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on Economic Geography |
| By: | Isbasoiu, George - Marian |
| Abstract: | Today’s economic climate is dominated by inter-firms networks, which have become powerful instruments for building economic capacity for regions to compete in the global market place. Industry clusters are recognised as playing a significant role both in regional economic development and in improvements to quality of life. The aim of this paper is to investigate this influence and to tackle the issues of de-localisation, decentralisation and cluster development as strategy for urban regeneration by comparing two clusters: Montebelluna and Timisoara. Clusters are a common reality in all economies and have traditionally been equated with cities. Across all European regions and cities there is a growing specialisation and concentration or clustering of industries in response to increasing competition and outsourcing as a result of economic reforms and globalisation. Industry clusters comprise groups of firms that share common suppliers, distributors and know-how and find advantage in a specific geographic location. Based on such insights, the paper suggests a theoretical proposal, supported by practical evidence. |
| Keywords: | Industrial district; De-localisation; Urban governance; Internalisation; Regional development. |
| JEL: | F22 R11 L16 |
| Date: | 2006–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:5037&r=geo |
| By: | Llussa, Fernanda |
| Abstract: | Brazil displays a geographic and institutional diversity unique in the world. It extends in a north-south direction rather than the east-west of other countries of similar size. Given the current debate on the relative role of geography and institutions in determining income levels, Brazil provides a single testing ground for the direct and indirect e¤ects of ge- ography. This paper evaluates how much of the income di¤erences across Brazilian regions and states stem from geographic characteristics and in- stitutional characteristics, the latter in turn partly determined by geogra- phy. Our results show, ?rst, that the rate of convergence of state income per capita increases substantially once regional e¤ects are taken into ac- count. Second, institutions, when instrumented with regional dummies, are a signi?cant determinant of state income levels. However, when we add additional geographic characteristics, some institutions cease to signif- icantly a¤ect income. The message from Brazilian data seems to be that, tough geography and institutions matter for income, geography matters more. |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp517&r=geo |
| By: | Sukkoo Kim |
| Abstract: | The development of the American economy was accompanied by significant spatial income inequalities between the northern and southern regions. While many factors contributed to northern industrialization and southern stagnation, an important factor was differences in their institutions. In the North, a democratic institution fostered growth whereas in the South, an oligarchic institution favored status quo. To gain some insights on the nature and causes of the divergence of these institutions, this paper examines the development of political and legal institutions in Massachusetts and Virginia, the two leading states in the North and the South. |
| JEL: | H11 H70 N41 |
| Date: | 2007–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13431&r=geo |
| By: | Feng Xie; David Levinson (Nexus (Networks, Economics, and Urban Systems) Research Group, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Minnesota) |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews the progress that has been made over the last |
| Keywords: | Network growth, Transport economics, Incremental connection |
| JEL: | R41 R42 R48 O33 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nex:wpaper:reviewofnetworkgrowth&r=geo |
| By: | Michela Cella (University of Milan-Bicocca); Massimo Florio (University of Milan) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a simple principal-supervisor-agent model of the investment game between a supranational player (the principal), such as the European Commission, a regional government (the supervisor), and a private firm (the executing agency) . The EC is a benevolent social welfare maximiser, the regional government has an objective function that combines private benefits to politicians and the welfare of their constituency, the agent is a utility maximiser. The latter can be of a high or low efficiency type, and the operative cost, observable ex post, depends upon this binary technology and managerial effort, also unobservable. The EC offers a matching capital grant to the firm (as it does with the EU Structural Funds), intended to cover part of the investment cost of an otherwise unprofitable project. The regional government offers the remaining share of the subsidy. If the firm claims to be inefficient, the EC can send with some probability an ex-post evaluator and there is a penalty if she discovers that it is of the efficient-type. Moreover the regional government can collaborate with the EC to disclose additional information it may have on the firm, but it needs to be given a reward not to collude with the firm, that is in turn willing to offer a private benefit to the regional government to conceal unfavourable evidence. We show that the role of these providers of additional information is essential to reducing the value of the grant and in improving the inefficiencies caused by asymmetric information and the grant decision stage. The paper suggests that the EC should include ex-post evaluation, currently provided by the Structural Funds regulations, within regional planning contracts for infrastructure investment; and that regional governments should be offered a reward for disclosing additional information on the firm technology (ex-ante supervision). |
| Keywords: | Hierachical contracting, evaluation, EU Structural Funds, |
| Date: | 2007–07–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bep:unimip:1059&r=geo |
| By: | Yannis M. Ioannides; Henry G. Overman; Esteban Rossi-Hansberg; Kurt Schmidheiny |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0708&r=geo |