| Abstract: |
As a result of the prevailing governance structure, economic policy in
democracies usually suffers from specific deficiencies. Among these are the
predominance of distributive over efficiency objectives, the neglect of
long-run effects, and the lack of or biased use of expert knowledge in the
political decision making process. These deficiencies can be attributed to a
'monopoly of democratic legitimacy' of the politicians and parties, an
overloaded democratic delegation, the influence of interest groups, and the
short-run incentives in the political process. The focus of this paper is on
the reform of the governance structure of economic policy. It is suggested
that a 'dual democratic legitimacy' should be introduced. A 'senate' which is
independent of the political parties will be directly elected by the people.
The senate firstly works as a second chamber in bicameralistic legislation,
closely cooperating with consultative expert institutions. Secondly, the
senate acts as a principal for any public institution outside of the
parliament and the government, appointing the top personnel. |