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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Wolfgang Karl Härdle; Annette B. Vogt; ; |
| Abstract: | Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz (1868 - 1931) was a European statistician. His scientific work covered theoretical economics, stochastics, mathematical statistics and radiology, today we would call him a cross disciplinary scientist. With his clear views on mathematical principles with their applications in these fields he stood in conflict with the mainstream economic schools in Germany at the dawn of the 20th century. He had many prominent students (Gumbel, Leontief, Freudenberg among them) and he carved out the path of modern statistical thinking. He was a true European intellectual with a career path from St. Petersburg via Gottingen to Straßburg and finally the Berliner Universität, now Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. He is known for the precise calibration of insurance claims applying the - at that time hardly known - Poisson distribution to Prussian horse kick and child suicide data. He proposed a simple solution to the Marxian transformation problem and wrote numerous articles and books on the mathematical treatment of statistical (including radiological physical) data. In this article we sketch his life and work and point out the prominent role that he has in today's statistical thinking. |
| Keywords: | History of science, Statistics, Horse kicks, Bortkiewicz |
| JEL: | N01 D02 B14 B16 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2014-015&r=hpe |
| By: | Maruta, Toshimasa; Okada, Akira |
| Abstract: | Abstract: We consider the formation and long-run stability of cooperative groups in a social dilemma situation where the pursuit of individual interests conflicts with the maximization of social welfare. The adaptive play model of Young (1993) is applied to a game of group formation where voluntary participants negotiate for an institution to enforce them to cooperate. For a class of group formation games with two types, the stochastically stable equilibrium can be characterized in terms of the Nash products of the associated hawk-dove games, which summarize the strategic interaction among the individuals in the game. |
| Keywords: | Adaptive play, cooperation, evolution, group formation, hawk-dove game, social dilemma, stochastic stability, voluntary participation |
| JEL: | C70 C72 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:econdp:2014-03&r=hpe |
| By: | Seung Han Yoo (Department of Economics, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea) |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a dynamic Bayesian game with an unknown population distribution. Players do not know the true population distribution and assess it based on their private observations using Bayes' rule. First, we show the existence and characterization of an equilibrium in which each player's strategy is a function not only of the player's type but also of experience. Second, we show that each player's initial belief about the population distribution converges almost surely to a "correct" belief. |
| Keywords: | Bayesian games, Dynamic games, Bayesian learning |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D83 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iek:wpaper:1401&r=hpe |
| By: | Schlicht, Ekkehart |
| Abstract: | Abstract This note offers two comments on the article “Social Influences towards Conformism in Economic Experiments” by Hargreaves Heap that is to appear in the Economics e-Journal. One relates to the concept of conformism, the other lines out some phenomena where an explicit recognition of group processes, such as conformism, may be analytically helpful. |
| Keywords: | Conformism; relative income hypothesis; reference group behavior; social multiplier; social preferences; self-classification; group polarization |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D43 H41 J41 D1 |
| Date: | 2014–02–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:18376&r=hpe |
| By: | Hwang, Sung-Ha; Newton, Jonathan |
| Abstract: | For games of contracting under perturbed best response dynamics, varying the perturbations along two dimensions (uniform vs. logit, directed vs. undirected) gives four possibilities. Three of these select differing major bargaining solutions as stochastically stable. The fourth possibility yields a new bargaining solution which exhibits significant nonmonotonicities and demonstrates the interplay of two key drivers of evolutionary selection: (i) the ease of making errors; (ii) the ease of responding to errors. |
| Keywords: | bargaining; adaptive learning; Evolution |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/9993&r=hpe |
| By: | Mikhail Antonov (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | In this article, the author examines the socio-legal conception of Eugen Ehrlich and its relation to state law and judicial law enforcement. The attention is focused on the practical implications of this conception on the functioning of judicial systems. Analyzing the criticism raised against Ehrlich’s conception, the author emphasizes that this thinker stood on a scientific platform which did not necessitate any strict distinction between the factual and the normative — between Is and Ought — considering any attempt to draw a net distinction between societal phenomena as pointless. Ehrlich sought to enlarge the province of jurisprudence through the application of sociological methods to the factual material from which arise social institutions. These institutions crystallize social practices into rules of behaviour, but this crystallization does not happen automatically. It requires an intellectual reconstruction of these practices by the actors acting in the legal order. A scientific examination of law implies that all these components (social facts, institutions, mental constructions, rules and norms) are taken into consideration. Ehrlich critically assesses both the state-centrist ideology of the doctrinal law and the metaphysic speculations about law, arguing that correct law enforcement needs to rely on sociological analysis. The judge should take advantage of methods of sociological research, which allows stating the actual trends of justice in society and comparing these trends with those existing at the time the applicable legal rules were adopted. This comparison leads to a correct balancing of the conflicting interests with a view to the values protected by the legal order. At the same time, the sociological data just help the judge to reveal the will of the lawmaker who would protect the conflicting interests in the same manner as those which were protected when the lawmaker adopted the legal rules in question. |
| Keywords: | Eugen Ehrlich, sociology of law, judiciary, rules of law, law enforcement, free finding of the law, normativity |
| JEL: | K10 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:33/law/2014&r=hpe |
| By: | Ulrich Faigle (Universität zu Köln - Mathematisches Institut); Michel Grabisch (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We study linear properties of TU-games, revisiting well-known issues like interaction transforms, the inverse Shapley value problem and the concept of semivalues and least square values. We embed TU-games into the model of cooperation systems and influence patterns, which allows us to introduce linear operators on games in a natural way. We focus on transforms, which are linear invertible maps, relate them to bases and investigate many examples (Möbius transform, interaction transform, walsh transform, etc.). In particular, we present a simple solution to the inverse problem in its general form: Given a linear value ? and a game v, find all games v? such that ?(v) = ?(v?). Generalizing Hart and Mas-Colell's concept of a potential, we introduce general potentials and show that every linear value is induced by an appropriate potential. We furthermore develop a general theory of allocations with a quadratic optimality criterion under linear constraints, obtaining results of Charnes et al., and Ruiz et al., and others as special cases. We prove that this class of allocations coincides exactly with the class of all linear values. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation system, cooperative game, basis, transform, inverse problem, potential, linear value, semivalue. |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14010&r=hpe |
| By: | Andrew E. Clark (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - École normale supérieure [ENS] - Paris - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA)); Sarah Flèche (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - École normale supérieure [ENS] - Paris - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA)); Claudia Senik (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - École normale supérieure [ENS] - Paris - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA), UP4 - Université Paris 4, Paris-Sorbonne - Université Paris IV - Paris Sorbonne - Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In spite of the great U-turn that saw income inequality rise in Western countries in the 1980s, happiness inequality has dropped in countries that have experienced income growth (but not in those that did not). Modern growth has reduced the share of both the "very unhappy" and the "perfectly happy". The extension of public amenities has certainly contributed to this greater happiness homogeneity. This new stylized fact comes as an addition to the Easterlin paradox, offering a somewhat brighter perspective for developing countries. |
| Keywords: | Happiness ; Inequality ; Economic growth ; Development ; Easterlin paradox |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00936145&r=hpe |
| By: | Stephen Pollock |
| Abstract: | This essay was written to accompany a lecture to beginning students of the course of Economic Analytics, which is taught in the Institute of Econometrics of the University of Lodz in Poland. It provides, within a few pages, a broad historical account the development of econometrics. It begins by describing the origin of regression analysis and it concludes with an account of cointegration analysis. The purpose of the essay is to provide a context in which the students can locate various aspects of econometric analysis. A distinction must be made between the means by which new ideas were propagated and the manner and the circumstances in which they have originated. This account is concerned primarily with the propagation of the ideas. |
| Keywords: | econometrics, regression analysis, cointegration analysis, statistical analysis |
| JEL: | B16 B23 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:14/05&r=hpe |
| By: | Gaël Giraud (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | I offer a critical reading of Thomas Piketty's book, Le Capital au XXIème siècle, Seuil, 2013. |
| Keywords: | Capital, capitalism, inequality, Kaldor, Solow. |
| JEL: | B22 B4 H20 N10 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14007&r=hpe |
| By: | Odile Blanchard (PACTE - Politiques publiques, ACtion politique, TErritoires - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Grenoble - CNRS : UMR5194 - Université Pierre-Mendès-France - Grenoble II - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble I); Arnaud Buchs (Institut de géographie et durabilité - Université de Lausanne) |
| Abstract: | The article aims at assessing the effectiveness of a role-play in addressing two concerns: clarifying the concept of sustainable development and teaching sustainable development issues. The effectiveness is gauged by surveying students to reveal how the game matches a set of "significant learning" criteria defined by Fink (2003). Firstly, our article brings a short overview of how the concept of sustainable development has emerged and spread over time. Secondly, in order to assess the learning potential of our role-play, we examine how it addresses the six components of Fink's taxonomy of "significant learning": (i) foundational knowledge, (ii) application, (iii) integration, (iv) human dimensions, (v) caring and, (vi) learning how to learn. This taxonomy is analysed through a rigorous assessment methodology. The assessment shows that our role-play is highly praised by the players as it not only brings them foundational knowledge, but also allows them to enhance many skills. Thus, the framework of this role-play contributes to educating about sustainable development as well as educating for sustainable development. |
| Keywords: | education ; role-play ; significant learning; sustainable development |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00946227&r=hpe |
| By: | Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne et Centre Walras Pareto - Université de Lausanne) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides an explanation of the emergence of the standars textbook definition of public goods in the middle of the 20th century. It focuses on Richard Musgrave's contribution in defining public goods as non-rival and non-excludable – from 1939 to 1969. Although Samuelson's mathematical definition is generally used in models of public goods, the qualitative understanding of the specificity of pure public goods owes more to Musgrave's emphasis on the impossibility of exclusion. This paper also highlights the importance of the size of the group to which benefits of a public good accrue. This analysis allow for a reassessment of the Summary table of goods which first appeared in Musgrave and Musgrave (1973) textbook. |
| Keywords: | Richard A. Musgrave, social goods, public goods, non-rivalry, non-exclusion. |
| JEL: | H41 B29 A22 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14004&r=hpe |
| By: | Arbel, Yuval (School of Business, Carmel Academic Center); Bar-El, Ronen (Open University of Israel); Siniver, Erez (College of Management, Rishon Lezion Campus); Tobol, Yossi (Jerusalem College of Technology (JTC)) |
| Abstract: | We examine the effect of adherence to behavioral codes, as measured by the degree of religiosity, on the level of honesty by conducting under-the-cup die experiments. The findings suggest that behavioral codes, which prohibit lying, offset the monetary incentive to lie. The highest level of honesty is found among young religious females while the lowest is found among secular females. Moreover, when the monetary incentive to lie is removed, the tendency of secular subjects to lie disappears. Given the strict separation between the secular and religious education systems the research findings confirm the importance of education in instilling ethical values. |
| Keywords: | honesty, religion, behavioral codes, ethical values |
| JEL: | C91 D63 Z12 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7946&r=hpe |
| By: | José Serrano Álvarez |
| Abstract: | In the 19th Century the Spanish State privatised large areas of common lands and took over management of common wastelands and woodlands, thus stripping the peasants of all the control they had over them. Just as in many other parts of Spain, State intervention in wastelands and woodlands in León was a controversial issue because it was a symptom of conflicting visions or interests: between the State that promoted forestry uses and the peasants whose livelihood, based on agriculture and cattle, depended on common lands. The aim of this paper is to study the motivation behind peasant resistances to State intervention in Northwest Spain in the period 1870-1936. Although the conflicts have been explained from different perspectives (as resistance to market penetration, as "weapons of the poor", or as environmental conflicts), here we argue that the tensions and disputes over the common lands represent the peasants' defence of their livelihoods as well as the struggle for the "opportunities" the market offered. |
| Keywords: | Northwest Spain, Common lands, Peasant resistances, Forest crime |
| JEL: | D70 L73 N54 P32 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:seh:wpaper:1402&r=hpe |
| By: | Farley Grubb |
| Abstract: | A new approach to explaining the value of colonial paper money that relies on their distinctive character as bills of credit is presented. The market value of these bills is decomposed into their real asset present value and their liquidity premium value. This approach is applied to the newly reconstructed monetary data for colonial New Jersey. New Jersey’s bills were structured as zero-interest bearer bonds. They had defined future redemption payoff dates in specie equivalents. The New Jersey government redeemed their bills on time as legislatively promised under a fiscally credible redemption tax structure. The real asset present value of New Jersey bills accounted for at least 80 percent, whereas the value of these bills as “money” accounted for at most 10 to 20 percent, of their market value. Colonial paper money was not primarily a fiat currency. New Jersey’s paper money did not depreciate. It traded below face value due to time-discounting; not depreciation. A positive liquidity premium implies that New Jersey’s paper money actually traded at an appreciated value over its real asset present value. That liquidity premium was positively associated with the quantity of paper money per capita in circulation and the method of monetary injection. |
| JEL: | E31 E42 E51 N11 N21 N41 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19903&r=hpe |