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on Game Theory |
| By: | Berger, Ulrich |
| Abstract: | In a recent article, Hahn [Hahn, S. (2008). The convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities. Economics Letters 99, 2, 304-306] claims to prove convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities. I show here that the proof is flawed and convergence remains an open question. |
| Keywords: | Fictitious play; Strategic complementarities; Supermodular games |
| JEL: | D83 C72 |
| Date: | 2009–09–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:20241&r=gth |
| By: | Michel Benaim; Mathieu Faure |
| Date: | 2010–01–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000437&r=gth |
| By: | Carmen CAMACHO (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)); Cagri SAGLAM (Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Turkey); Agah TURAN (Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Turkey) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a strategic growth model that analyzes the impact of Endogenous preferences on equilibrium dynamics by employing the tools provided by lattice theory and supermodular games. Supermodular game structure of the model let us provide monotonicity results on the greatest and the least equilibrium without making any assumptions regarding the curvature of the production function. We also sharpen these results by showing the differentiability of the value function and the uniqueness of the best response correspondence almost everywhere. We show that, unlike globally monotone capital sequences obtained under corresponding optimal growth models, a non-monotonic capital sequence can be obtained. We conclude that the rich can help the poor avoid poverty trap whereas even under convex technology, the poor may theoretically push the rich to her lower steady state. |
| Keywords: | Lattice programming, Endogenous time preference |
| JEL: | C61 |
| Date: | 2010–01–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvir:2010001&r=gth |
| By: | George J. Mailath (University of Pennsylvania); Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania); Larry Samuelson (Cowles Foundation, Yale University) |
| Abstract: | Different markets are cleared by different types of prices -- a universal price for all buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We introduce the notion of premuneration values -- the values in the absence of any muneration (payments) -- created by the buyer-seller match. We characterize the premuneration values under which uniform-price and personalized-price equilibria agree. In this case, we have efficient allocations, including pre-match investment decisions, without the costs of personalized pricing. We then examine the inefficiencies that arise when the premuneration values preclude the agreement of uniform-price and personalized-price equilibria. We view premuneration values as an important consideration in market design. |
| Keywords: | Directed search, Matching, Premuneration value, Prematch investments, Search |
| JEL: | C78 D40 D41 D50 D83 |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1752&r=gth |
| By: | Chiara Donnini (Università di Napoli Parthenope); Maria Gabriella Graziano (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF); Maria Laura Pesce (Università di Napoli Federico II) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the notion of fairness in pure exchange economies involving uncertainty and asymmetric information. We propose a new concept of coalitional fair allocation in order to solve the tension that may exist between efficiency and envy-freeness when the equity of allocations is evaluated at the {\it interim} stage. Some characterizations of constrained market equilibria are derived extending the analysis to economies that have both an atomic and an atomless sector. |
| Keywords: | Mixed markets, coalitional fairness, envy, efficiency, asymmetric information |
| JEL: | C71 D51 D82 |
| Date: | 2010–01–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:245&r=gth |
| By: | K. Bjorvatn; A. Naghavi |
| Abstract: | Are natural resources a source of conflict or stability? Empirical studies demonstrate that rents from natural resources, and in particular oil, are an important source of civil war. Allegedly, resource rents attract rent seekers, which destabilize society. However, there is a large literature on how so-called rentier states manage to pacify opposition groups by handing out special favors. The present paper attempts to bridge the gap between the rent-seeking view of resource rents as a source of conflict and the rentier state view which emphasizes the role of resource rents in promoting peace and stability, and show how one may lead to the other. The mechanism that we highlight relies on the notion that higher rents may activate more interest groups in a power struggle. We demonstrate that the associated increased cost of conflict may in fact promote social stability. The peaceful solution is upheld by a self reinforcing transfer program, in the form of patronage employment. The chance of conflict and rent dissipation in our model is highest for intermediate levels of resource rents, where the government cannot make credible commitments to the opposition groups. |
| JEL: | D74 Q34 |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:690&r=gth |