour caractériser un point aveugle dans la construction des sciences sociales et pour élaborer une théorie de l’action collective mieux fondée. A ce titre, la théorie de l’action collective mériterait, selon l’auteur, une attention particulière. Son examen se justifierait, de plus, par la place importante que cette théorie occuperait dans les sciences de gestion contemporaines. Cependant, l’analyse proposée dans cet article reste sans lien avec les sciences de gestion et ne s’intéresse pas aux problèmes des sciences économiques et sociales qui sont à l’origine de la théorie de l’action collective. Baptiste Rappin retient surtout que cette théorie exprime une ambition philosophique universelle qui rejoindrait les tentatives actuelles de «sortie de la métaphysique ». Tentative, qui réaliserait un véritable «tour de force», mais qui resterait néanmoins vaine parce que prisonnière de présupposés idéologiques que l’auteur se propose d’abord de dévoiler puis ensuite de condamner en prenant le parti - pour le moins extravagant, compte tenu du champ de la théorie d’invoquer Heidegger à cette fin. |
| Keywords: | philosophie ,action collective |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01502891&r=hpe |
| By: | Abdelatif Kerzabi (Université Aboubekr Belkaid - University of Belkaïd Abou Bekr [Tlemcen]) |
| Abstract: | Le conseil d’administration a souvent fait l’objet des études juridiques ; les juristes se préoccupent de la légalité du fonctionnement du conseil, de la responsabilité dévolue à chaque membre et des missions légales relatives au contrôle des dirigeants. Au-delà de la pertinence de cette vision, nous proposons dans le présent article l’apport de la science économique à travers la théorie contractuelle qui s’inscrit dans le prolongement du renouvellement de la théorie néoclassique. |
| Keywords: | administrateur, asymétrie d'information, dirigeant,Actionnaires |
| Date: | 2017–05–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01522150&r=hpe |
| By: | Christine L. Exley (Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit); Judd B. Kessler (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.) |
| Abstract: | In standard economic theory, information helps agents optimize. But providing agents with information about the benefits of an action often fails to encourage that action. This paper proposes a far-reaching behavioral explanation: information may make salient that the benefits of taking an action could be improved and agents may see the potential for improvement as a reason to avoid the action. In an experiment, making more salient how a donation could be improved significantly decreases giving. Self-serving motives dramatically magnify the effect, suggesting why information may be particularly ineffective at encouraging privately costly actions with social or future benefits. |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:18-017&r=hpe |
| By: | Paris Chrysos (ISC PARIS) |
| Abstract: | What do we see when we look at data? This recurrent question when confronted to Big Data, is largely answered by two different disciplinary visions dominating the debate during the last years, concluding that data are raw and Big Data is a hubris. While disciplines still treat just a part of them, we experience a wider and wider spreading of Big Data. The notion of “monuments of cyberspace” discussed here helps understand their peculiar nature and delimit related issues of method, of wealth and of experience. |
| Keywords: | Big data,Disciplines,Experience |
| Date: | 2017–03–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01498296&r=hpe |
| By: | Fabio Galeotti (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France); Reuben Kline (Stony Brook University, Department of Political Science Social and Behavioral Sciences, N735 Stony Brook, NY 11794); Raimondello Orsini (University of Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna, Italy) |
| Abstract: | The distributive justice norm of “just deserts” — i.e. the notion that one gets what one deserves — is an essential norm in a market society, and honesty is an important factor in economic and social exchange. We experimentally investigate the effect of violations of the distributive justice norm of “just deserts” on honesty in a setting where behaving dishonestly entails income redistribution. We find that the violation of the just deserts norm results in a greater propensity toward dishonesty. We then test a more general proposition that violations of just deserts induce dishonesty, even in cases where dishonesty does not have redistributive consequences. Our results confirm this proposition but only for cases in which the v iolation of just deserts also entails income inequality. |
| Keywords: | Meritocracy, Equity, Dishonesty, Just Deserts, Experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D31 D63 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1719&r=hpe |
| By: | Sell, Friedrich L.; Öllinger, Michael |
| Keywords: | Keynesian and Kaldorian Approaches to Income Distribution,Income Distribution in European Economies,Empirical Estimates of Saving Functions |
| JEL: | D30 D33 D63 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ubwwpe:20171&r=hpe |
| By: | Michel Rocca (CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes) |
| Abstract: | Une histoire longue de l’économie du travail permet d’identifier deux traditions d’analyse des questions du travail : l’approche qualifiée de "labor problems" et celle du "labor economics". Ce texte discute leurs conditions d’émergence, leurs fondements axiomatiques et leurs rapports dans le champ scientifique des dernières décennies. Au contraire de l’idée communément répandue, il est avancé l’idée que ces deux traditions peuvent être comprises comme deux "programmes de recherche" irréductibles. |
| Keywords: | analyse économique , théorie économique,pensée économique , histoire , économie du travail , institutionnalisme |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01566506&r=hpe |
| By: | Blanche Segrestin (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Franck Aggeri (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Pascal Le Masson (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Albert David (Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL - Paris Sciences et Lettres) |
| Abstract: | Armand Hatchuel’s work marks a turning point in management research and paves the way for a refoundation of management science. Hatchuel’s research deals with organizational metabolism rather than organizational change, as he is concerned with the drivers of change and with the organization of innovative collective action. Several theoretical milestones can be put forward. First, Hatchuel offers a theory of the cognitive processes of generativity: while decision theory targets optimization by supporting the selection of a solution, “C-K theory” is a design theory. It accounts for the generation of new alternatives by expanding what is known to include some unknowns in innovations. This theory has provided the theoretical cornerstone characterizing the rationality and organization of innovative or design-oriented collective action. Second, in Hatchuel’s view, learning and organizational dynamics are tightly bound. Learning processes are hosted and supported by social relationships, which, in turn, are shaped by the distribution of knowledge. Hatchuel proposes a theory of collective action whereby knowledge and relationships are involved in a dynamic interplay: this theory shows that both markets and hierarchies are special and highly unstable forms of organization, because they imply that either knowledge or relationships are frozen. Management scholars contribute to the study of generative forms of collective action: Hatchuel argues that management science, far from being applied economics or applied sociology, is a basic science devoted to the design and study of new models of collective action. He therefore opens up promising avenues for programmes on post-decision paradigms and creative institutions. |
| Keywords: | Collective action,Management sciences,Innovation,Design theory |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01534794&r=hpe |
| By: | Haoran He (School of Economics and Business Administration - Beijing Normal University); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and non-anonymous interactions. |
| Keywords: | social image,experiment,Team,inequity aversion,preference aggregation |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00996545&r=hpe |
| By: | Pierre Bernhard (Université Côte d’Azur, INRIA); Marc Deschamps (Université de Bourgogne Franche-Comté, CRESE) |
| Abstract: | Rudolf Emil Kalman (“R.E.K.”) passed away on July, 2nd, 2016. Among contemporary economists Kalman is mainly remembered for his filter, an algorithm that allows recursive estimation of unobserved time varying variables in a system. However, he has also a key part on the whole of recursive macroeconomic theory as is notably expressed by Lars Ljungqvist’s and Thomas Sargent’s book [Ljunqvist and Sargent, 2012]. Our paper is a contribution to show the links between Kalman’s works on filtering, linear quadratic optimal control, and system theory. We also provide a model on cooperative advertising to show that Kalman’s works on dynamics and control can be useful in macroeconomics as in microeconomics, a domain where his contributions seem to be unfortunately less used. |
| Keywords: | Dynamic Programming, System Theory, Linear Quadratic Optimal Control, Kalman Filter, Riccati Equation |
| JEL: | C61 C60 C02 |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2017-10&r=hpe |
| By: | Remi Jardat (IRG - Institut de Recherche en Gestion - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12) |
| Abstract: | In this article I look at how management tools can be considered technical objects under the definition put forward by the philosopher Gilbert Simondon. Through that lens, I examine how a strategy matrix can be thought of as a ‘technical individual’ striving to become itself, which can imply success, disappearance or reappearance. The object’s ‘becomingness’ can be explained by considering its ‘degree of concretization’ and capacity to produce its own ‘milieu.’ Four stages are involved in such processes, wherein strategy matrixes undergo ‘technical genesis.’ In conclusion I will broaden the discussion to look at ‘technical culture’ borrowing from Simondon’s notion of ‘transindividuality’. |
| Keywords: | Simondon,Strategy matrix,transindividual |
| Date: | 2017–01–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01484479&r=hpe |
| By: | Parisa Dashtipour (Middlesex University [London]); Bénédicte Vidaillet (IRG - Institut de Recherche en Gestion - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12) |
| Abstract: | Psychoanalytic perspectives (such as the Kleinian/Bionian and Lacanian literature) have made significant contributions to the study of affect in organizations. While some have pointed out the affects involved in work tasks, most of this literature generally focuses on the affects linked to organizational life (such as learning, leadership, motivation, power, or change). The center of attention is not on affects associated with the work process itself. We draw from the French psychodynamic theory of Christophe Dejours—who is yet to be known in English language organization studies—to make the following contributions. First, we show the relationship between affect and working by discussing Dejours' notions of affective suffering, the real of work, the significance of the body, and 'ordinary sublimation'. Second, we advance critical research in organization studies by demonstrating the centrality of work in the affective life of the subject. Third, the article reinterprets Menzies' well-known hospital case study to illustrate how Dejours' theory extends existing psychoanalytical approaches, and especially to point to the significant role of the work collective in supporting workers to work well. We conclude by suggesting that if the centrality of work in the affective life of the subject is acknowledged, it follows that resistance strategies, and work collectives' struggle for emancipation, should focus on reclaiming work. |
| Keywords: | work,work collectives,Affect,Dejours,psychoanalysis |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01474361&r=hpe |