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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Taro Hisamatsu (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University) |
| Abstract: | Historians of economic thought have often pointed out that Ricardo fs famous England-Portugal model differs from the gRicardian model h presented in modern international economics textbooks. This paper argues that the erroneous belief that David Ricardo was the father of the Ricardian model might have arisen from Robert Torrens f own explanations of comparative advantage and his repeated claims. The principle of comparative advantage put forward by Torrens has much in common with the modern Ricardian model. In the early twentieth century, distinguished writers of international trade theory devoted their attention to a great controversy among famous economists in the authoritative The Economic Journal about who should be considered the true father of comparative advantage, Ricardo or Torrens, and concluded that Ricardo, in his text, proposed the same principles of comparative advantage as Torrens had presented. |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:koe:wpaper:1630&r=hpe |
| By: | Tatsuyoshi Saijo (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology); Takehito Masuda (Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University); Yoshitaka Okano (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology); Takafumi Yamakawa |
| Abstract: | After prisoner's dilemma, players can approve or reject the other's choice of cooperation or defection. If both players approve the other's choice, the outcome is the one they chose; however, if either rejects the other's choice, the outcome is the one they both defect. In theory, such approval mechanism implements cooperation in a backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies, although this is not the case in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. By contrast, Varian's (1994) compensation mechanism implements cooperation in the latter but not in the former, which motivates the present study. The approval mechanism sessions yield a cooperation rate of 90% in the first period and 93.2% across periods, while the compensation mechanism sessions yield a rate of 63.3% in the first period and 75.2% across periods, indicating a significant difference. In addition, the backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies better predicts subjects' behavior than subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in both mechanism sessions. |
| Keywords: | prisoner’s dilemma, approval mechanism, cooperation, laboratory experiment, Selten’s index |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C92 D74 P43 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2016-15&r=hpe |
| By: | José M. Gaspar (Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200-464 Porto PORTUGAL) |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to synthesize the main conceptual and ontological discussion around the field of New Economic Geography. It starts out by laying down the fundamental reasons and motivations that led to the surge of New Economic Geography and provides the background in adjacent fields of economic theory which made this possible. I then provide an overall assessment of the state of the art in NEG and track the intellectual evolution of the field since the nineties up to the present, focusing on the intrinsic criticism that it has been subject to throughout its history. This criticism has its roots in the different ontological conceptions of geography (space) and history (time), as well on the methodological differences, between economists and geographers. Another concern of this paper is to analyze the evolution of the debate and communication between geographical economists and economic geographers. |
| Keywords: | economic geography; geography and history; ontological debate; |
| JEL: | N7 N9 R12 |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:por:fepwps:580&r=hpe |
| By: | Alexandre Skoda (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | Let G = (N,E,w ) be a weighted communication graph (with weight function w on E ). For every subset A ? N, we delete in the subset E (A ) of edges with ends in A, all edges of minimum weight in E (A ). Then the connected components of the corresponding induced subgraph constitue a partition of A that we Pmin(A ). For every game (N , v ), we define the Pmin-restricted game (N , v ) by v (A = ?F? Pmin (A) v(F ) for all A ? N. We prove that we can decide in polynomial time if there is inheritance of F-convexity from N , v ) to the Pmin-restricted game (N , v ) where F-convexity is obtained by restricting convexity to connected subsets |
| Keywords: | communication networks; cooperative game; convex game; restricted game; partitions; supermodularity; graph; complexity |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:16055&r=hpe |
| By: | Alice Hsiaw (Brandeis University); Ing-Haw Cheng (Brandeis University) |
| Abstract: | Individuals often must learn about a state of the world when both the state and the credibility of information sources (experts) are uncertain. We argue that learning in these "rank-deficient" environments may be subject to a bias that leads agents to over-infer expert quality. Agents who encounter information or experts in different order disagree about substance because they endogenously disagree about the credibility of each others' experts, as first impressions about experts have long-lived influences on beliefs about the state. This arises even though agents share common priors, information, and biases, providing a theory for the origins of disagreement. Our theory helps explain why disagreement about substance and expert credibility often go hand-in-hand and is hard to resolve in a wide-range of issues where agents share common information, including economics, climate change, and medicine. |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:brd:wpaper:110&r=hpe |
| By: | Antonio Torrero Mañas |
| Abstract: | En este breve ensayo el Pfsor. Torrero plantea la vigencia del pensamiento de Keynes en la actualidad, especialmente en tres puntos: el exceso de ahorro o el déficit de inversión; la existencia de instituciones financieras privadas con sus propias normas y los problemas que se derivan de ello; y, la importancia de la incertidumbre. Este úlimo punto constituye el foco central del ensayo del que se saca la importante conclusión de que es necesario adecuar las instituciones a la aceptación de que la incertidumbre radical existe, y no podemos comportarnos como si fuera posible transformarla en riesgo susceptible de medición. Por cometer este error nos encontramos inmersos todavía en la crisis que comenzó en 2008. |
| Keywords: | Crisis Financiera, Keynes, Riesgo, Incertidumbre |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uae:wpaper:0716&r=hpe |
| By: | Yvon Pesqueux (LIRSA - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche en Sciences de l'Action - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM]) |
| Abstract: | Affirmer que le développement durable est une « théorie » pratique, c’est dire qu’il n’est pas comme cela une pratique, ajouter les deux arguments du « flou » et de l’« ambiguïté », c’est mettre en avant sa dimension duale (un phénomène global qui s’aborde comme tel ou bien l’agrégation de micro phénomènes) et sa dimension rhétorique dans la mesure où c’est l’argumentation qui est mise en avant qui lui sert de support en affirmant l’idée sage de mesure, de conformité actant les deux dimensions de séduction et de promesse face à la rhétorique vieillissante (dépassée ?) du développement, bref une rhétorique d’un développement sage qui sera couplée avec les questions pourtant différentes du « bio » et du « vert » dans une assimilation entre « durable, bio et vert ». Il s’agit avant tout d’une notion dont on doit accepter qu’il ne fait pas comme cela concept. La notion repose ainsi sur la référence à la très floue demande sociale |
| Keywords: | développement durable, environnement, management |
| Date: | 2016–10–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:cel-01385677&r=hpe |
| By: | Nicolas Pinsard (Centre d'Economie de l'Université de Paris Nord (CEPN)) |
| Abstract: | Le Cartel des Gauches resta au gouvernement de juin 1924 à juillet 1926, mois au cours duquel R. Poincaré revint aux affaires. Trois jours après que l’on sut que R. Poincaré avait accepté de diriger le gouvernement, le franc s’apprécia de 20 % par rapport à la livre sterling. Ce fut la fin de la crise du franc sur le marché des changes, et cela sans qu’aucune annonce politique soit faite, et avant même la déclaration d’investiture du gouvernement. Comment expliquer le « miracle Poincaré » ? La monnaie est « un lien de confiance », elle se décline en trois types de confiance : la confiance méthodique, éthique et hiérarchique. Or, la crise du franc, lors du gouvernement du Cartel, est essentiellement due à une perte de confiance hiérarchique en ce gouvernement. En effet, celui-ci n’était plus capable d’assurer son rôle de souverain monétaire, c’est-à-dire garantir la valeur du franc. Or, la monnaie est ce qui représente symboliquement l’unité d’une communauté de compte, et si celle-ci entre en crise, c’est la communauté en elle-même qui est fragilisée. Ainsi, il y eut une perte de confiance hiérarchique dans la monnaie. Comment expliquer que la crise économique ait suffisamment d’ampleur pour projeter dans la sphère politique des problèmes initialement économiques ? Comment s’opère le passage d’une crise économique à une crise politique qui se traduit par une perte de confiance hiérarchique ? Comment expliquer l’arrêt de la crise monétaire, à la fois économique et politique, et, in fine, comment la confiance hiérarchique a-t-elle été recouvrée, alors que ce phénomène de crise est auto-entraînant ? Gramsci et notamment ses concepts de crises organique et hégémonique, et de césarisme seront mobilisés pour répondre à ces problématiques. Le concept de crise organique articule le passage de la crise économique à la crise politique. Celui de crise hégémonique donne à voir les enjeux de pouvoir entre différents groupes sociaux. La notion de césarisme permet d’interpréter la cause du renversement soudain de la valeur du franc sur le marché des changes, dans la mesure où le « César » réussit à instrumentaliser la crise organique pour arriver au pouvoir et à l’arrêter lorsqu’il y parvient. Les raisons de la perte de confiance hiérarchique et son recouvrement peuvent alors être éclairées par ces trois concepts gramsciens qui complètent celui de confiance hiérarchique. |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upn:wpaper:2016-07&r=hpe |
| By: | Maria Roubtsova (Centre d'Economie de l'Université de Paris Nord (CEPN)) |
| Abstract: | From the burst of the dotcom bubble in 2000, until the global financial crisis that started in August 2007, the global economy was growing. During that phase, macroeconomics went through an era of general optimism around the idea of having reached a great moderation, with high steady growth and low stable inflation. Central bankers thought they managed to dampen the economic cycles. This era came to an end following the meltdown which started with the global financial crisis of 2007. And as among economic agents, macroeconomists’ general state of mind went from optimism to pessimism. Almost ten years since the beginning of the crisis, growth is not back to its pre-crisis trends. Therefore, macroeconomists are debating the notion of a secular stagnation. Is the economy on a long-term stagnation trend, if so, for what reasons, and how to address this situation? This paper offers a critical review of the debates among macroeconomists around this notion of secular stagnation, a concept which was invented by Alvin Hansen following the global economic crisis of the 1930s, and was brought back into the public debate largely by Lawrence Summers since the end of 2013. This literature review starts with a brief synthesis of the original debate about secular stagnation, launched by Hansen in 1938, and ended in the mid-1950s, since these debates inspired contemporary theorists. The second part highlights the main elements of neoclassical explanations for secular stagnation. The third part focuses on the Minskian idea of the end of a debt super-cycle. The last part offers a contemporary reading of the unleashing of the contradictions of capitalism, and the tendency of mature capitalism to generate oligopolies, as a cause for long stagnation. |
| Keywords: | macroeconomics, secular stagnation, balance sheet recession, financialization, private debt, growth and distribution |
| JEL: | E39 E44 E66 G01 |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upn:wpaper:2016-09&r=hpe |
| By: | Alejandro Lee-Penagos (School of Economics, University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | Theoretical models have had difficulties to account, at the same time, for the most important stylized facts observed in experiments of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. A recent approach tackling that gap is Arifovic and Ledyard (2012), which implements social preferences in tandem with an evolutionary learning algorithm. However, the stylized facts have evolved. The model was not built to explain some of the most important findings in the public good games recent literature: that altruistic punishment can sustain cooperation. This paper extends their model in order to explain such recent findings. It focuses on fear of punishment, not punishment itself, as the key mechanism to sustain contributions to the public good. Results show that our model can replicate both qualitatively and quantitatively the main facts. Data generated by our model differs, on average, in less than 5% compared to relevant experiments with punishment in the lab. |
| Keywords: | Public Good Games, Punishment, Agent Based Modelling, Learning Algorithms, Other Regarding Preferences, Bounded Rationality. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2016-15&r=hpe |
| By: | Peter Backus (University of Manchester& Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB)); María Cubel (Universitat de Barcelona); Matej Guid (University of Ljubljana); Santiago Sánchez-Pages (Universitat de Barcelona); Enrique Lopez Manas (Google Developer Expert) |
| Abstract: | There is a growing literature looking at how men and women respond differently to competition. We contribute to this literature by studying gender differences in performance in a high-stakes and male dominated competitive environment, expert chess tournaments. Our findings show that women underperform compared to men of the same ability and that the gender composition of games drives this effect. Using within player variation in the conditionally random gender of their opponent, we find that women earn significantly worse outcomes against male opponents. We examine the mechanisms through which this effect operates by using a unique measure of within game quality of play. We find that the gender composition effect is driven by women playing worse against men, rather than by men playing better against women. The gender of the opponent does not affect a male player’s quality of play. We also find that men persist longer against women before resigning. These results suggest that the gender composition of competitions affects the behavior of both men and women in ways that are detrimental to the performance of women. Lastly, we study the effect of competitive pressure and find that players’ quality of play deteriorates when stakes increase, though we find no differential effect over the gender composition of games. |
| Keywords: | Competition, Gender, Stereotype threat, Chess |
| JEL: | D03 J16 J24 J70 L83 M50 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2016-27&r=hpe |
| By: | Taro Hisamatsu (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University) |
| Abstract: | This paper reconstructs Torrens fs theory of economic growth. Actual wage is determined by the capital-population ratio between the maximum and the minimum wage. In the process of growth, the maximum wage keeps being lowered by the decreasing marginal productivity in agriculture, while the minimum wage remains constant. Based on these notions of wages, Torrens fs economic dynamics are described as follows. In the early stage of growth, capital increases faster than population so that the actual wage rises above the minimum. Thereafter, the economy grows with a tendency for the population to increase faster than the capital while limiting the actual wage below the decreasing maximum until it enters a stationary state and the actual wage and profit rate are reduced to their minimum. This theory has been attributed to Ricardo by some scholars, but Torrens proposed a more ingenious theory than Ricardo fs. |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:koe:wpaper:1633&r=hpe |