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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Daniyal Khan (Department of Economics, Seeta Majeed School of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, Beaconhouse National University) |
| Abstract: | This paper argues that given certain self-definitions and key defining features of economic sociology, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money can be read and interpreted as a text in economic sociology. Around this core argument, a case is built for a more open interaction and mutual appreciation between economic sociology and heterodox approaches to economics. The paper suggests how broader interpretations of classics of social science (such as the General Theory) may help us better appreciate the shared intellectual lineages and legacies of economics and sociology. It concludes with reflections on the historical development of the relationship between economics and sociology, and some speculation about their future. |
| Keywords: | John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory, economic sociology, heterodox economics, capitalism |
| JEL: | B31 B50 P10 Z13 |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:new:wpaper:1605&r=hpe |
| By: | George S. Tavlas (Bank of Greece) |
| Abstract: | The Great Depression was the most devastating and destructive economic event to afflict the global economy since the beginning of the twentieth century. What, then, were the origins of the Great Depression and what have we learned about the appropriate policy responses to economic depressions from that episode? This essay reviews two recently published books on the Great Depression. Eric Rauchway’s The Money Makers: How Roosevelt and Keynes Ended the Depression, Defeated Fascism, and Secured a Prosperous Peace (Basic Books, 2015) tells the story of the ways Franklin D. Roosevelt drew on the ideas of John Maynard Keynes to place monetary policy front-and-center to underpin the recovery from the Great Depression and to underwrite the blueprint of the Bretton-Woods System. Barry Eichengreen’s Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, the Great Recession, and the Uses — and Misuses — of History (Oxford University Press, 2015) shows the way the lessons learned from analysis of the Great Depression helped shape policy makers’ response to the 2007-08 financial crisis, thus helping to avoid many of the mistakes made by policy makers in the 1930s |
| Keywords: | Great Depression; Gold Standard; Bretton Woods System; 2008 Financial Crisis |
| JEL: | E52 F33 |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bog:wpaper:212&r=hpe |
| By: | Francesco Sergi (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this contribution to the epistemology and history of recent macroeconomics is to construct a clear understanding of econometric methods and problems in New Classical macroeconomics. Most historical work have focused so far on theoretical or policy implication aspects of this research program set in motion by Robert Lucas in the early seventies. On the contrary, the empirical and econometric works of New Classical macroeconomics have received little attention. I focus especially on the contributions gathered in Rational Expectations and Econometric Practice, edited in 1981 by Lucas and Thomas Sargent. The main claim of this article is that the publication of this book must be regarded as a turn in macroeconomics, that would bring macroeconometric modeling methodology closer to Lucas's conception of models. The analysis of the New Classical macroeconometrics through the Lucas methodology allow us to propose an original historical account of the methods presented in Rational Expectations and Econometric Practice, but also of the problems that flawed this approach. |
| Abstract: | L'objectif de cette contribution à l'épistémologie et à l'histoire de la pensée économique est de proposer une compréhension claire des méthodes et des problèmes économétriques de la nouvelle macroéconomie classique. La plupart des travaux historiques à ce sujet se sont focalisés sur les aspects théoriques ou sur les implications de politique économique de ce programme de recherche, lancé par Robert Lucas au début des années soixante-dix. En revanche, le travail empirique et économétrique de la nouvelle macroéconomie classique a reçu peu d'attention par les historiens. L'article s'intéresse plus particulièrement aux contributions rassemblées dans Rational Expectations and Econometric Practice, ouvrage collectif de 1981 dirigé par Lucas et Thomas Sargent. La principale thèse de l'article est que la publication de ce livre entérine un tournant dans la modélisation macroéconométrique, en étroite résonance avec la conception méthodologique de Lucas sur les modèles. L'analyse de la macroéconométrie des nouveaux classiques par le prisme de la méthodologie lucasienne nous permet de proposer une vision historique originale des méthodes présentées dans Rational Expectations and Econometric Practice, tout comme des problèmes qui ont entravé le développement de cette approche. |
| Keywords: | history of macroeconomics,macroeconometrics,modeling methodology,histoire de la macroéconomie,Lucas (Robert),Sargent (Thomas),macroéconométrie,méthodologie et modélisation |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01244393&r=hpe |
| By: | Alain Béraud (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - Université de Cergy Pontoise - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Alors qu’en 1943, Allais se présentait comme un disciple de Walras, il en vint à critiquer, à la fin des années 1960 le modèle moniste de l’économie de marché et à lui opposer le modèle pluraliste de l’économie de marchés. On analyse, ici, les divers aspects de cette critique. En 1943, Allais reprochait déjà à Walras d’avoir conçu un modèle statique et il avançait une modification de ce modèle, l’introduction des prévisions, qui permettait d’y introduire le temps, donc de développer une dynamique. A la fin des années 1960, ce qu’Allais critique c’est, avant tout, le processus d’ajustement. Walras admettait qu’il n’existe pour un bien qu’un seul prix et que les échanges ne sont effectifs qu’aux prix d’équilibre. Allais lui oppose un modèle où les prix utilisés sont spécifiques aux transactions considérées et où les marchandises sont échangées avant même que l’équilibre ne soit atteint. Il conclut que les théories actuelles de l’équilibre qui s’appuient sur les hypothèses du modèle walrassien doivent être reformulées. |
| Keywords: | General equilibium,Equilibre général,Walras,Allais,Surplus |
| Date: | 2015–09–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01353827&r=hpe |
| By: | Risse, Mathias (Risse, Mathias); Meyer, John W. (Meyer, John W.) |
| Abstract: | In recent decades the world has grown together in ways in which it had never been before. This integration is linked to a greatly expanded public and collective awareness of global integration and interdependence. Academics across the social sciences and humanities have reacted to the expanded realities and perceptions, trying to make sense of the world within the confines of their disciplines. In sociology, since the 1970, notions of the world as a society have become more and more prominent. John Meyer, among others, has put forward, theoretically and empirically, a general world-society approach. In philosophy, much more recently, Mathias Risse has proposed the grounds-of-justice approach. Even though one is a social-scientific approach and the other a philosophical one, Meyer's world society approach and Risse's grounds-of-justice approach have much in common. This essay brings these two approaches into a conversation. |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:15-054&r=hpe |
| By: | Frank Page |
| Abstract: | For a discounted stochastic game with an uncountable state space and compact metric action spaces, we show that if the measurable-selection-valued, Nash payoff selection correspondence of the underlying one-shot game contains a sub-correspondence having the K- limit property (i.e., if the Nash payoff selection sub-correspondence contains its K-limits and therefore is a K correspondence), then the discounted stochastic game has a stationary Markov equilibrium. Our key result is a new fixed point theorem for measurable-selection-valued correspondences having the K-limit property. We also show that if the discounted stochastic game is noisy (Duggan, 2012), or if the underlying probability space satisfies the G-nonatomic condition of Rokhlin (1949) and Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) (and therefore satisfies the coaser transition kernel condition of He and Sun, 2014), then the Nash payoff selection correspondence contains a sub-correspondence having the K-limit property. |
| Keywords: | approximate Caratheodory selections; fixed points of nonconvex valued correspondences; measurable selection valued correspondences; Komlos limits; Komlos’ Theorem; weak star convergence; discounted stochastic games; stationary Markov equilibria |
| JEL: | C7 |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:67809&r=hpe |
| By: | Fusari, Angelo |
| Abstract: | It is becoming increasingly clear that a new economics is required for investigating modern dynamic economies and the coming social world. Important features of those economies, such as innovation, uncertainty and entrepreneurship, are usually considered capitalist features. This may have been true historically, but this book argues that the contrary will be true for the future: the full and efficient operation of those supposed capitalist features will increasingly require the overcoming of capitalist civilization. In this book, Angelo Fusari constructs a theoretical framework for the interpretation and management of modern dynamic economies which demonstrates that deep institutional transformations are essential if we are to move beyond the current consumer-capitalist age and the age of the domination of financial capital . A New Economics for Modern Dynamic Economies opens with a consideration of the basic aspects of modern dynamic economies and proceeds to develop a representation of the whole economic system centered on the interrelationships between entrepreneurship, innovation and radical uncertainty in a ‘dynamic competition’ process. This model provides an explanation of business cycles that largely differs from current explanations as it derives from the notion of dynamic competition. The book is then extended from the sectoral to the micro level and then to the level of the firm. The second half of the book is concerned with operational problems and in particular with the integration of this analysis of cycles with the notion of historical phases of development. The final chapter explores the route of the transition from capitalism to a new economic and social order – a transition of vital importance, both for the contemporary world and for the coming world. The book also shows the possibility of a scientific explanation of important ethical pinciples as indispensable to the organizational efficiency of social system: for instance, the necessity and the way to conciliate productive efficiency, social justice and individual freedom. This volume is of great interest to those who study political economy, macro-economics and economic theory and philosophy. |
| Keywords: | Innovation; Uncertainty; Entrepreneurship; Macro and micro specification; Monetary and financial variables; Ethics |
| JEL: | C0 C02 C3 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:74008&r=hpe |
| By: | Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen |
| Abstract: | Since the publication of Adam Smithís Wealth of Nations, it has been customary among economists to presume that economic agents are purely selfinterested. However, research in experimental and behavioral economics has shown that human motivation is more complex and that observed behavior is often better explained by additional motivational factors such as a concern for fairness, social welfare etc. As a complement to that body of work we have carried out theoretical investigations into the evolutionary foundations of human motivation (Alger and Weibull 2013, 2016). We found that natural selection, in starkly simpliÖed but mathematically well-structured environments, favors preferences that combine self-interest with morality. Roughly speaking, the moral component evaluates oneís own action in terms of what would happen, if, hypothetically, this action were adopted by others. Such moral preferences have important implications for economic behavior. They motivate individuals to contribute to public goods, to give fair o§ers when they could get away with cheap o§ers, and to contribute to social institutions and act in environmentally friendly ways even if their individual impact is negligible. |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:31011&r=hpe |
| By: | Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen |
| Abstract: | Since the publication of Adam Smithís Wealth of Nations, it has been customary among economists to presume that economic agents are purely selfinterested. However, research in experimental and behavioral economics has shown that human motivation is more complex and that observed behavior is often better explained by additional motivational factors such as a concern for fairness, social welfare etc. As a complement to that body of work we have carried out theoretical investigations into the evolutionary foundations of human motivation (Alger and Weibull 2013, 2016). We found that natural selection, in starkly simpliÖed but mathematically well-structured environments, favors preferences that combine self-interest with morality. Roughly speaking, the moral component evaluates oneís own action in terms of what would happen, if, hypothetically, this action were adopted by others. Such moral preferences have important implications for economic behavior. They motivate individuals to contribute to public goods, to give fair o§ers when they could get away with cheap o§ers, and to contribute to social institutions and act in environmentally friendly ways even if their individual impact is negligible. |
| Date: | 2016–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:iastwp:31010&r=hpe |
| By: | Giacomo Degli Antoni (University of Parma, Department of Law); Marco Faillo (University of Trento); Lorenzo Sacconi (University of Trento); Pedro Francés-Gomez (University of Granada) |
| Abstract: | Drawing on the theoretical and experimental literature on distributive justice, we put some assumptions of the contractarian argument to an empirical test by means of an experiment which investigates the influence that explicit agreement under the veil of ignorance may have on individuals' conception of justice and its implementation in a context of the production and distribution of a common output. One crucial characteristic of our experiment is that subjects are assigned unequal endowments for which they are not responsible; the assignment is random. At the same time, their work naturally generates unequal levels of earnings. Do the subjects involved in this interaction distinguish between the two types of inequality? Do they try to reduce the arbitrary one, while accepting the one generated through effort? Do they elaborate other distributive criteria? Does their choice ex-ante, when they are behind the veil, differ from their choice ex-post once the veil has been lifted and they know the outcome of the production phase? The main result is that the agreement under a veil of ignorance induces subjects to accept a liberal egalitarian division rule not only in the ex-ante agreement, but also in the actual implementation of the pie division, even if this contradicts their self-interest and some common economic assumptions about reciprocal expectations of rationality. In addition, our results show that deliberating through open discussion increases the level of ex-post compliance. |
| Keywords: | Trust; Distributive justice, social contract, fairness, dictator game, contractarian business ethics |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D02 D63 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp60&r=hpe |
| By: | Andrzej Nowak (Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw - Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw,, Florida Atlantic University [Boca Raton]); Jørgen Vitting Andersen (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Wojciech Borkowski (University of Social Sciences and Humanities - University of Social Sciences and Humanities) |
| Abstract: | Gintis Helbing and go beyond the traditional boundaries of scientific disciplines and offer the integration of major theories of the main disciplines of the social and natural sciences. The theory captures many ideas of social psychology. Several assumptions of the model, however, can be questioned. The hypothesis that social systems are at equilibrium is too narrow, because social systems can also be out of balance. The concept of dynamic attraction shows that the systems may converge to different types of attractors in accordance with the value of control parameters. The notion of rationality of human behavior can be challenged on the basis of new data of psychology, decision sciences and behavioral economics. Often individuals do not process information, but rather copy the choices of others. Individuals interact by both direct and indirect means – if market mechanisms. More importantly, the social dynamic, unlike physical systems, are governed by a sense. Despite these limitations of the theory and Gintis Helbing is an important step in the integration of social sciences. |
| Keywords: | Complex system,adaptive system,general equilibrium |
| Date: | 2015–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01242298&r=hpe |
| By: | Jean-François Caulier (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Ana Mauleon (CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain, CEREC - Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles); Vincent Vannetelbosch (CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain, CEREC - Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles) |
| Abstract: | Coalitional network games are real-valued functions defined on a set of players organized into a network and a coalition structure. We adopt a flexible approach assuming that players organize themselves the best way possible by forming the efficient coalitional network structure. We propose two allocation rules that distribute the value of the efficient coalitional network structure: the atom-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule and the player-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule. |
| Keywords: | cooperative game theory, allocation rules,Coalition, Networks |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01301981&r=hpe |
| By: | Ohad Navon |
| Abstract: | An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an equilibrium strategy that is immune to invasions by rare alternative (mutant) strategies. Unlike Nash equilibria, ESS do not always exist in finite games. In this paper we address the question of what happens when the size of the game increases: does an ESS exist for almost every” large game? We let the entries of an n × n game matrix be independently randomly chosen according to a symmetrical subexponential distribution F, and study the expected number of ESS with support of size d as n ? ?. In a previous paper by Hart, Rinott and Weiss [6] it was shown that this limit is 1 2 for d = 2. This paper deals with the case of d ? 4, and proves the conjecture in [6] (Section 6,c), that the expected number of ESS with support of size d ? 4 is 0. Furthermore, it discusses the classic problem of the number of facets of a convex hull of n random points in Rd, and relates it to the above ESS problem. Given a collection of i.i.d. random points, our result implies that the expected number of facets of their convex hull converges to 2d as n ? ?. |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp702&r=hpe |
| By: | Francesco Bogliacino; Laura Jiménez; Daniel Reyes |
| Abstract: | In this work, we test the hypothesis that the Colombian system of socio-economic stratification, which ranks dwellings from one to six to calculate utility (public services) rates, may be discriminatory and increase segregation. A field experiment with around 1000 participants from Bogota is carried out. The design includes a combination of a trust game and a dictator game. Results exclude the presence of pure preferences for discrimination, yet confirm that low strata are associated with stereotypes of low trustworthiness. We also observe significant pro-social behaviour in the low income population, and, most strikingly, we do not observe any difference in trustworthiness according to income level. |
| Keywords: | segregation; discrimination; statistical discrimination; stereotypes; trust |
| JEL: | C93 H24 J15 |
| Date: | 2016–09–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000178:015112&r=hpe |
| By: | Gunes, Okay |
| Abstract: | Abstract Recent developments in identifying economic and social phenomena within the theory and laws of physics do not provide a sufficient basis of information for economists. In this article, an interdisciplinary analysis in microeconomics, is proposed to overcome this limit by establishing a new economic theory in the way of better analyzing economic problems from the methodological perspectives of physics. This new theoretical approach is tested on a model using individual time use values that identifies how life satisfaction may be defined through economic utility so as to better investigate the income-happiness paradox as pointed out by Easterlin. The theoretical analysis point out that an increase in happiness would depend on the ability to replace subsidiaries with conspicuous consumption so long as they have common characteristics that satisfy the same needs. This consumption pattern implies that consumers would draw more satisfaction from less usage of conspicuous goods than from higher usage of subsidiaries, under given budget and time constraints. |
| Keywords: | Time use,Relativistic Satisfaction,Satisfaction Waves,Speed of Satisfaction |
| JEL: | J22 D01 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:146402&r=hpe |
| By: | Frank Page |
| Abstract: | We identify a new class of uncountable-compact discounted stochastic games for which existence of stationary Markov equilibria can be established and we prove two new existence results for this class. Our approach to proving existence in both cases is new – with both proofs being based upon continuous approximation methods. For our first result we use approximation methods involving measurable-selection-valued continuous functions to establish a new fixed point result for Nash payoff selection correspondences - and more generally for measurable-selection-valued correspondences having nonconvex values. For our second result, we again use approximation methods, but this time involving player action-profile-valued continuous functions to establish a new measurable selection result for upper Caratheodory Nash payoff correspondences. Because conditions which guarantee approximability - the presence of sub-correspondences taking contractible values (or more generally, Rd-values) - are the very conditions which rule out Nash equilibria homeomorphic to the unit circle, we conjecture that for uncountable-compact discounted stochastic games, the approximable class is the widest class for which existence of stationary Markov equilibria can be established. |
| Keywords: | tationary Markov equilibria; discounted stochastic games; fixed point |
| JEL: | C7 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:67808&r=hpe |
| By: | Athey, Susan (Stanford University); Calvano, Emilio (Bologna University); Jha, Saumitra (Stanford University) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the classic problem of sustaining trust when cheating and leaving trading partners is easy, and outside enforcement is difficult. We construct equilibria where individuals are loyal to smaller groups--communities--that allow repeated interaction. Hierarchies provide incentives for loyalty and allow individuals to trust agents to extent that the agents are actually trustworthy. We contrast these with other plausible institutions for engendering loyalty that require inefficient withholding of trust to support group norms, and are not robust to coalitional deviations. In communities whose members randomly match, we show that social mobility within hierarchies falls as temptations to cheat rise. In communities where individuals can concentrate their trading with pre-selected members, hierarchies where senior members are favored for trade sustain trust even in the presence of proximate nonhierarchical communities. We link these results to the emergence of trust in new market environments and early human societies. |
| Date: | 2016–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:3467&r=hpe |
| By: | Blanche Segrestin (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Cent ans après sa publication, l’ouvrage d’Henri Fayol, Administration industrielle et générale, passe pour être l’un des livres fondateurs des sciences de gestion. Il marque la naissance de l’entreprise moderne, avec la reconnaissance de la nouvelle figure du chef d’entreprise. Un siècle après, ce numéro d’Entreprises et Histoire, coordonné par Blanche Segrestin, vise à mieux caractériser le tournant que Fayol cherchait à théoriser : quelles ruptures percevait-il qui nécessitaient une nouvelle doctrine de gouvernement et de nouvelles formations pour les dirigeants ? Comment relier en particulier son effort théorique à son expérience pratique en tant qu’ingénieur et directeur, mais aussi en tant que géologue et créateur d’un laboratoire de recherche innovant ? Les articles réunis dans ce numéro montrent que Fayol a eu besoin de recourir à de nouveaux termes pour décrire les bouleversements industriels et stratégiques de l’époque, mais aussi d’introduire des concepts originaux pour faire face à l’intégration de la recherche scientifique et de l’innovation dans le cours des affaires. Autant de mutations qui, à l’heure où les pratiques du management sont remises en cause, permettent d’éclairer sous un nouveau jour les fondements du management moderne. |
| Keywords: | Fayol, innovation, histoire, chef d'entreprise, science, industrie |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01336829&r=hpe |
| By: | Mukand, Sharun (University of Warwick); Rodrik, Dani (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | We distinguish between three sets of rights - property rights, political rights, and civil rights - and provide a taxonomy of political regimes. The distinctive nature of liberal democracy is that it protects civil rights (equality before the law for minorities) in addition to the other two. Democratic transitions are typically the product of a settlement between the elite (who care mostly about property rights) and the majority (who care mostly about political rights). Such settlements rarely produce liberal democracy, as the minority has neither the resources nor the numbers to make a contribution at the bargaining table. We develop a formal model to sharpen the contrast between electoral and liberal democracies and highlight circumstances under which liberal democracy can emerge. We discuss informally the difference between social mobilizations sparked by industrialization and decolonization. Since the latter revolve around identity cleavages rather than class cleavages, they are less conducive to liberal politics. |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:15-052&r=hpe |