|
on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Marion Dieudonné (LEDA-SDFi - LEDA-SDFi - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine, PSL - Université Paris-Dauphine) |
| Abstract: | The beginning of the 20th century saw the first steps in a tradition of leading economists explaining the link between corporate finance, investment and financial structure. The writings of John Maynard Keynes (1930), Gunnar Myrdal (1931, 1933) and James Tobin (1969) deal with the development of an investment theory based on the financial structure. In this context, we give a new presentation of Wicksellian and Keynesian theories. The initial impetus given by Knut Wicksell (1898) with his system of two interest rates must be emphasized (Schmidt, 1995). However, these studies do not mention Thorstein Veblen (1904, 1908, 1923), one of the founding fathers of institutionalism, who remains unknown, particularly in this tradition, although recent literature (Ganley, 2004; Gagnon, 2007; Cochrane, 2011; Mendez, 2012) considers that he made a real contribution to capital theory. He made an early American analysis of corporate governance structure, which emerged as a central issue in the early 20th century in light of the development of financial instruments, shareholder behavior and corporate equity valuation concerns. Our work is based on a critical review of the literature, which is guilty of omissions, lack of accuracy and errors of formalization. The theory of the non-neutrality of the financial structure remains wholly relevant today, so that in this paper, we focus on the reasons why Veblen’s corporate financial analysis should not be forgotten. |
| Keywords: | Keynes, goodwill, investment theory,capital valuation, corporate governance, financial structure, promoter’s profit, Myrdal’s Q, Tobin’s q, Veblen, Wicksell, windfall profits. |
| Date: | 2016–05–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01313309&r=hpe |
| By: | Claude Gamel (LEST - Laboratoire d'économie et de sociologie du travail - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille 2 - Université de Provence - Aix-Marseille 1 - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Whereas liberalism has been long assumed as an emancipatory philosophy of individuals facing with any arbitrary political power, why nowadays is it often considered as the philosophy of the submission to the despotic institutions of the market? This challenge commands to conciliate in a better way political liberalism and economic liberalism, so that the entire proposition has to be at least as consistent as Hayekian neoliberalism, but also it has to be more easily acceptable to individuals and peoples (1.1). We think that liberal egalitarianism with Rawlsian inspiration could give our question a suitable answer, provided that economics extends philosophy (1.2). If we consider contributions of authors as diverse as Sen, Kolm and Van Parijs, we can find analyses which are more or less identified – " equal liberty " of access to employment (2.1) and equalization of " capabilities-potentialities " (2.2)-, at the first two levels of the Rawlsian theory of justice; but, at the last level, the debate on the economics of the difference principle is still open: on one hand, we have the lump sum taxation of the product of the " capacities-resources " (3.1) and, on the other hand, the equalization of the " real freedom " of everyone (3.2). As a conclusion, we notice that others challenges are to be met, namely the findings of potential solutions in the debate on economics of the difference principle (4.1) or of possible implementations here and now of the whole economics of liberal egalitarianism (4.2). |
| Abstract: | Pourquoi le libéralisme, longtemps perçu comme une philosophie émancipatrice de l'individu face à l'arbitraire du pouvoir politique, est-il souvent considéré aujourd'hui comme une philosophie de la soumission au despotisme des marchés ? Face à un tel défi, il convient de mieux concilier libéralismes politique et économique, par une réponse au moins aussi cohérente que le néolibéralisme hayékien, mais plus acceptable par les individus et les peuples (1.1). L'égalitarisme libéral d'inspiration rawlsienne pourrait selon nous fournir la trame d'une telle réponse, à condition que cette philosophie soit prolongée par son économie (1.2). En s'appuyant notamment sur des contributions d'auteurs aussi différents que Sen, Kolm et Van Parijs, on recense alors des analyses à peu près balisées – « égale liberté » d'accès à l'emploi (2.1) et égalisation des « capacités-potentialités » (2.2) –, aux deux premiers niveaux de la théorie de la justice de Rawls ; mais le débat, au dernier niveau, sur l'économie du principe de différence reste ouvert, entre, d'une part, la redistribution forfaitaire du produit des « capacités-ressources » (3.1) et, d'autre part, l'égalisation de la « liberté réelle » de chacun (3.2). En conclusion sont évoqués d'autres défis encore à relever, qu'il s'agisse d'éventuelles issues au débat sur l'économie du principe de différence (4.1) ou des possibilités de mise en oeuvre, ici et maintenant, de toute l'économie de l'égalitarisme libéral (4.2). |
| Keywords: | liberalism,access to employment,capabilities as potentialities,capacities as resources,real freedom,libéralisme,accès à l'emploi,capacités-potentialités,capacités-ressources,liberté réelle. |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01333315&r=hpe |
| By: | Hugo C. W. Chu |
| Abstract: | Aggregation has been a pesky topic in economics at least since Stanley Jevons’s The Theory of Political Economy, when he resorted to a “fictitious mean” to grasp the complexity of an economy composed of heterogeneous agents. In the twentieth-century context, trade economists have helped deepen the search for a measure of society's overall welfare by which they brought out the concept of community indifference curve whose proofs were first provided in Gorman (1953) and in Samuelson (1956) under highly restrictive assumptions. Since there is a close relationship between community indifference curve and representative consumer, as proved by Samuelson (1956) and acknowledged by various authors such as Chipman (1965), Muellbauer (1976), and Dow and Werlang (1988), the question addressed in this article is: what role did Samuelson (1956) play in the rise of the representative-agent macroeconomics as materialized in the seminal papers by Cass (1965) and by Koopmans (1965) and continued into the traditions of Lucas (1969a, 1975, 1977), Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Prescott (1986)? I claim in this article that although Samuelson and Koopmans belonged to different scientific communities their research interests overlapped. Based also on archival works, this paper narrates how Samuelson’s representative consumer (agent) made it to Koopmans’s and, therefore, ultimately paved the way to today’s macroeconomics. |
| Keywords: | Paul Samuelson; Tjalling Koopmans; Representative consumer; Representative Agent; General Equilibrium Theory. |
| JEL: | B2 B22 |
| Date: | 2016–10–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spa:wpaper:2016wpecon17&r=hpe |
| By: | Thieme, Sebastian; Heise, Arne |
| Abstract: | This article discusses the development of 'heterodox' economics at universities in Germany since the 1970s. Based on Lakatos' concept of scientific research programmes (SRP), the article introduces a classification of economics in order to clarify the understanding of variety within economics, especially in the case of Germany. Based on this classification and taking into account the different kinds of capital (economic, social and symbolic) available to heterodox economists, this article aims to show how heterodox economics in Germany has developed from the early 1970s until the present day. It will be shown that the heterodox schools expanded in the 1970s, but marginalisation took hold again by the 1980s and ultimately left German heterodox economics in a state of near-extinction today. From this, it follows that the history of heterodoxy in Germany is an unequal 'battle of the paradigms', and can only be told as the story of a failure. |
| Keywords: | heterodox economics,pluralisation,philosophy of science,sociology of science,Germany |
| JEL: | A11 B20 B50 Z |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cessdp:57&r=hpe |
| By: | Bidard, Christian (University Paris Ouest) |
| Abstract: | We propose to re-read Ricardo's theory of rent to which, we claim, the post-Sraffian literature is methodologically unfaithful. Ricardo's dynamic approach follows the transformations of a long-term equilibrium with demand. Sraffa adopted the same framework while substituting a value criterion for a physical criterion to determine the incoming marginal method, but he did not state the law of succession of methods explicitly. This prevented him to realize that his critique to Ricardo opens the door to all complications of capital theory, with the consequence that the Ricardian dynamics fail when a divergence appears between profitability and productivity. Contemporary studies have cast doubts on the validity of some of Ricardo's and Sraffa's over-optimistic conclusions, but the abandonment of the dynamic approach does not allow them to explain the ultimate reason of the phenomena they have pointed at Ricardo's method has been recently rediscovered by mathematicians. |
| Keywords: | Classical theory; land; rent; Ricardo; Sraffa |
| JEL: | B12 B51 C61 D33 |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:sraffa:0008&r=hpe |
| By: | Stirati, Antonella (Università degli Studi Roma Tre (University of Rome Tre)) |
| Abstract: | Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century has been spectacularly successful and a reason for this might be the fact that the theory that underlies his analysis is mainstream theory, with some adjustments or reservations on specific points, but never on the fundamentals. Thus, while Piketty’s empirical analysis often challenges received views and supports a non-apologetic view of capitalism’s dynamics, the book at the same time speaks a language which is common to mainstream economists around the world. This however is not always conducive to consistency and interpretative accuracy. A different theoretical perspective (and some empirical evi-dence) might lead to questioning some of the book’s central claims. |
| Keywords: | Piketty; inequality; income distribution; capitalist dynamics |
| JEL: | D31 E25 P10 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:sraffa:0018&r=hpe |
| By: | Aidas Masiliunas (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM) - AMU - Aix-Marseille Université) |
| Abstract: | Path-dependence in coordination games may lead to lock-in on inefficient outcomes, such as adoption of inferior technologies (Arthur, 1989) or inefficient economic institutions (North, 1990). We aim to find conditions under which lock-in is overcome by developing a solution concept that makes ex-ante predictions about the adaptation process following lock-in. We assume that some players are myopic, forming beliefs according to fictitious play, while others are sophisticated, anticipating the learning process of the myopic players. We propose a solution concept based on a Nash equilibrium of the strategies chosen by sophisticated players. Our model predicts that no players would switch from the efficient to the inefficient action, but deviations in the other direction are possible. Three types of equilibria may exist: in the first type lock-in is sustained, while in the other two types lock-in is overcome. We determine the existence conditions for each of these equilibria and show that the equilibria in which lock-in is overcome are more likely and the transition is faster when sophisticated players have a longer planning horizon, or when the history of inefficient coordination is shorter. |
| Keywords: | game theory,learning,lock-in,farsightedness,coordination |
| Date: | 2016–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01304178&r=hpe |
| By: | Bellino , Enrico (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart)); Nerozzi, Sebastiano (Università degli studi di Palermo (University of Palermo)) |
| Abstract: | The formal representation of economic theories normally takes the shape of a model, that is, a system of equations which connect the endogenous variables with the values of the parameters which are taken as given. Sometimes, it is possible to identify one or more equations which are able to determine a subset of endogenous variables priory and independently of the other equations and of the value taken by the remaining variables of the system. The first group of equations and variables are thus said to causally determine the remaining variables. In Pasinetti’s works, this notion of causality has often been emphasized as a formal property having the burden of conveying a profound economic meaning. In this paper, we will go through those works of Pasinetti where the notion of causality plays a central role, with the purpose of contextualizing it within the econometric debate of the Sixties, enucleate its economic meaning, and show its connections with other fields of the modern classical approach. |
| Keywords: | causality; interdependence; modern classical approach; Ricardo distribution theory; Keynes’s analysis; ‘given quantities’; surplus approach; structural dynamics; vertical integration |
| JEL: | B00 B24 B51 C50 E12 |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:sraffa:0010&r=hpe |
| By: | Gabriel Galvez-Behar (IRHiS - Institut de Recherches Historiques du Septentrion - Université de Lille, Sciences Humaines et Sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | For many studies, the current “commodification” of science ends with a period which started in the middle of the twentieth century. The scientific entrepreneur may renew old practices and reminds old figures like Louis Pasteur's one. Such an echo of the past justifies an historical approach. Thus this paper calls for a renewed economic history of science thanks to the study of Pasteur's scientific enterprise. Based on new approaches to entrepreneurship, he focuses here on the analysis of three very specific resources - money, patents and capital – in order to have a better understanding of Pasteur's entrepreneurial logic. This study uses sources, which were largely neglected or even unknown. At last, it highlights the accumulation process of Pasteur's enterprise, which allowed him to take more risk in his scientific activities. |
| Abstract: | De nombreux travaux considèrent que l’implication croissante de la science dans des formes de valorisation économique met fin à une parenthèse ouverte au milieu du XXe siècle. La figure actuelle du chercheur entrepreneur – ou de l’entrepreneur scientifique – renouerait avec des pratiques plus anciennes dont Louis Pasteur serait d’ailleurs l’un des symboles. Un tel constat appelle une histoire économique renouvelée des mondes savants à laquelle cet article entend contribuer à travers l’étude de l’entreprise scientifique de Louis Pasteur. S’inspirant d’approches nouvelles de l’entrepreneuriat, il se concentre ici sur l’analyse de trois ressources bien particulières – l’argent, les brevets d’invention et le capital – qui permettent de mieux saisir la logique entrepreneuriale de Louis Pasteur. Cette étude, qui repose sur l’exploitation de sources jusqu’alors largement négligées voire inexploitées, fait alors ressortir la logique d’accumulation de l’entreprise pasteurienne qui lui permet d’assumer des risques toujours croissants. |
| Keywords: | Economic History,History of science,Patents, Brevets,Pasteur (Louis), Histoire des sciences, Histoire économique |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01267638&r=hpe |
| By: | Luc Marco (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - Université Paris 13 - USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Robert Noumen (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - Université Paris 13 - USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | The history of the small business schools in Province in the nineteenth century can be made through the works of his professors. The link between arithmetic and accounting is essential to understand the education at the average level for pupils having between 12 and 16 years. The rediscovery of a mathematician doubled by an accountant, Lazare Moulin-Collin, allows to understand the formation of the teachers and the experts in these domains. From new archival sources we rediscover the biography and the contents of his very interesting works. |
| Abstract: | L'histoire des petites écoles de commerce en Province au dix-neuvième siècle peut être faite au travers des ouvrages de ses professeurs. Le lien entre arithmétique et comptabilité est essentiel pour comprendre l'enseignement au niveau moyen pour des élèves ayant entre 12 et 16 ans. La redécouverte d'un mathématicien doublé d'un comptable, Lazare Moulin-Collin, permet de comprendre la formation des enseignants et des experts dans ces domaines. A partir de sources archivistiques nouvelles nous redécouvrons la biographie et le contenu de ses ouvrages très intéressants. |
| Keywords: | Arithmetic,accounting,Arithmétique,comptabilité |
| Date: | 2015–11–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01233103&r=hpe |
| By: | Jérôme Hergueux (ETH Zurich); Nicolas Jacquemet (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Stéphane Luchini (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille 3 - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jason Shogren (Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming - UW - University of Wyoming) |
| Abstract: | Real economic commitment (or the lack of it) of others affects a person's preferences to cooperate. But what if the commitment of others cannot be observed ex ante? Herein we examine how a classic non-monetary institution– a solemn oath of honesty –creates economic commitment within the public goods game. Commitment-through-the-oath asks people to hold themselves to a higher standard of integrity. Our results suggest the oath can increase cooperation (by 33%)– but the oath does not change preferences for cooperation. Rather people react quicker and cooperate, taking less time to ponder on the strategic free riding behavior. |
| Keywords: | WorkingPublic good game,Social Preference,Truth Keywords: Public good game |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01379060&r=hpe |
| By: | Brice Corgnet (EMLYON Business school - EMLYON Business School, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Mark Desantis (Chapman University - Chapman University, Argyros School of Business and Economics); David Porter (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University - Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | Using simulations and experiments, we pinpoint two main drivers of trader performance: cognitive reflection and theory of mind. Both dimensions facilitate traders' learning about asset valuation. Cognitive reflection helps traders use market signals to update their beliefs whereas theory of mind offers traders crucial hints on the quality of those signals. We show these skills to be complementary because traders benefit from understanding the quality of market signals only if they are capable of processing them. Cognitive reflection relates to previous Behavioral Finance research as it is the best predictor of a trader's ability to avoid commonly-observed behavioral biases. |
| Keywords: | Experimental asset markets, behavioral finance, cognitive reflection, theory of mind, financial education |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01364432&r=hpe |
| By: | Sebastian Galiani; Gustavo Torrens |
| Abstract: | Why did the most prosperous colonies in the British Empire mount a rebellion? Even more puzzling, why didn't the British agree to have American representation in Parliament and quickly settle the dispute peacefully? At first glance, it would appear that a deal could have been reached to share the costs of the global public goods provided by the Empire in exchange for political power and representation for the colonies. (At least, this was the view of men of the time such as Lord Chapman, Thomas Pownall and Adam Smith.) We argue, however, that the incumbent government in Great Britain, controlled by the landed gentry, feared that allowing Americans to be represented in Parliament would undermine the position of the dominant coalition, strengthen the incipient democratic movement, and intensify social pressures for the reform of a political system based on land ownership. Since American elites could not credibly commit to refuse to form a coalition with the British opposition, the only realistic options were to maintain the original colonial status or fight a full-scale war of independence. |
| JEL: | D74 N41 |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22724&r=hpe |
| By: | Deaton, Angus (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | Interview with the 2015 Laureate in Economic Sciences Angus Deaton on 6 December 2015, during the Nobel Week in Stockholm, Sweden. |
| Keywords: | Consumption; Development |
| JEL: | D10 O10 |
| Date: | 2015–12–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nobelp:2015_005&r=hpe |
| By: | Geoffrey C. Harcourt (School of Economics, UNSW Business School, UNSW) |
| Keywords: | Keynes, Versailles, King’s, lives of economists and scientists, life philosophy |
| JEL: | B10 B31 A31 |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:swe:wpaper:2016-10&r=hpe |
| By: | Petri, Fabio (Università degli Studi di Siena (University of Siena)) |
| Abstract: | A review by Bortkiewicz, wholeheartedly approved by Walras, of the second edition of the Eléments supplies an important insight, until now neglected, on how Walras interpreted his own capitalization equations before the fourth edition. The insight helps to explain why Walras was for so long unable to perceive that his given vectorial endowment of capital goods was incompatible with the uniform rate of return on supply price that he was assuming. Walras seems to have confusedly considered the capital endowments relevant for the determi-nation of equilibrium rentals to be the ones resulting from the production of new capital goods, and therefore as having already undergone an adjustment of their composition toward the one required for URRSP. Realization of the erroneousness of this view can explain the unobtrusive but crucial changes in the discussion of capitalization in the fourth edition, and most likely also the introduction of the ‘bons’. |
| Keywords: | Walras; capital; Bortkiewicz; tâtonnement |
| JEL: | B13 B31 D50 |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:sraffa:0017&r=hpe |
| By: | Committee, Nobel Prize (Nobel Prize Committee) |
| Abstract: | Contracts are essential to the functioning of modern societies. Oliver Hart's and Bengt Holmström's research sheds light on how contracts help us deal with conflicting interests. |
| Keywords: | Contract theory; |
| JEL: | D86 |
| Date: | 2016–10–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nobelp:2016_002&r=hpe |
| By: | Eric Schmidbauer (University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL) |
| Abstract: | Each of n experts communicates with a principal about the privately observed quality of the expert's own project via cheap talk, with new independently drawn projects available each period until the principal adopts one. Even when experts are very biased in that they only receive a positive payoff if their own project is selected, we show that informative equilibria may exist, characterize the set of stationary equilibria, and nd the Pareto dominant symmetric equilibrium. Experts face a tradeoff between inducing acceptance now versus waiting for a better project should the game continue. When the future is more highly valued experts send more informative messages, increasing the average quality of an adopted project and resulting in a Pareto improvement, while communication is harmed and payoffs can decline when there is more competition between experts. |
| Keywords: | cheap talk, multiple senders, competition |
| JEL: | D23 D74 D82 |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfl:wpaper:2016-04&r=hpe |
| By: | Pierre-Henri Faure (Larefi - Laboratoire d'analyse et de recherche en économie et finance internationales - Université Montesquieu - Bordeaux 4) |
| Abstract: | La multiplication sur Internet des nouveaux instruments de paiement virtuels recourant à la cryptographie interpelle aujourd’hui les économistes sur leur conception de la monnaie, en même temps qu’elle remet en question l’organisation pyramidale du système bancaire. Leur émission privée et leur circulation dans des réseaux pair-à-pair, au sein desquels n’existe plus aucun tiers de confiance désigné, contestent en effet l’ordre monétaire fondé sur le crédit et les banques centrales. Le présent papier s’intéresse au bitcoin, le plus emblématique de ces instruments virtuels, et traite la question de savoir s’il peut être réellement considéré comme une monnaie au sens où l’entendent les économistes. Il apparaît en première analyse qu’il ne remplit que très imparfaitement les trois fonctions qui lui sont habituellement dévolues et qu’il s’apparente surtout à un actif financier. Le bitcoin est ensuite étudié à partir de l’approche réaliste en privilégiant le point de vue de l’école économique autrichienne, compte tenu du soubassement intellectuel des idées défendues par ses promoteurs ; dans ce cadre, deux points sont plus particulièrement abordés : sa compatibilité avec le théorème de régression puis la comparaison des projets actuels avec la proposition hayékienne de dénationalisation des monnaies. Le cas du bitcoin est enfin examiné dans la perspective du paradigme hétérodoxe qui combine la conception institutionnaliste et la pensée post-keynésienne. En conclusion, s’il peut être vu comme une sorte de mise à l’épreuve des thèses autrichiennes, son caractère totalement exogène et son incapacité à satisfaire les différentes formes de confiance qui sont indispensables à la légitimation de la monnaie conduisent à lui refuser ce qualificatif dans la grille de lecture institutionnaliste. |
| Keywords: | bitcoin, cryptomonnaie, école autrichienne, institutionnalisme, post-keynésianisme |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01337694&r=hpe |
| By: | Antoine Guironnet (LATTS - Laboratoire Techniques, Territoires et Sociétés - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Ludovic Halbert (LATTS - Laboratoire Techniques, Territoires et Sociétés - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Rachel Weber’s recent book offers a landmark contribution to the scholarship of urban studies. Written in a sharp and vivid style, and drawing from an intimate knowledge of Chicago, From Boom to Bubble constitutes an impressive work. Combining empirically-rich material with theoretically-informed research, Weber achieves the feat of bringing a strikingly new perspective on the much-debated question of why urban development is prone to overbuilding. |
| Keywords: | urban political economy, financialisation, planning,urban redevelopment |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01336517&r=hpe |
| By: | Fratini, Saverio M. (Università degli Studi Roma Tre (University of Rome Tre)) |
| Abstract: | The paper reconstructs the history of what Sraffa called the ‘degeneration of cost’ as emerges from his manuscripts of the late 1920s. In particular, Sraffa regards the Physiocrats as having the correct idea of cost as being the commodities that allow workers to subsist. The classical economists measured this bundle of commodi-ties in terms of labour, which they also ambiguously viewed as ‘toil and trouble’. Then, the idea of labour as ‘toil and trouble’ was indicated by neoclassical authors as an anticipation of their conception of cost as a sacrifice. Conferring also upon abstinence from consumption the nature of sacrifice, the neoclassical-marginalist theory understood wages and interest as compensation for the disutility of working and saving. Then, cost was ultimately seen as what induces workers and capitalists to produce. This completed the degeneration of cost from the objective-physical conception of the Physiocrats to the subjective-psychological view of the neoclassical school. |
| Keywords: | cost; economic methodology; Sraffa; Sraffa’s manuscripts |
| JEL: | B12 B13 B41 B51 D24 |
| Date: | 2016–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:sraffa:0021&r=hpe |
| By: | Frédéric Gavrel (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In a status game, homogenous individuals first decide on their income (and on the effort necessary to that end) with the aim at Getting ahead of the Smithes (GAS). Next, they make use of a pure positional good to make incomes visible. Although the GAS hypothesis is ordinal, the signalling costs induce cardinal social concerns. The GAS hypothesis, translated into the KUJ (Keeping Up with the Joneses) (pride) concern, generates an equilibrium in which identical agents have unequal income levels. This equilibrium is an egalitarian optimum. But utilitarian and Paretian inefficiency are the price paid for equality. |
| Keywords: | Efficiency,Conspicuous consumption,Well-being,Status game,Social concerns,Income inequalities |
| Date: | 2016–05–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01319593&r=hpe |
| By: | Angus Deaton (Princeton University); Nancy Cartwright (Durham University and University of California San Diego) |
| Abstract: | RCTs are valuable tools whose use is spreading in economics and in other social sciences. They are seen as desirable aids in scientific discovery and for generating evidence for policy. Yet some of the enthusiasm for RCTs appears to be based on misunderstandings: that randomization provides a fair test by equalizing everything but the treatment and so allows a precise estimate of the treatment alone; that randomization is required to solve selection problems; that lack of blinding does little to compromise inference; and that statistical inference in RCTs is straightforward, because it requires only the comparison of two means. None of these statements is true. RCTs do indeed require minimal assumptions and can operate with little prior knowledge, an advantage when persuading distrustful audiences, but a crucial disadvantage for cumulative scientific progress, where randomization adds noise and undermines precision. The lack of connection between RCTs and other scientific knowledge makes it hard to use them outside of the exact context in which they are conducted. Yet, once they are seen as part of a cumulative program, they can play a role in building general knowledge and useful predictions, provided they are combined with other methods, including conceptual and theoretical development, to discover not "what works," but why things work. Unless we are prepared to make assumptions, and to stand on what we know, making statements that will be incredible to some, all the credibility of RCTs is for naught. |
| JEL: | C53 |
| Date: | 2016–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:rpdevs:august_25.pdf&r=hpe |
| By: | Di Bartolomeo Giovanni; Papa Stefano |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to study the effects of free-form messages (cheap talk) in an investment game as Berg et al. (1995). We guess that messages matter, but they may not affect the outcomes on average because different outcomes of communication can be systematically misunderstood generating different effects that offset each other. Considering a non-binary choice game, where misunderstandings are more likely to be observed, we test our intuition in two steps. First, we classify messages by their contents and then we verify their impact on participants’ behavior accordingly to their kind. |
| Keywords: | Trust, reciprocity, promises, requests, empty talk |
| JEL: | D03 C91 D83 |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ter:wpaper:00123&r=hpe |
| By: | Andrés Salamanca Lugo (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics); Olga Manrique Chaparro (Universidad Nacional de Colombia [Bogotá]) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we experimentally analyze the use of private information in a class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side and perfect monitoring. We analyze whether the information disclosure by the informed players, and its use by the uninformed players, matches the theoretical predictions. We consider two games that differ according to the amount of information that the informed player should optimally disclose: in the first game, the informed player should entirely conceal his information. In contrast, in the second game the informed player should fully disclose his information. We find that the flow of information is higher than predicted in the first game and lower than predicted in the second game. However, the use of information is strictly higher in the second game than in the first one. Uninformed subjects tend not to use the revealed information in the first game, and seem to misinterpret the revealed information in the second game. |
| Keywords: | Repeated games,incomplete information,experiments |
| Date: | 2016–04–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01305213&r=hpe |
| By: | Troels Krarup (Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | European integration of financial markets appears to repeatedly encounter specific kinds of problems about the substance and limits of the notion of “the market” undergoing integration, and about the status and role of money, market infrastructures, and government within it. Moreover, these problems and the controversies around them parallel classical discussions in economic theory such as that between conceptions of the market as a frictionless space and as a process of competition. A “competitive conception of the market” is identified as producing these parallel problems and controversies in European market integration and economic theory because it implies a contradictory “integration of fragmentation.” These themes and parallels can be specifically identified in a recent major project to integrate financial market infrastructures: a pan-European settlement platform – “Target2-Securities (T2S)” – to overcome existing fragmentation between the systems that perform the actual delivery of money and securities from financial transactions. Moreover, a close analysis of T2S answers a question that existing sociological and political economy approaches to European integration – focusing primarily on the interests and ideas of powerful players – struggle with: why T2S will become de facto a monopoly for the European Central Bank when early on in the integration process EU institutions emphasized an industry-led integration. Foucault’s notion of “discursive formation” is employed to conceptualize these arguments. |
| Keywords: | European integration; financial markets; financial infrastructures; money |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5roa67nl3t9vmaafofq0ug2d9d&r=hpe |