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on Game Theory |
By: | Yukun Cheng; Xiaotie Deng; Yunxuan Ma |
Abstract: | In the digital age, resources such as open-source software and publicly accessible databases form a crucial category of digital public goods, providing extensive benefits for Internet. This paper investigates networked public goods games involving heterogeneous players and convex costs, focusing on the characterization of Nash Equilibrium (NE). In these games, each player can choose her effort level, representing her contributions to public goods. Network structures are employed to model the interactions among participants. Each player's utility consists of a concave value component, influenced by the collective efforts of all players, and a convex cost component, determined solely by the individual's own effort. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to explore the networked public goods game with convex costs. Our research begins by examining welfare solutions aimed at maximizing social welfare and ensuring the convergence of pseudo-gradient ascent dynamics. We establish the presence of NE in this model and provide an in-depth analysis of the conditions under which NE is unique. We also delve into comparative statics, an essential tool in economics, to evaluate how slight modifications in the model--interpreted as monetary redistribution--affect player utilities. In addition, we analyze a particular scenario with a predefined game structure, illustrating the practical relevance of our theoretical insights. Overall, our research enhances the broader understanding of strategic interactions and structural dynamics in networked public goods games, with significant implications for policy design in internet economic and social networks. |
Date: | 2025–02 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2502.01001 |
By: | Iuliia Alekseenko; Dmitry Dagaev; Sofia Paklina; Petr Parshakov |
Abstract: | A Keynesian beauty contest is a wide class of games of guessing the most popular strategy among other players. In particular, guessing a fraction of a mean of numbers chosen by all players is a classic behavioral experiment designed to test iterative reasoning patterns among various groups of people. The previous literature reveals that the level of sophistication of the opponents is an important factor affecting the outcome of the game. Smarter decision makers choose strategies that are closer to theoretical Nash equilibrium and demonstrate faster convergence to equilibrium in iterated contests with information revelation. We replicate a series of classic experiments by running virtual experiments with modern large language models (LLMs) who play against various groups of virtual players. We test how advanced the LLMs' behavior is compared to the behavior of human players. We show that LLMs typically take into account the opponents' level of sophistication and adapt by changing the strategy. In various settings, most LLMs (with the exception of Llama) are more sophisticated and play lower numbers compared to human players. Our results suggest that LLMs (except Llama) are rather successful in identifying the underlying strategic environment and adopting the strategies to the changing set of parameters of the game in the same way that human players do. All LLMs still fail to play dominant strategies in a two-player game. Our results contribute to the discussion on the accuracy of modeling human economic agents by artificial intelligence. |
Date: | 2025–02 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2502.03158 |
By: | Igor Cialenco; Michael Ludkovski |
Abstract: | We introduce the problem of groundwater trading, capturing the emergent groundwater market setups among stakeholders in a given groundwater basin. The agents optimize their production, taking into account their available water rights, the requisite water consumption, and the opportunity to trade water among themselves. We study the resulting Nash equilibrium, providing a full characterization of the 1-period setting and initial results about the features of the multi-period game driven by the ability of agents to bank their water rights in order to smooth out the intertemporal shocks. |
Date: | 2025–01 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2501.14071 |
By: | Volker Nocke; Nicolas Schutz |
Abstract: | We adopt a potential games approach to study multiproduct-firm pricing games where products can be local complements or substitutes. We show that any such game based on an IIA demand system admits an ordinal potential, giving rise to a simple proof of equilibrium existence. We introduce the concept of transformed potential, and characterize the class of demand systems that give rise to multiproduct-firm pricing games admitting such a potential, as well as the associated transformation functions. The resulting demand systems allow for substitutability or complementarity patterns that go beyond IIA, and can resemble those induced by "one-stop shopping" behavior. |
Keywords: | Multiproduct firms, potential game, oligopoly pricing, IIA demand, complementary goods |
JEL: | L13 D43 |
Date: | 2025–02 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_644 |
By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Stéphane Luchini; Jason Shogren; Adam Zylbersztejn |
Abstract: | Under incomplete contracts, the mutual belief in reciprocity facilitates how traders create value through economic exchange. Creating such beliefs among strangers can be challenging even when they are allowed to communicate, because communication is cheap. In this paper, we first extend the literature showing that a truth-telling oath increases honesty to a sequential trust game with pre-play, fixed-form, and cheap-talk communication. Our results confirm that the oath creates more trust and cooperative behavior thanks to an improvement in communication; but we also show that the oath induces selection into communication -it makes people more wary of using communication, precisely because communication speaks louder under oath. We next designed additional treatments featuring mild and deterrent fines for deception to measure the monetary equivalent of the non-monetary incentives implemented by a truth-telling oath. We find that the oath is behaviorally equivalent to mild fines. The deterrent fine induces the highest level of cooperation. Altogether, these results confirm that allowing for interactions under oath within a trust game with communication creates significantly more economic value than the identical exchange institutions without the oath. |
Keywords: | Trust game, cooperation, communication, commitment, deception, fine, oath |
Date: | 2024 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04722343 |
By: | Itzhak Rasooly (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
Abstract: | In this paper, we design and implement an experiment aimed at testing the level-k model of auctions. We begin by identifying (simple) environments that optimally disentangle the predictions of the level-k model from the natural benchmark of Bayes-Nash equilibrium. We then implement these environments within a virtual laboratory in order to see which theory can best explain observed bidding behaviour. Overall, our findings suggest that, despite its notable success in predicting behaviour in other strategic settings, the level-k model (and its close cousin, cognitive hierarchy) cannot explain behaviour in auctions. |
Keywords: | Auction, Behavioural game theory, Experimental design, Level-k models |
Date: | 2023–12 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04328602 |
By: | Roberto Galbiati (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Emeric Henry (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
Abstract: | Formal enforcement punishing defectors can sustain cooperation by changing incentives. In this paper we introduce a second effect of enforcement: it can also affect the capacity to learn about the group's cooperativeness. Indeed, in contexts with strong enforcement, it is difficult to tell apart those who cooperate because of the threat of fines from those who are intrinsically cooperative types. Enforcement can then potentially have a negative dynamic impact on cooperation when it prevents learning. We provide theoretical and experimental evidence in support of this mechanism. Using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, we observe that, in early interactions, having faced an environment with fines in the past decreases current cooperation. We further show that this results from the interaction between enforcement and learning: the effect of having met cooperative partners has a stronger effect on current cooperation when this happened in an environment with no enforcement. |
Keywords: | Enforcement, social values, cooperation, learning, spillovers, repeated games, experiments |
Date: | 2024–03 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04800439 |
By: | Polina Borisova (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Nikhil Vellodi (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
Abstract: | A present-biased decision maker (DM) faces a two-armed bandit problem whose risky arm generates random payoffs at exponentially distributed times. The DM learns about payoff arrivals through informative feedback. At the unique stationary Markov perfect equilibrium of the multi-self game, positive feedback supports greater equilibrium welfare than both negative and transparent feedback. Regardless of the form of feedback, the DM's behavior exhibits indecision, deriving from their desire to procrastinate. We relate our findings to the theory of self-prospection -the process of imagining future goals and outcomes when seeking motivation in the present. |
Keywords: | Present-bias, Strategic experimentation, Motivational feedback, Self-confidence |
Date: | 2024–10 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04721098 |
By: | Louis-Marie Harpedanne de Belleville (Banque de France - Banque de France - Banque de France, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
Abstract: | The loan literature analyzes the hold-up problem from the bank monopolistic information perspective, but if only the firm can fully repay the bank, the loan relationship is actually a bilateral monopoly. Then, if a firm borrows short to finance a long-term project, non-cooperative bargaining occurs at loan renewal. If, regardless of the firm's second-period quality, the perfect equilibrium partition derived from this bargaining grants the bank less than the break-even condition, she declines to lend ex-ante.That is, expected hold-up by the firm induces credit constraints. If the firm gets more by defaulting than by borrowing from another bank, the initial bank cannot break even by filing for the firm bankruptcy; that is, the bank has a weak outside option. Then, even if this option is binding, the previous credit constraints result holds. Such hold-up by illiquid firms provides a new foundation for long-term lending to finance long-term projects. |
Keywords: | Hold-up, Credit constraints, Subgame perfection, Non-cooperative bargaining, Outside option principle, Perfect equilibrium partition, Strategic default, Liquidity, Long-term loan, Skin in the game, Unverifiability, Interest-bearing asset, Strategic bargaining, Bank, Firm, Loan relationship |
Date: | 2024–11–19 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-04792104 |
By: | Raouf Boucekkine (ESC [Rennes] - ESC Rennes School of Business, CUT - Centre for Unframed Thinking - ESC [Rennes] - ESC Rennes School of Business); Carmen Camacho (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Weihua Ruan (Purdue University Northwest, CUT - Centre for Unframed Thinking - ESC [Rennes] - ESC Rennes School of Business); Benteng Zou (uni.lu - Université du Luxembourg = University of Luxembourg = Universität Luxemburg) |
Abstract: | We propose an alternative dynamic theory of coalition breakdown. Motivated by recent coalition splitting events through unilateral countries' withdrawals, we assume that: i) the payoff sharing rule within coalitions is not necessarily set according to any optimality and/or stability criterion, and, ii) players initially behave as if the coalition will last forever. If the sharing rule is non-negotiable or if renegotiation is very costly, compliance to these rules may become unbearable for a given member |
Keywords: | Coalition splitting, Environmental agreements, Constitutional vs technological heterogeneity, Differential games, Multistage optimal control |
Date: | 2023–11–15 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-04287200 |
By: | Andrew Dillon; Nicolo Tomaselli |
Abstract: | We study the design of auctions in a low-income country where business licenses for new markets are auctioned to private firms. The field experiment varies two auction design choices: the auction mechanism and the type of information provided to bidders. The results suggest that: i) open auctions, in which bidders implicitly share information with their peers, have up to 61 percent lower mean bid prices and up to 67 percent lower bid variance than closed auctions, in which bidders bid secretly; ii) bidding behavior is influenced by the pre-bid license information provided by the auctioneer as much as by bidders’ ex-ante beliefs; and iii) auctions with real stakes reduce bids by a factor of five relative to non-incentivized auctions. These results underscore the importance of auction design for pricing innovations and the challenges inherent in creating markets in low-income countries where returns to innovations are highly uncertain. |
Keywords: | Auctions; Asymmetric and Private Information, Mechanism Design, Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Input Markets |
JEL: | D44 D82 Q12 |
Date: | 2025 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2025_03.rdf |
By: | Matteo Camboni; Mingzi Niu; Mallesh M. Pai; Rakesh Vohra |
Abstract: | We revisit the classic job-market signaling model of \cite{spence1973job}, introducing profit-seeking schools as intermediaries that design the mapping from candidates' efforts to job-market signals. Each school commits to an attendance fee and a monitoring policy. We show that, in equilibrium, a monopolist school captures the entire social surplus by committing to low information signals and charging fees that extract students' surplus from being hired. In contrast, competition shifts surplus to students, with schools vying to attract high-ability students, enabling them to distinguish themselves from their lower-ability peers. However, this increased signal informativeness leads to more wasteful effort in equilibrium, contrasting with the usual argument that competition enhances social efficiency. This result may be reversed if schools face binding fee caps or students are credit-constrained. |
Date: | 2025–02 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2502.02328 |
By: | Antonin Macé (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Rafael Treibich (SDU - University of Southern Denmark) |
Abstract: | We propose a general model of repeated voting in committees and study equilibrium behavior under alternative majority rules. We find that repetition may significantly increase the efficiency of majority voting through a mechanism of intertemporal logrolling, agents sometimes voting against their immediate preference to benefit the group's long-term interest. In turn, this affects the comparison of majority rules, which may differ significantly relative to the static setting. The model provides a rationale for the use of super-majority rules, while accounting for the prevalence of consensus in committee voting. |
Keywords: | Logrolling, Repeated games, Majority voting, Preference intensities, Consensus |
Date: | 2024–06 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04610689 |
By: | Tymofiy Mylovanov; Thomas Tröger |
Abstract: | A mechanism proposal by a privately informed principal is a signal. The agents' belief updating endogenizes their incentives in the mechanism, implying that such design problems cannot be solved via optimizing subject to incentive constraints. We propose a solution, neo-optimum, that can be interpreted as principal-preferred perfect-Bayesian equilibrium. Its neologism-based definition allows an intuitive computation, as we demonstrate in several applications. Neo-optimum connects the two main established approaches to the problem, by Myerson and by Maskin-Tirole. Any Myerson neutral optimum is a neo-optimum, implying that a neo-optimum generally exists. In private-values environments, neo-optimum is equivalent to strong unconstrained Pareto optimum (Maskin-Tirole) and strong neologism-proofness (Mylovanov-Tröger). In information-design settings, any interim-optimum (Koessler-Skreta) is a neo-optimum. Our methods can be used to reconstruct the perfect-Bayesian equilibria in the informed-principal literature. |
Keywords: | mechanism-design, informed-principal, neologism |
JEL: | D47 D82 |
Date: | 2025–02 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_643 |
By: | Ivo Steimanis; Natalie Struwe; Julian Benda; Esther Blanco |
Abstract: | Interrelated global crises - climate change, pandemics, loss of ecosystem services and biodiversity - pose risks that demand collective solutions. Uncertainty about others’ behavior, coupled with the dependence on some to take collective efforts to mitigate risks for all (e.g. conservation of natural habitats by those living at wildlife boarders to reduce risk of zoonoses), complicates collective action. We extend the experimental collective risk social dilemma to consider that some individuals (’beneficiaries’) cannot protect themselves and must rely on others (’providers’) for collective protection. Our approach allows to disentangle the relevance of self-interest and uncertainty over the actions of others in explaining self-reliance by providers. Our findings show that reducing strategic uncertainty leads to more collective solutions, with more beneficiaries protected, less resources wasted, and lower inequality. Moreover, we show that institutions inspired by payments for ecosystem services that allow beneficiaries to make compensation transfers to providers of protection are highly effective in fostering collective solutions. Indeed, these voluntary institutions are similarly effective in alleviating the social dilemma as (the hypothetical case of) fully removing strategic uncertainty. Thus, we show that understanding the reasons for self-reliance in collective risk social dilemmas can help develop better institutions to enhance the use of collective solutions, and thereby enhancing social welfare. |
Keywords: | Collective risk social dilemma, cooperation, mitigation, adaptation, strategic uncertainty, selfinterest, public good, donation, laboratory experiment |
JEL: | D70 H41 C92 D64 Q54 |
Date: | 2025–02 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2025-02 |
By: | Luc Arrondel (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Richard Duhautois (LIRSA - Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de recherche en sciences de l'action - CNAM - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM]); Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
Abstract: | The paper studies a very simple game-theoretical model of sports competition such as the European football leagues. In this oligopoly-type context, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium reveals a paradoxical differentiation between clubs: those that include not only profit but also sporting performance in their objectives end up generating more profit than others who purely maximize profit. |
Keywords: | Cournot-Nash equilibrium, Oligopoly, Sports economics, Football |
Date: | 2023–12 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04358491 |
By: | Marco Caliendo (Director of Research at the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn and affiliated with DIW Berlin and IAB - Director of Research at the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn and affiliated with DIW Berlin and IAB); Deborah Cobb-Clark; Juliana Silva-Goncalves; Arne Uhlendorff (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
Abstract: | We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how locus of control operates through people's preferences and beliefs to influence their decisions. Using the principal–agent setting of the delegation game, we test four key channels that conceptually link locus of control to decision-making: (i) preference for agency, (ii) optimism and (iii) confidence regarding the return to effort, and (iv) illusion of control. Knowing the return and cost of stated effort, principals either retain or delegate the right to make an investment decision that generates payoffs for themselves and their agents. Extending the game to the context in which the return to stated effort is unknown allows us to explicitly study the relationship between locus of control and beliefs about the return to effort. We find that internal locus of control is linked to the preference for agency, an effect that is driven by women. We find no evidence that locus of control influences optimism and confidence about the return to stated effort, or that it operates through an illusion of control. |
Date: | 2024–06 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04793394 |
By: | Eiko Arata (Faculty of Business and Commerce, Keio University); Toru Hokari (Faculty of Economics, Keio University) |
Abstract: | This paper aims to provide a theoretical foundation of what is known as “ Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), †focusing on depreciation. It is widely accepted that a depreciation method should be rational and systematic. There are many possible depreciation methods; however, only a few are used in practice, such as the straight-line method, the declining-balance method, the sum-of-the-years’ digits method, and the fair value measurement. We investigate through the axiomatic approach in what sense these depreciation methods can be considered rational and systematic. We provide a practical interpretation for each axiom examined in this paper and relate the axioms to accounting principles. Interestingly, it turns out that the straight-line method satisfies all axioms but consistency considered in the paper. Since the players are not humans in the model studied in the paper, it is not so clear whether the axiom of core selection is desirable or not in this context. In this paper, we provide a positive answer to this question. Namely, we show that three appealing axioms, population-monotonicity, the final year reasonableness, and conservatism, jointly imply core selection. |
Keywords: | Axiomatic approach, Cooperative games, Depreciation |
JEL: | C71 M41 |
Date: | 2025–01–31 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:keo:dpaper:2025-002 |
By: | Francis Bloch (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Philippe Gagnepain (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
Abstract: | We study a model of non-cooperative interaction between two infrastructure managers (IMs) for international rail transport. We compare equilibrium access charges when the IMs are unregulated and regulated. We show that cooperation among IMs eliminates double-marginalization to the benefit of passengers and IMs. We also show that the delegation of access charge collection with adequate transfers allows the two IMs to reach efficiency, both in the unregulated and regulated régimes. We study the effect of differences in regulatory policies, and analyze the effect of monopoly power of train operators and competition among high speed and low speed train routes on access charges. |
Keywords: | International Rail Transport, Access Charges, International Regulation, Infrastructure Managers |
Date: | 2025–01–14 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04892920 |
By: | Philippe Gagnepain (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Sébastien Massoni (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Alexandre Mayol (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Carine Staropoli (UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
Abstract: | We investigate the impact of different public transport pricing schemes on daily commuting habits. Psychological inertia, car stickiness, complexity aversion, or skewed perception of prices are expected to influence decisions. We build a controlled experiment, where participants make transport decisions and face various public transport tariffs. Our findings indicate that players are rational as they reach the Nash predictions of our model, but cognitive biases inherent to users are also present. Peak/offpeak and two-part tariffs prove to be more successful in encouraging public transit use than flat fare subscriptions, possibly due to a preference for flexibility and the ability to take past experiences into account (congestion and incident) in future travel choices. Thus, this paper suggests that well designed pricing strategies are useful tools to promote public transit use and reduce road congestion. |
Keywords: | Public transport pricing, Private car, Congestion, Experiment |
Date: | 2024–06 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04610702 |
By: | Carballa-Smichowski, Bruno; Lefouili, Yassine; Mantovani, Andrea; Reggiani, Carlo |
Abstract: | Data combination and analytics can generate valuable insights for firms and society as a whole. Firms can seize these opportunities by joining platforms that either allow them to access the data contributed by other firms or provide the result of the analytics performed on such data, depending on whether the platform adopts ''data sharing'' or "analytics sharing" technologies. The former technology enables firms to exploit their data endowment together with the data contributed by others, whereas the latter offers advantages in terms of privacy and security by reducing data transmission. We present a model that allows us to study the economic and managerial incentives generated by these technologies for both firms and a platform. First, we find that the platform chooses analytics sharing only when the security advantage of this technology is sufficiently large. Second, we show that analytics sharing results in a higher total data contribution than data sharing under general and reasonable conditions. Third, we determine the optimal data-combination technology from the perspective of consumers and discuss potential misalignments between the platform's and consumers' preferred technology. Our findings carry relevant policy and managerial implications, offering a pathway to enhance both data provision and security. |
Keywords: | Data sharing; analytics sharing; data platforms |
JEL: | D43 K21 L11 L13 L41 L86 M21 M31 |
Date: | 2025–02 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:130300 |