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on Business, Economic and Financial History |
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Issue of 2010‒08‒28
five papers chosen by |
| By: | de Carvalho Filho, Irineu; Colistete, Renato P. |
| Abstract: | This paper deals with institutional persistence in long-term economic development. We investigate the historical record of education in one of the fastest growing and most unequal societies in the twentieth century – the state of São Paulo, Brazil. Based on historical data from an agricultural census and education statistics, we assess the role played by factors such as land concentration, immigration and type of economic activity in determining supply and demand of education during the early twentieth century, and to what degree these factors help explain current educational performance and income levels. We find a positive and enduring effect of the presence of foreign-born immigrants on the supply of public instruction, as well as a negative effect of land concentration. Immigrant farm-laborers established their own community schools, and pressured for public funding for those schools or for public schools. The effects of early adoption of public instruction can be detected more than one hundred years later in the form of better test scores and higher income per capita. These results are suggestive of an additional mechanism generating inequality across regions: the places that received immigration from countries with an established public education system benefited from an earlier adoption of the revolutionary idea of public education. |
| Keywords: | Public education; Brazil; Economic History; Economic Development; Coffee; Immigration; Land Inequality; Toryism |
| JEL: | N16 H75 O4 |
| Date: | 2010–08–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:24494&r=his |
| By: | Littlechild, S. |
| Abstract: | In September 1989, as part of its privatization program, the Government laid down an eight year timetable for opening up to retail competition the entire electricity market of England and Wales, phased over the period 1990-1998. It might be assumed that the Government was in a position to specify all the arrangements, and that this was part of a considered policy to facilitate the introduction and implementation of competition. But previous accounts suggest that the outcome was part of a deal between generators and regional companies to limit competition (Henney 1994), or was intended to set targets to force companies, regulators and government to come up with practical solutions (Helm 2004). The Department of Energy’s internal History of Electricity Privatisation, only now available, shows that there is merit in these last two suggestions. However, it also documents the significantly evolving views within Government as the implications of retail competition became clearer, not least for electricity contracts and for privatization of the coal industry. Initially, retail competition was hardly worth mentioning, later it was a mild concern that could be met by a small tranche of spot-price contracts, by July 1989 the plan was to introduce full competition immediately with short-term instead of long-term contracts. But the industry resisted, and in September 1989 the Government accepted the industry proposal of a franchise monopoly to enable a mix of short, medium and long-term contracts, though it insisted that the franchise should have an eight year limit. The approach may not be a model for others, but it may not be atypical of how governments actually behave in balancing conflicting objectives and practical constraints, save perhaps for the distinctive commitment to competition exhibited by the leading actors here. |
| Keywords: | Retail competition, Electricity regulation |
| JEL: | L94 |
| Date: | 2010–08–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1035&r=his |
| By: | L. Randall Wray |
| Abstract: | Before we can reform the financial system, we need to understand what banks do; or, better, what banks should do. This paper will examine the later work of Hyman Minsky at the Levy Institute, on his project titled "Reconstituting the United States’ Financial Structure." This led to a number of Levy working papers and also to a draft book manuscript that was left uncompleted at his death in 1996. In this paper I focus on Minsky’s papers and manuscripts from 1992 to 1996 and his last major contribution (his Veblen-Commons Award–winning paper). Much of this work was devoted to his thoughts on the role that banks do and should play in the economy. To put it as succinctly as possible, Minsky always insisted that the proper role of the financial system was to promote the "capital development" of the economy. By this he did not simply mean that banks should finance investment in physical capital. Rather, he was concerned with creating a financial structure that would be conducive to economic development to improve living standards, broadly defined. Central to his argument is the understanding of banking that he developed over his career. Just as the financial system changed (and with it, the capitalist economy), Minsky’s views evolved. I will conclude with general recommendations for reform along Minskyan lines. |
| Keywords: | China; Hyman Minsky; Banks and Shadow Banks; Money Manager Capitalism; Finance Capital; Financial Instability Hypothesis; Global Financial Crisis; Debt Deflation Theory |
| JEL: | E12 E32 E58 G2 G18 G21 |
| Date: | 2010–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:wrkpap:wp_612&r=his |
| By: | Jon D. Wisman; Barton Baker |
| Abstract: | Inequality increased dramatically in the decades leading up to the financial crises of both 1929 and 2008. Yet students of both crises have largely ignored any role that rising inequality might have played in rendering the financial sector more vulnerable to systemic dysfunction. This study draws upon the work of Thorstein Veblen, Michal Kalecki, and Karl Marx to clarify the manner in which growing inequality prior to both crises made U.S. financial markets more prone to systemic dysfunction. Greater inequality generated three dynamics that heightened conditions in which these financial crises might occur. The first is that greater inequality meant that individuals were forced to struggle harder to find ways to consume more to maintain their relative social status, thereby reducing their savings and increasing their indebtedness. The second is that holding ever greater income and wealth, the elite flooded financial markets with credit, helping keep interest rates low and encouraging the creation of new credit instruments. The third dynamic is that, as the rich took larger shares of income and wealth, they gained more command over ideology and hence politics. Reducing the size of government, tax cuts for the rich, deregulating the economy, and failing to regulate newly evolving credit instruments flowed out of this ideology. |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:amu:wpaper:2010-10&r=his |
| By: | Roel Beetsma; Massimo Giuliodori; Mark Walschot; Peter Wierts |
| Abstract: | Using real-time data from the annual budget over the period 1958-2009, we explore the planning and realization of fiscal policy in the Netherlands . Our key findings are the following. First, planned surpluses are on average unbiased, although they are overoptimistic during the first half of the sample and too pessimistic during the second half of the sample. The latter is the result of cautious real-time revenue estimates by the Dutch Ministry of Finance during this period. Second, real growth projections by the official Dutch forecasting agency are unbiased. This contrasts with the experience of the EU as a whole where biased growth projections represent an important source of fiscal slippage. Third, general economic conditions and the state of the public finances are important determinants of both fiscal plans and their implementation. Fourth, this is also the case for political and institutional factors. Expenditure overruns are partly related to political factors , whereas cautious revenue forecasts relate to the institutional setting. In particular, the most recent regime of the “trendbased budget policy” has worked well for fiscal discipline in the Netherlands |
| JEL: | E6 H6 |
| Date: | 2010–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:260&r=his |