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on Game Theory |
| By: | Peters, Michael; Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian |
| Abstract: | We prove a folk theorem for games in which mechanism designers compete in mechanisms and in which there are at least 4 players. All allocations supportable by a centralized mechanism designer, including allocations involving correlated actions (and correlated punishments) can be supported as Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in the competing mechanism game. |
| Date: | 2010–05–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ubc:pmicro:michael_peters-2010-17&r=gth |
| By: | Peters, Michael |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a set of mechanisms that we refer to as emph{dual mechanisms. }These mechanisms have the property that every outcome that can be supported as a Bayesian equilibrium in a competing mechanism game can be supported as an equilibrium in dual mechanisms. In this sense, dual mechanisms play the same role as direct mechanisms do in single principal problems. The advantage of these mechanisms over alternatives like the universal set of mechanisms cite{epspet97} is that they are conceptually straightforward and no more difficult to deal with than the simple direct mechanisms used in single principal mechanism design. |
| Keywords: | competing mechanisms, revelation principle |
| Date: | 2010–05–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ubc:pmicro:michael_peters-2010-18&r=gth |
| By: | Habis Helga; Herings P. Jean-Jacques (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) supporting their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characterization result. We also provide the remedy, a modification of the definition, to rescue the characterization. |
| Keywords: | microeconomics ; |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2010022&r=gth |
| By: | László Á. Kóczy (Óbuda University); Fabien Lange (Óbuda University) |
| Abstract: | A voting situation is given by a set of voters and the rules of legislation that determine minimal requirements for a group of voters to pass a motion. A priori measures of voting power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf value, show the influence of the individual players. We used to calculate them by looking at marginal contributions in a simple game consisting of winning and losing coalitions derived from the rules of the legislation. We introduce a new way to calculate these measures directly from the set of minimal winning coalitions. This new approach logically appealing as it writes measures as functions of the rules of the legislation. For certain classes of games that arise naturally in applications the logical shortcut drastically simplifies calculations. The technique generalises directly to all semivalues. Keywords. Shapley-Shubik index, Banzhaf index, semivalue, minimal winning coalition, Möbius transform. |
| Keywords: | Shapley-Shubik index, Banzhaf index, semivalue, minimal winning coalition, Möbius transform. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0909.rdf&r=gth |
| By: | László Á. Kóczy (Budapest Tech) |
| Abstract: | While they use the language of game theory the known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave dierently from the indices' predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour. In our model players do not automatically participate in every winning coalition they are members of, but have the possibility to block the formation of such a coalition. The strategic use of such blocks can increase voting power, when the latter is dened over the game with the remaining winning coalitions. In our model players do not automatically participate in every winning coalition they are members of, but have the possibility to block the formation of such a coalition. The strategic use of such blocks can increase voting power, when the latter is defined over the game with the remaining winning coalitions. |
| Keywords: | Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index, a priori voting power, rational players. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0908.rdf&r=gth |
| By: | Jaromir Kovarik (University of the Basque Country); Friederike Mengel (Maastricht University); José Gabriel Romero (University of Santiago de Chile) |
| Abstract: | We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant across treatments. We find the following results. Heterogeneity in the number of connections dramatically improves the rate of successful coordination. In addition, even though there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria theoretically, a very sharp selection is observed empirically: the most connected player can impose her preferred Nash equilibrium almost always and observed Nash equilibria are such that all links are coordinated. As a second treatment variation we let agents decide endogenously on the amount of information they would like to have and find that local (endogenous) information is equally efficient in ensuring successful coordination as full information. We provide an intuitive explanation of these facts which is supported by our data. |
| Keywords: | Game Theory, Networks, Coordination Problems, Experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C90 C91 D85 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.49&r=gth |
| By: | Richard Cornes; Roger Hartley; Yuji Tamura |
| Abstract: | We set out a model of production and appropriation involving many players, who differ with respect to both resource endowments and productivities. We write down the model in a novel way that permits our analysis to avoid the proliferation of dimensions associated with the best response function approach as the number of heterogeneous players increases. We establish existence of a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and carry out some comparative static exercises. |
| JEL: | C72 D74 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2010-521&r=gth |
| By: | Bobtcheff, Catherine (Toulouse School of Economics (CNRS, LERNA)); Mariotti, Thomas (Toulouse School of Economics (CNRS, GREMAQ, IDEI)) |
| Abstract: | We consider a preemption game with two potential competitors who come into play at some random secret times. The presence of a competitor is revealed to a player only when the former moves, which terminates the game. We show that all perfect Bayesian equilibria give rise to the same distribution of players' moving times. Moreover, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which each player's behavior from any time on is independent of the date at which she came into play. We find that competitive pressure is nonmonotonic over time, and that private information tends to alleviate rent dissipation. Our results have a natural interpretation in terms of eroding reputations. |
| JEL: | C73 D82 |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:22000&r=gth |
| By: | Cheikbossian, Guillaume |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking activities in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking game between two groups of different size. We first investigate Nash reversion strategies to support cooperative behavior in a given group before analyzing double-edge trigger strategies which have the property that cheating on the cooperative agreement in a given group is followed by non-cooperation in this group and cooperation in the rival group. The main conclusion is that the set of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained within the larger group as a subgame perfect outcome is as large as that for which cooperation can be sustained in the smaller group. Hence, in contrast with Olson’s (1965) celebrated thesis but in accordance with many informal and formal observations, the larger group is as effective as the smaller group in furthering its interest. |
| Keywords: | collective action, rent-seeking, within-group cooperation |
| JEL: | D72 D74 C72 C73 |
| Date: | 2009–09–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:22192&r=gth |
| By: | Lombardi Michele; Yoshihara Naoki (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin''s theorem (Maskin, 1999) is shown using a mechanism with Saijo''s type of strategy space reduction (Saijo, 1988), this paper fully characterizes the class of Nash-implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms with the strategy space reduction, which is further shown to be equivalent to the class of Nash-implementable SCCs. |
| Keywords: | microeconomics ; |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2010023&r=gth |
| By: | Sergio Sousa (School of Economics, University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the efficacy of a punishment mechanism in promoting cooperative behaviour in a public goods game when enforcement of punishment is uncertain. Experimental studies have found that a sanctioning system can induce individuals to adopt behaviour deemed as socially acceptable. Yet, our experiment shows that a sanctioning system cannot promote cooperative behaviour if enforcement is a low-probability event and free-riding behaviour is not often punished. This supports the view that punishment needs to be exercised to be feared, otherwise the simple threat of it cannot be effective in promoting cooperation. |
| Keywords: | uncertain enforcement; public good game; altruistic punishment; decisionmaking under uncertainty; cooperation |
| Date: | 2010–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2010-06&r=gth |
| By: | Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc |
| Abstract: | Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The first player(s) acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition. The effects of different preference assumption--particularly, different kinds of single-peakedness--and of player weights on the number of coherent coalitions, their connectedness, and which players become kingmakers and leaders are investigated. The fallback procedure may be used (i) empirically to identify kingmakers and leaders or (ii) normatively to select them. We illustrate and test the model by applying it to coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court, 2005-2009, which shows the build-up over stages of a conservative coalition that prevailed in nearly half of the 5-4 decisions. |
| Keywords: | coalition formation; fallback procedure; kingmakers; leaders; US Supreme Court |
| JEL: | D72 C7 D85 |
| Date: | 2010–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:22710&r=gth |
| By: | Dirk Bergemann (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Maher Said (Microsoft Research New England & Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis) |
| Abstract: | We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents whose private information changes across time. Within each of these settings, we discuss both efficient (welfare-maximizing) and optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | Dynamic auctions and mechanisms, Random arrivals and departures, Changing private information, Incentive compatibility |
| JEL: | C73 D43 D44 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2010–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1757r&r=gth |
| By: | Cochard, François; Couprie, Hélène; Hopfensitz, Astrid |
| Abstract: | Models of household economics require an understanding of economic interactions in families. Social ties, repetition and reduced strategic uncertainty make social dilemmas in couples a very special case that needs to be empirically studied. In this paper we present results from a large economic experiment with 100 maritally living couples. Participants made decisions in a social dilemma with their partner and with a stranger. We predict behavior in this task with individual and couples' socio-demographic variables, efficiency preferences and couples' marital satisfaction. As opposed to models explaining behavior amongst strangers, the regressions on couples’ decisions highlight clear patterns concerning cooperation behavior which could inspire future household decision-making models. |
| Keywords: | noncooperative games, laboratory, individual behavior |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D13 |
| Date: | 2009–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:22255&r=gth |
| By: | Demange, Gabrielle (Paris School of Economics (EHESS)); Van Der Straeten, Karine (Toulouse School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a game to study strategic communication on platforms by parties. Parties’ platforms have been chosen in a multidimensional policy space, but are imperfectly known by voters. Parties strategically decide the emphasis they put on the various issues, and thus the precision of the information they convey to voters on their position on each issue. The questions we address are the following: what are the equilibria of this communication game? How many issues will they address? Will parties talk about the same issues or not? Will they talk on issues that they "own" or not? |
| JEL: | C70 D70 |
| Date: | 2009–11–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:21976&r=gth |