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on Gender |
| By: | Tim Lohse; Salmai Qari |
| Abstract: | We study the role of face-to-face interaction for gender differences in deceptive behavior and perceived honesty. In the first part, we compare women’s to men’s deceptive behavior using data from an incentivized income reporting experiment in which lies can be detected in the course of an audit. Between the three treatments of that experiment, (i) the degree, and (ii) the impact of the face-to-face interaction vary from none (computerized baseline treatment) to a little (treatment in which face-to-face communication triggers psychological effects such as greater lying aversion) to much (treatment in which the perception by others also enters as a strategic effect determining the probability of detecting a lie). In the computerized baseline treatment men and women lie alike. Women’s truthfulness increases when psychological effects of face-to-face interaction come into play. In contrast, male deceptive behavior does not change until the strategic effect of perceived honesty matters and men’s truthfulness rises way beyond the level of women. To elaborate on these gender differences, in the second part, participants are asked to assess the honesty of videotaped statements from an experimental setting identical to the third treatment. We find that more men are assessed as rather dishonest. Men’s dishonest perception is independent of whether they are actually truthful or not and whether they are assessed by men or women. We conclude that men anticipate their low perceived honesty in a face-to-face setting and, therefore, deceive less compared to women. |
| Keywords: | gender differences, lying, face-to-face interaction, honesty assessment, perception, video analysis, laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D91 J16 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7995&r=all |
| By: | Kovacs, Attila |
| Abstract: | Online peer-to-peer investment platforms are increasingly popular venues for entrepreneurs and investors to engage in financial transactions without the involvement of banks and loan managers. Despite their purported transparency and lack of bias, it is unclear whether social inequalities present in traditional capital markets transfer to these platforms as well, impeding their hoped revolutionary potential. In this paper we analyze nearly four years’ worth of data from one of the leading UK-based equity crowdfunding platforms. Specifically, we investigate gender-related differences in patterns of entrepreneurship, investment, and success. In agreement with offline trends, men have more activity on the platform. Yet, women entrepreneurs benefit of higher success rates in fundraising, a finding that mimics trends seen on some rewardsbased crowdfunding platforms. Surprisingly, we also find that female investors tend to choose campaigns that have lower success rates. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of gender-related discrepancies in success on the online capital market and point to differences in activity that are key factors in the apparent patterns of gender inequality. |
| Date: | 2018–11–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:5pcmb&r=all |
| By: | Rose C. Liao (Rutgers Business School, Rutgers University); Gilberto Loureiro (NIPE and Department of Economics, University of Minho); Alvaro G. Taboada (Mississippi State University) |
| Abstract: | Using a sample of 469 banks from 39 countries between 2008 and 2017 and a generalized difference-in-differences methodology, we show that board gender quota laws lead to increased female board representation. We find an increase in risk taking and systemic risk and worse long-run operating performance post quota law for banks most impacted by the reforms, and those located in countries with a smaller pool of qualified women executives. Results suggest that the addition of younger and less experienced female board members to important board committees due labor market constraints drive the risk taking and performance outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Gender quotas; director independence; bank risk taking; bank performance |
| JEL: | G15 G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nip:nipewp:17/2019&r=all |
| By: | Patricia Gallego Granados (DIW Berlin); Katharina Wrohlich (DIW Berlin) |
| Abstract: | Using quantile regression methods, this paper analyses the gender wage gap across the wage distribution and over time (1990–2014), while controlling for changing sample selection into full-time employment. Our findings show that the selection-corrected gender wage gap is much larger than the one observed in the data, which is mainly due to large positive selection of women into full-time employment. However, we show that selection-corrected wages of male and female workers at the lower half of the distribution have moderately converged over time. The reason for this development have been changes in the composition of the male full-time employment force over time, which in spite of the rather constant male full-time employment rate, have given place to a small but rising selection bias in male observed wages. In the upper half of the wage distribution, however, neither the observed nor the selection-corrected gender wage gap has narrowed over time. |
| Keywords: | gender wage gap, quantile regression, selection into employment |
| JEL: | J31 J21 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pot:cepadp:15&r=all |
| By: | Fenske, James (University of Warwick); Castagnetti, Alessandro (University of Warwick); Sharma, Karmini (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | In many settings, economic outcomes depend on the competence and effort of the agents involved, and also on luck. When principals assess agents’ performance they can suffer from attribution bias by gender: male agents may be assessed more favorably than female agents because males will be rewarded for good luck, while women are punished for bad luck. We conduct a laboratory experiment to test whether principals judge agents’ outcomes differently by gender. Agents perform tasks for the principals and the realized outcomes depend on both the agents’ performance and luck. Principals then assess agents’ performance and decide what to pay the agents. Our experimental results do not show evidence consistent with attribution bias by gender. While principals’ payments and beliefs about agent performance are heavily influenced by realized outcomes, they do not depend on the gender of the agent. We find suggestive evidence that the interaction between the gender of the principal and the agent plays a role. In particular, principals are more generous to agents of the opposite gender. |
| Keywords: | JEL Classification: |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:452&r=all |