nep-gth New Economics Papers
on Game Theory
Issue of 2017‒05‒28
24 papers chosen by
László Á. Kóczy
Magyar Tudományos Akadémia
  1. Designing International Environmental Agreements under Participation Uncertainty By Mao, Liang
  2. Cooperation in Social Dilemmas through Position Uncertainty By Andrea Gallice; Ignacio Monzon
  3. Selling with Evidence By Koessler, Frédéric; Skreta, Vasiliki
  4. Dynamic competition over social networks Dynamic competition over social networks By Antoine Mandel; Xavier Venel
  5. Selling Through Referrals By Condorelli, Daniele; Galeotti, Andrea; Skreta, Vasiliki
  6. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 2: Games in standard form By Harsanyi, John C.; Selten, Reinhard
  7. A Comparison of NTU Values in a Cooperative Game with Incomplete Information By Andrés Salamanca
  8. Doubly Reflected BSDEs and ${\cal E}^{f}$-Dynkin games: beyond the right-continuous case By Miryana Grigorova; Peter Imkeller; Youssef Ouknine; Marie-Claire Quenez
  9. A Walrasian approach to bargaining games By Trockel, Walter
  10. Auctions with Signaling Concerns By Bos, Olivier; Truyts, Tom
  11. The tracing procedure: a Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n-person noncooperative games. Part II By Harsanyi, John C.
  12. The tracing procedure: a Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n-person noncooperative games. Part I By Harsanyi, John C.
  13. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 7: a bargaining problem with transaction costs on one side By Selten, Reinhard
  14. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 3: Consequence of desirable properties By Harsanyi, John C.; Selten, Reinhard
  15. Solution concepts for c-convex, assignment, and m2-games By Sudhölter, Peter
  16. Decision process, preferences over risk and consensus rule: a group experiment By Morone, Andrea; Nuzzo, Simone; Temerario, Tiziana
  17. Coalitional desirability and the equal division value By Sylvain Béal; Eric Rémila; Phillippe Solal
  18. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 5: The solution concept By Harsanyi, John C.; Selten, Reinhard
  19. A Dynkin game on assets with incomplete information on the return By Tiziano De Angelis; Fabien Gensbittel; St\'ephane Villeneuve
  20. Games and incomplete information. A survey: Part I By Wallmeier, Hans-Martin
  21. Sophisticated and naïve procrastination: an experimental study By Claudia Cerrone; Leonhard K. Lades
  22. A non-cooperative solution theory with cooperative applications. Chapter 2: Consequences of desirable properties By Harsanyi, John C.; Selten, Reinhard
  23. Games and incomplete information. A survey: Part II By Heuer, Martin
  24. A non-cooperative solution theory with cooperative applications. Chapter 1: Preliminary discussion By Harsanyi, John C.; Selten, Reinhard
  1. By: Mao, Liang
    Abstract: We analyze the design of optimal international environmental agreement (IEA) by a three-stage coalition formation game. A certain degree of participation uncertainty exists in that each country choosing to sign the IEA for its best interest has a probability to make a mistake and end up a non-signatory. The IEA rule, which specifies the action of each signatory for each coalition formed, is endogenously determined by a designer, whose goal is to maximize the expected payoff of each signatory. We provide an algorithm to determine an optimal rule and compare this rule to some popular rules used in the literature.
    Keywords: International environmental agreement; coalition formation; participation uncertainty, stable coalition
    JEL: C72 H41 Q54
    Date: 2017–05–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:79145&r=gth
  2. By: Andrea Gallice; Ignacio Monzon
    Abstract: Abstract We propose a simple mechanism that sustains full cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the sequence, but observe the actions of some predecessors. Position uncertainty provides an incentive to contribute in order to induce potential successors to also do so. Full contribution can then emerge in equilibrium. Our mechanism also leads to full cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma.
    Keywords: Social Dilemmas; Position Uncertainty; Public Goods; Voluntary Contributions; Fundraising
    JEL: C72 D82 H41
    Date: 2016
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:493&r=gth
  3. By: Koessler, Frédéric; Skreta, Vasiliki
    Abstract: We study how to optimally sell a good in a bilateral asymmetric information monopoly setting with interdependent values when the informed seller can voluntarily and costlessly provide evidence about the good's characteristics. Equilibrium allocations are feasible and immune to deviations to any mechanism. We show that there is an ex-ante profit-maximizing selling procedure that is an equilibrium of the mechanism-proposal game. In contrast to posted price settings, information unravelling of product characteristics may fail even when all buyer types agree on the ranking of product quality.
    Keywords: Informed principal; consumer heterogeneity; interdependent valuations; product information disclosure; mechanism design; certification
    JEL: C72 D82
    Date: 2017–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12049&r=gth
  4. By: Antoine Mandel (PSE - Paris School of Economics, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Xavier Venel (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics)
    Abstract: We provide an analytical approach to the problem of influence maximization in a social network when two players compete by means of dynamic targeting strategies. We formulate the problem as a two-player zero-sum stochastic game. We prove the existence of the uniform value: if the players are sufficiently patient, both players can guarantee the same mean-average opinion without knowing the exact discount factor. Further, we put forward some elements for the characterization of equilibrium strategies. In general, players must implement a trade-off between a forward-looking perspective, according to which they shall aim at maximizing the future spread of their opinion in the network, and a backward-looking perspective, according to which they shall aim at counteracting their opponent's previous actions. When the influence potential of players is small, an equilibrium strategy is to systematically target the agent with the largest eigenvector centrality.
    Abstract: Nous proposons une approche analytique au problème de maximisation de l'influence dans un réseau social entre deux joueurs utilisant des stratégies dynamiques. Le problème est formulé comme un jeu stochastique à somme nulle. Nous prouvons l'existence de la valeur uniforme et donnons une caractérisation partielle des stratégies d'équilibre. Nous montrons notamment que lorsque l'influence exercée par les agents est faible, ces derniers doivent systématiquement cibler l'agent avec la centralité "vecteur propre" la plus élevée.
    Keywords: Stochastic games,Social network,Dynamic games,Targeting,Jeux stochastiques,Jeux dynamiques,Réseaux sociaux
    Date: 2017–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01524453&r=gth
  5. By: Condorelli, Daniele; Galeotti, Andrea; Skreta, Vasiliki
    Abstract: We endogenize intermediaries' choice to operate as agents or merchants in a market where there are frictions due to asymmetric information about consumption values. A seller has an object for sale and can reach buyers only through intermediaries. Intermediaries can either mediate the transaction by buying and reselling - the merchant mode - or refer buyers to the seller for a fee - the agency mode. When the seller can condition the minimum selling price to the intermediaries' business model choice, all intermediaries specialize in agency. The seller's and intermediaries' joint profits equal the seller's profits when he has access to all buyers. When the seller's trading protocol does not depend on the business mode adopted by intermediaries, hybrid agency-merchant mode are adopted in equilibrium. Banning the agency mode can decrease welfare since the merchant mode is associated with additional allocative distortions due to asymmetric information compared to agency.
    Keywords: asymmetric information; intermediaries; referrals; resale
    JEL: C72 D44
    Date: 2017–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12048&r=gth
  6. By: Harsanyi, John C. (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Selten, Reinhard (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Date: 2017–05–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:105&r=gth
  7. By: Andrés Salamanca (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics)
    Abstract: Several value-like solutions concepts are computed and compared in a cooperative game with incomplete information and non-transferable utility.
    Keywords: incomplete information, non-transferable utility,Cooperative games
    Date: 2017–02–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01500966&r=gth
  8. By: Miryana Grigorova (KVW - Centre for Risk and Insurance, Hanover); Peter Imkeller (Institut für Mathematik [Humboldt] - Humboldt Universität zu Berlin [Berlin]); Youssef Ouknine ([MRC-CAD] - Department of Mathematics [Marrakech] - UCA - University Cadi Ayyad); Marie-Claire Quenez (LPMA - Laboratoire de Probabilités et Modèles Aléatoires - UPMC - Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris 6 - UPD7 - Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: We formulate a notion of doubly reflected BSDE in the case where the barriers $\xi$ and $\zeta$ do not satisfy any regularity assumption. Under a technical assumption (a Mokobodzki-type condition), we show existence and uniqueness of the solution. In the case where $\xi$ and $-\zeta$ are assumed to be right-uppersemicontinuous, the solution is characterized in terms of the value of a corresponding $\mathcal{E}^f$-Dynkin game, i.e. a game problem over stopping times with (non-linear) $f$-expectation, where $f$ is the driver of the doubly reflected BSDE. In the general case where the barriers do not satisfy any regularity assumptions, the solution of the doubly reflected BSDE is related to the value of "an extension" of the previous non-linear game problem over a larger set of "stopping strategies" than the set of stopping times. This characterization is then used to establish a comparison result and \textit{a priori} estimates with universal constants.
    Keywords: saddle points, $f$-expectation, nonlinear expectation, Dynkin game,Doubly reflected BSDEs, backward stochastic differential equations, game option
    Date: 2017–03–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01497914&r=gth
  9. By: Trockel, Walter (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Date: 2017–05–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:231&r=gth
  10. By: Bos, Olivier; Truyts, Tom
    Abstract: We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer to infer the bidders' types. We elicit conditions under which an essentially unique D1 equilibrium bidding function exists in four auction formats: first-price, second-price, all-pay and the English auction. We obtain a strict ranking in terms of expected revenues: the first-price and all-pay auctions dominate the English auction but are dominated by the second-price auction.
    Keywords: Costly signaling; D1 criterion; social status; art auctions; charity auctions.
    JEL: D44 D82
    Date: 2017
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:79181&r=gth
  11. By: Harsanyi, John C. (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Date: 2017–05–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:16&r=gth
  12. By: Harsanyi, John C. (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Date: 2017–05–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:15&r=gth
  13. By: Selten, Reinhard (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Date: 2017–05–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:136&r=gth
  14. By: Harsanyi, John C. (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Selten, Reinhard (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Date: 2017–05–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:114&r=gth
  15. By: Sudhölter, Peter (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Date: 2017–05–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:232&r=gth
  16. By: Morone, Andrea; Nuzzo, Simone; Temerario, Tiziana
    Abstract: The recent literature on individual vs. group decisions over risk has brought about divergent results, mainly depending on the institutional rules through which groups take decisions. While some studies where group decisions relied on the majority rule showed no appreciable difference between individuals and groups’ preferences, others where unanimity among group members was required found collective decisions to be less risk averse than individual ones. Of course, these studies share the imposition of a choice rule to determine the groups’ outcome. Alternatively, in the study at hand, we elicited groups’ preferences over risk using a consensus rule, i.e. leaving groups free to endogenously solve the potential disagreement among their members, just as in many real life instances. Our results from a logit regression unambiguously show that individuals’ preferences are systematically further from the risk neutrality than those of groups. In particular, individuals are more risk seeker than groups when facing gambles with positive expected payoff difference and more risk averse in the opposite case.
    Keywords: Risk attitudes, group’s behaviour
    JEL: C91 C92 D01
    Date: 2017–05–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:79332&r=gth
  17. By: Sylvain Béal (Université de Bourgogne Franche-Comté, CRESE); Eric Rémila (Université de Saint-Etienne, Gate); Phillippe Solal (Université de Saint-Etienne, Gate)
    Abstract: We introduce three natural collective variants of the well-known axiom of Desirability (Maschler and Peleg, 1966), which require that if the (per capita) contributions of a rst coalition are at least as large as the (per capita) contributions of a second coalition, then the (average) payo in the rst coalition should be as large as the (average) payo in the second coalition. These axioms are called Coalitional desirability and Average coalitional desirability. The third variant, called Uniform coalitional desirability applies only to coalitions with the same size. We show that Coalitional desirability is very strong: no value satis es simultaneously this axiom and Eciency. To the contrary, the combination of either Average coalitional desirability or Uniform coalitional desirability with Eciency and Additivity characterizes the Equal Division value.
    Keywords: Desirability, Coalitional desirability, Average coalitional desirability, Uniform coalitional desirability, Equal Division value, Shapley value.
    Date: 2017–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2017-08&r=gth
  18. By: Harsanyi, John C. (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Selten, Reinhard (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Date: 2017–05–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:132&r=gth
  19. By: Tiziano De Angelis; Fabien Gensbittel; St\'ephane Villeneuve
    Abstract: This paper studies a 2-players zero-sum Dynkin game arising from pricing an option on an asset whose rate of return is unknown to both players. Using filtering techniques we first reduce the problem to a zero-sum Dynkin game on a bi-dimensional diffusion $(X,Y)$. Then we characterize the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in which each player stops at the hitting time of $(X,Y)$ to a set with moving boundary. A detailed description of the stopping sets for the two players is provided along with global $C^1$ regularity of the value function.
    Date: 2017–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1705.07352&r=gth
  20. By: Wallmeier, Hans-Martin (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Date: 2017–05–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:146&r=gth
  21. By: Claudia Cerrone (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Leonhard K. Lades (University of Stirling, Economics)
    Abstract: The model of time-inconsistent procrastination by O'Donoughe and Rabin shows that individuals who are not aware of their present-bias (naïve) procrastinate more than individuals who are aware of it (sophisticated) or are not present-biased (time-consistent). This paper tests this prediction. We classify participants into types using a novel measure, and require them to perform a real-effort task on one out of three dates. We find that sophisticated participants perform the task significantly later than naïve participants. Our data suggest that this result may be explained by habit formation.
    JEL: C72 C73 D03 D91
    Date: 2017–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2017_08&r=gth
  22. By: Harsanyi, John C. (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Selten, Reinhard (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Date: 2017–05–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:92&r=gth
  23. By: Heuer, Martin (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Date: 2017–05–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:149&r=gth
  24. By: Harsanyi, John C. (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Selten, Reinhard (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
    Date: 2017–05–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:91&r=gth
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