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on Health Economics |
| By: | Liliana E. Pezzin; Robert A. Pollak; Barbara S. Schone |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we use a two-stage bargaining model to analyze the living arrangement of a disabled elderly parent and the assistance provided to the parent by her adult children. The first stage determines the living arrangement: the parent can live in a nursing home, live alone in the community, or live with any child who has invited coresidence. The second stage determines the assistance provided by each child in the family. Working by backward induction, we first calculate the level of assistance that each child would provide to the parent in each possible living arrangement. Using these calculations, we then analyze the living arrangement that would emerge from the first stage game. A key assumption of our model is that family members cannot or will not make binding agreements at the first stage regarding transfers at the second stage. Because coresidence is likely to reduce the bargaining power of the coresident child relative to her siblings, coresidence may fail to emerge as the equilibrium living arrangement even when it is Pareto efficient. That is, the outcome of the two-stage game need not be Pareto efficient. |
| JEL: | D1 J1 J2 |
| Date: | 2006–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12358&r=hea |
| By: | David C. Grabowski; Jonathan Gruber; Joseph J. Angelelli |
| Abstract: | There has been much debate among economists about whether nursing home quality is a public good across Medicaid and private-pay patients within a common facility. However, there has been only limited empirical work addressing this issue. Using a unique individual level panel of residents of nursing homes from seven states, we exploit both within-facility and within-patient variation in payer source and quality to examine this issue. We also test the robustness of these results across states with different Medicaid and private-pay rate differentials. Across our various identification strategies, the results generally support the idea that quality is a public good within nursing homes. That is, within a common nursing home, there is very little evidence to suggest that Medicaid-funded residents receive consistently lower quality care relative to their private-paying counterparts. |
| JEL: | I11 I18 |
| Date: | 2006–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12361&r=hea |
| By: | Madeline Zavodny (Department of Economics, Agnes Scott College); David Paton (Nottingham University Business School) |
| Abstract: | Since April 1998, the only public health clinic in McHenry County, Illinois, has required minors to obtain parental consent before receiving prescription contraceptives. This study uses data on the number of births and abortions to compare changes in birth and abortion rates among minors in the county with the changes among minors in nearby counties and with changes among slightly older women. The results fail to show a significant relative decline in the birth or abortion rate among minors in McHenry County after the parental consent requirement. The failure to find a significant effect is robust to examining different time periods, looking only at non-Hispanic white or unmarried minors, and comparing minors to women aged 18-19. Some estimates that include 18-year-olds indicate a positive effect on births. |
| Keywords: | transaction cost, property rights, innovation |
| JEL: | J13 I18 |
| Date: | 2006–10–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nub:occpap:18&r=hea |
| By: | Mariano Kulish (Reserve Bank of Australia); Kathryn Smith (Reserve Bank of Australia); Christopher Kent (Reserve Bank of Australia) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the macroeconomic consequences of ageing in an overlapping-generations model with endogenous retirement. We study the behaviour of the economy when population ageing is driven by movements in fertility, changes in longevity, and a combination of both. To gauge the economic implications of these demographic changes we calibrate the model to match key features of the Australian economy. With either a fall in fertility or a rise in longevity, population ageing increases capital intensity in the long run. When fertility and longevity operate together, the increase in capital intensity is more than additive, and the share of life spent in retirement stays roughly constant. The dynamic response of the economy is sensitive to the relative strength of the two factors that drive ageing. |
| Keywords: | baby boom; endogenous retirement; longevity; OLG (overlapping generations) |
| JEL: | D91 J13 J26 |
| Date: | 2006–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rba:rbardp:rdp2006-06&r=hea |