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on Game Theory |
| By: | Kukushkin, Nikolai S. |
| Abstract: | Game forms are studied where the acyclicity, in a stronger or weaker sense, of (coalition or individual) improvements is ensured in all derivative games. In every game form generated by an ``ordered voting'' procedure, individual improvements converge to Nash equilibria if the players restrict themselves to ``minimal'' strategy changes. A complete description of game forms where all coalition improvement paths lead to strong equilibria is obtained: they are either dictatorial, or voting (or rather lobbing) about two outcomes. The restriction to minimal strategy changes ensures the convergence of coalition improvements to strong equilibria in every game form generated by a ``voting by veto'' procedure. |
| Keywords: | Improvement dynamics; Game form; Perfect information game; Potential game; Voting by veto |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2008–11–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:11802&r=gth |
| By: | Rutstrom, E. Elizabet; Wilcox, Nathaniel |
| Abstract: | If asking subjects their beliefs during repeated game play changes the way those subjects play, using those stated beliefs to evaluate and compare theories of strategic behavior is problematic. We experimentally verify that belief elicitation can alter paths of play in a repeated asymmetric matching pennies game. In this setting, belief elicitation improves the goodness of fit of structural models of belief learning, and the prior beliefs implied by such structural models are both stronger and more realistic when beliefs are elicited than when they are not. These effects are, however, confined to the player type who sees a strong asymmetry between payoff possibilities for her two strategies in the game. We also find that “inferred beliefs” (beliefs estimated from past observed actions of opponents) can be better predictors of observed actions than the “stated beliefs” resulting from belief elicitation. |
| Keywords: | beliefs; stated beliefs; belief elicitation; inferred beliefs; estimated beliefs; belief updating; repeated games; experimental methods |
| JEL: | C92 D83 C25 C73 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:11852&r=gth |
| By: | Krupka, Erin L. (IZA); Weber, Roberto A. (Carnegie Mellon University) |
| Abstract: | We explore the influence of social norms on behavior. To do so, we introduce a method for identifying norms, based on the property that social norms reflect social consensus regarding the appropriateness of different possible behaviors. We demonstrate that the norms we elicit, along with a simple model combining concern for norm-compliance with utility for money, predict changes in behavior across several variants of the dictator game in which behavior changes substantially following the introduction of minor contextual variations. Our findings indicate that people care not just about monetary payoffs but also care about the social appropriateness of any action they take. Our work also suggests that a social norm is not always a single action that should or should not be taken, but rather a profile of varying degrees of social appropriateness for different available actions. |
| Keywords: | norms, matching games, dictator games |
| JEL: | C91 C72 |
| Date: | 2008–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3860&r=gth |
| By: | Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Duke University - Department of Economics); Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University - Department of Economics); Yosuke Yasuda (Columbia University - Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism which allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a greater scope of efficiency. |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clu:wpaper:0809-09&r=gth |
| By: | Luigi Marengo; Simona Settepanella |
| Abstract: | Marengo and Pasquali (2008) present a model of object construction in majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriate changes of such bundles, different social outcomes may be obtained. In this paper we extend and generalize this approach by providing a geometric model of individual preferences and social aggregation based on hyperplanes and their arrangements. As an application of this model we give a necessary condition for existence of a local social optimum. Moreover we address the question if a social decision rule depends also upon the number of voting agents. More precisely: are there social decision rules that can be obtained by an odd (even) number of voting agent which cannot be obtained by only three (two) voting agent? The answer is negative. Indeed three (or two) voting agent can produce all possible social decision rules. |
| Keywords: | Social choice; object construction power; agenda power; intransitive cycles; arrangements; graph theory. |
| JEL: | D71 D72 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2008/28&r=gth |
| By: | Hernando Zuleta; Juanita Villaveces |
| Abstract: | We study economic conflicts using a game theoretical approach. We model a conflict between two agents where each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or neglect the truce. Under this setting, we use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game where agents commit to transfer a share of their output to the other agent (Sertel, 1992), and explain under which conditions a system of pre-donations can facilitate a truce. We find that for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, such that, the best strategy for both parties is Cease-Fire. However, in many cases there are no sufficient conditions for the scheme or pre-donations to be effective. We also analyze some limitations of this framework and extend the model in order to deal with some of these flaws. Finally, in order to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results we briefly describe some of the circumstances that characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and different illegal groups. |
| Date: | 2008–11–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000092:005148&r=gth |
| By: | Václav Hausenblas (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic); Petr Svarc (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic) |
| Abstract: | Kooperativní chování je nezbytnou podmínkou pro existenci moderních komplexních společenství a ekonomik, jak je známe dnes. Z pohledu společenských věd je proto zajímavé porozumnět, jak takové chování může převažovat i v situacích, kdy jednoduchá úvaha vede k opačnému očekávání, tedy že chování jedinců bude spíše charakterizované tendencí sledovat vlastní, raději než společenský zájem. Model vývoje kooperativního chování, který je prezentován v této práci, navazuje na studie, kde struktura interakcí má podobu sítě ([31], [23], [22]) a vznikl rozšířením jednoduchého modelu popsaného v [31]. Na rozdíl od p•vodního modelu je v naší práci kladen důraz na prvek imitace a jeho vliv na rozvoj kooperativního (resp. nekooperativního) chování v simulované populaci agent•. Hlavní motivací pro nás bylo otestovat, zda evoluční dynamika vězňova dilematu hraného na komplexních sítí je skutečně ovlivňována především samotnou topologií sítě nebo je spíše souběžně determinovaná jak topologií tak dalšími evolučními mechanismy, v našem případě konkrétní podobou imitace. |
| Keywords: | kooperativní chování, vězňovo dilema, sítě, simulace |
| JEL: | C15 C73 D85 |
| Date: | 2008–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2008_30&r=gth |