|
on Experimental Economics |
|
Issue of 2019‒09‒23
twenty-two papers chosen by |
| By: | Janet Hua Jiang (Bank of Canada); Cathy Zhang (Purdue University); Daniela Puzzello (Indiana University) |
| Abstract: | We integrate theory and experimental evidence to study the effects of alternative inflationary monetary policies on allocations and welfare. The framework of our experiment is based on the Lagos and Wright (2005) model of monetary exchange that provides a role for money as a medium of exchange. We compare a baseline laissez-faire policy with constant money growth and three different inflationary policies where the government fixes the money growth rate. In the first scheme (Government Spending), the government adjusts expenditures financed through seigniorage; in the second scheme (Lump Sum Transfers), the government injects new money through lump-sum transfers; in the third scheme (Proportional Transfers), the government makes transfers proportional to individual money holdings. Theory predicts inflation is constant at the money growth rate in a stationary equilibrium under all inflationary policies. However, while the first two policies yield the same stationary equilibrium with lower welfare relative to the laissez-faire setting, the third policy is neutral. Consistent with theory, output and welfare in the experimental economies are significantly lower with Government Spending relative to baseline while there are no significant effects with Proportional transfers. Our findings have implications on monetary policy implementation and provide support for policies in line with the quantity theory. |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed019:263&r=all |
| By: | Niu, Xiaofei; Li, Jianbiao |
| Abstract: | In China, United States and in many other countries, there is a serious gap between the demand and the supply of human organs for transplantation. To fill this gap, policy makers have made great efforts to promote organ donor registration. In this paper, we provide a novel organ donation incentive strategy, i.e. swearing an oath, and experimentally identify channels through which oath impacts organ donation. Our experimental results show that the impacts of oath work through the signature and ritual channels, i.e. voluntarily signing oath or swearing an oath accompanied by ritualized gesture significantly increase the organ donor registration rate. However, the oath alone does not affect organ donation behavior. In addition, we also find that the opt-out rule has a positive influence on donor registration rate only in Rounds 1-11 but not in Rounds 12-22. The donor registration rate is significantly reduced when changing from opt-out to opt-in rule, and it is unaffected when changing from opt-in to opt-out rule. These results indicate that the effect of opt-out rule may attenuate with experience. |
| Keywords: | organ donation,oath,ritual,opt-in vs. opt-out,laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C91 I10 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:203243&r=all |
| By: | Erina Ytsma (Carnegie Mellon University); Jana Gallus (UCLA) |
| Abstract: | The Internet has brought forth fundamental changes in the nature and organization of work. Firms increasingly draw on online labor markets and communities for their production and innovation needs, which allows them to benefit from greater flexibility and innovation by drawing from a more diverse and changing human capital pool (Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011; Altman, Nagle, and Tushman, 2014). Yet, relying on resources beyond the traditional boundaries and organizational structure of the firm also poses challenges in terms of the coordination and motivation of these online “crowds”. Open source communities, a main focus of this paper, epitomize these difficulties as the workforce they rely on is not only external and possibly distributed, but also, to varying degrees, self-directed and not contracted or paid. This paper aims to add to our understanding of the optimal organization of open, collaborative knowledge work by studying and comparing the impact of non-financial and career incentives on innovative productivity through a randomized field experiment in the context of open, collaborative software development. In particular, we experimentally vary the salience and availability of peer feedback, and randomly vary the domain of people who can see the feedback on a large, international open source platform. We thus vary the informational content and degree of publicness of recognition for contributions to projects and, hence, the strength of reputational concerns. By doing so, we aim to analyze the effect of non-financial and career incentives on innovative effort, and how this differs across organizational settings (open source, closed source, inner-source). In this way, we aim to provide evidence-based insights into the effects of carefully designed recognition schemes on collaborative knowledge work. |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed019:1141&r=all |
| By: | Annan, J.; Falb, K.; Kpebo, D.; Hossain, M.; Gupta, J. |
| Abstract: | Background. Women living in war-affected contexts face high levels of gender-based violence, including intimate partner violence (Stark & Ager, 2011). Despite well-documented negative consequences, including posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Garcia-Moreno et al. 2006; Steel et al. 2009), evidence remains thin regarding intervention effectiveness to mitigate consequences in these settings. Methods. This study used a two-armed parallel pilot randomized controlled trial to compare the impact of a group savings only (control) to gender dialogue groups added to group savings (treatment) on women's symptoms of PTSD in northwestern Côte d'Ivoire. Eligible Ivorian women (18+ years, no prior experience with group savings) were invited to participate and 1198 were randomized into treatment groups. Results. In the ITT analyses, women in the treatment arm had significantly fewer PTSD symptoms relative to the control arm (β: −0.12; 95% CI: −0.20 to −0.03; p = 0.005). Partnered women in the treatment arm who had not experienced intimate partner violence (IPV) at baseline had significantly fewer PTSD symptoms than the control arm (β = −0.12; 95% CI: −0.21 to −0.03; p = 0.008), while those who had experienced IPV did not show significant differences between treatment and control arms (β = −0.09; 95% CI: −0.29 to 0.11; p = 0.40). Conclusions. Adding a couples gender discussion group to a women's savings group significantly reduced women's PTSD symptoms overall. Different patterns emerge for women who experienced IPV at baseline v. those who did not. More research is needed on interventions to improve mental health symptoms for women with and without IPV experiences in settings affected by conflict. |
| Keywords: | Armed conflict; gender-based violence (GBV); interventions; intimate partner violence (IPV); mental health; PTSD |
| JEL: | N0 |
| Date: | 2017–11–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:101628&r=all |
| By: | Darai, D.; Roux, C.; Schneider, F. |
| Abstract: | We study whether firms’ collusive ability influences their incentives to merge: when tacit collusion is unsuccessful, firms may merge to reduce competitive pressure. We run a series of Bertrand oligopoly experiments where the participants decide whether, when, and to whom they send merger bids. Our experimental design allows us to observe (i) when and to whom mergers are proposed, (ii) when and by whom merger offers are accepted, and (iii) the effect on prices when mergers occur in this way. Our findings suggest that firms send more merger offers when prices are closer to marginal costs. Maverick firms that cut prices and thereby fuel competition are the predominant (but reluctant) receivers of these offers. |
| Keywords: | Tacit collusion, Mavericks, Bertrand oligopoly, Experiments |
| JEL: | C91 D43 K21 L13 L41 |
| Date: | 2019–09–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1984&r=all |
| By: | Liangfei Qiu (Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, USA); Asoo Vakharia (Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, USA); Arunima Chhikara (Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, USA) |
| Abstract: | The prevalence of consumers sharing their purchases on social media platforms (e.g., Instagram, and Pinterest) and the use of this information by potential future consumers have substantial implications for online retailing. In this study, we examine how product characteristics and the type of information provider jointly moderate the purchase decision in a social network setting. We first propose an analytical observational learning framework integrating the impact of product differentiation and social ties. Then, we use two experimental studies to validate our analytical results and provide additional insights. Our key findings are that the effect of learning from strangers is stronger for vertically differentiated products than for horizontally differentiated products. However, the effect of learning from friends does not depend on whether the underlying product is horizontally or vertically differentiated. What is more interesting is the nuanced role of social ties: For horizontally differentiated products, the effect of learning increases with the strength of social ties. In addition, “contact-based” tie strength is more important than “structure-based” tie strength in accelerating observational learning. These findings provide a motivation for online retailers to generate alternative strategies for increasing product sales through social networks. For example, online retailers offering horizontally differentiated products have strong incentives to cooperate with social media platforms (e.g., Instagram and Pinterest) in encouraging customers to share their purchase information. |
| Keywords: | Multi-Dimensional Observational Learning; Social Ties; Product Differentiation |
| JEL: | C91 C93 D83 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:1901&r=all |
| By: | Ivan Soraperra (CREED, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands); Anton Suvorov (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Pokrovsky bd., 11, Suite S1039; 109028 Moscow Russia); Jeroen van de Ven (Tinbergen Institute and Amsterdam School of Economics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands); Marie Claire Villeval (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE UMR5824, 93 Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, France; IZA, Bonn, Germany) |
| Abstract: | Several studies show that social image concerns stimulate pro-social behavior. We study a setting in which there is uncertainty about which action is pro-social. Then, the quest for a better social image can potentially con flict with genuinely pro-social behavior. This confl ict can induce \bad" behavior, where people lower both their own and others' material payoffs to preserve a good image. This setting is relevant for various types of credence goods. For example, recommending an inexpensive treatment reduces the expert's profits and may not satisfy the true needs of the client, but is generally good for the expert's image (as it signals the lack of greed). We test experimentally if people start to act bad in order to look good. We find that people care about their social image, but social image concerns alone do not induce them to act bad. That is, without future interactions, social image concerns do not lead to bad behavior. However, with future interactions, where building up a good image has instrumental value (reputational concerns), we do find evidence of bad behavior in the short run to secure higher earnings in the long run. |
| Keywords: | Social image, credence goods, prosocial behavior, reputation, experiment |
| JEL: | C92 D82 D91 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1926&r=all |
| By: | Fabio Galeotti (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Valeria Maggian (University of Ca’ Foscari [Venice, Italy]); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Deterrence institutions are widely used in modern societies to discourage rule violations but whether they have an impact beyond their immediate scope of application is usually ignored. Using a natural field experiment, we show that they affect intrinsic honesty across contexts. We identified fraudsters and non-fraudsters in public transport who were or not exposed to ticket inspections by the transport company. We then measured the intrinsic honesty of the same persons in a new unrelated context where they could misappropriate money. Instead of having an educative effect across contexts, the exposure to deterrence practices increases unethical behavior of fraudsters but also of non-fraudsters. |
| Keywords: | Deterrence Institutions,Intrinsic Honesty,Spillovers |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02281894&r=all |
| By: | Choo, Lawrence; Kaplan, Todd R.; Zhou, Xiaoyu |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we seek to determine if auctions can be used to select players according to their level-k types. To do so, we embed auctions into the p-beauty contest game. We find that by using different designs, we can get the auction winners to be either the lower level-k types or the higher level-k types. In particular, when the value of winning the auction is increasing in the level-k types of all the players, higher level-k players bid higher. When the value of winning the auction is decreasing in the level-k types of all the players, the lower level-k players bid higher. Taken together, our experiment confirms that we can use auctions to select players by their level-k types. This shows that auctions can allow an economic designer to affect the outcome of a game through the selection of level-k types entering to play the game. |
| Keywords: | p-beauty contest game, level-k, auctions, mechanism design. |
| JEL: | C72 C90 D44 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:95987&r=all |
| By: | David J. Cooper (Florida State University Department of Economics and University of East Anglia School of Economics, 113 Collegiate Loop, PO Box 3062180 Tallahassee, FL 32306-2180, USA); Krista Saral (University of North Carolina at Charlotte Department of Economics, 9201 University City Blvd. Charlotte, NC 28223, USA; Webster University Geneva George Herbert Walker School of Business and Technology, Geneva, Switzerland; GATE, Ecully, France); Marie Claire Villeval (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE UMR5824, 93 Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, France; IZA, Bonn, Germany) |
| Abstract: | We present experiments exploring why high ability workers join teams with less able co-workers when there are no short-term financial benefits. We distinguish between two explanations: pro-social preferences and expected long-term financial gains from teaching future teammates. Participants perform a real-effort task and decide whether to work independently or join a two-person team. Treatments vary the payment scheme (piece rate or revenue sharing), whether teammates can communicate, and the role of teaching. High ability workers are more willing to join teams in the absence of revenue sharing and less willing to join teams when they cannot communicate. When communication is possible, the choice of high ability workers to join teams is driven by expected future financial gains from teaching rather than some variety of pro-social preferences. This result has important implications for the role of adverse selection in determining the productivity of teams. |
| Keywords: | Teams, teaching, revenue sharing, social preferences, self-selection, experiment |
| JEL: | C92 D23 M52 M53 J24 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1928&r=all |
| By: | Molina Millán, Teresa (Universidade Nova de Lisboa); Macours, Karen (Paris School of Economics); Maluccio, John (Middlebury College); Tejerina, Luis (IDB Invest) |
| Abstract: | Numerous evaluations of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs show positive short-term impacts, but there is only limited evidence on whether these benefits translate into sustained longer-term gains. This paper uses the municipal-level randomized assignment of a CCT program implemented for five years in Honduras to estimate long-term effects 13 years after the program began. We estimate intent-to-treat effects using individual-level data from the population census, which allows assignment of individuals to their municipality of birth, thereby circumventing migration selection concerns. For the non-indigenous, we find positive and robust impacts on educational outcomes for cohorts of a very wide age range. These include increases of more than 50 percent for secondary school completion rates and the probability of reaching university studies for those exposed at school-going ages. They also include substantive gains for grades attained and current enrollment for others exposed during early childhood, raising the possibility of further gains going forward. Educational gains are, however, more limited for the indigenous. Finally, exposure to the CCT increased the probability of international migration for young men, from 3 to 7 percentage points, also stronger for the non-indigenous. Both early childhood exposure to the nutrition and health components of the CCT as well as exposure during school-going ages to the educational components led to sustained increases in human capital. |
| Keywords: | conditional cash transfers (CCTs), early childhood, education, migration |
| JEL: | I25 I28 I38 O15 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12590&r=all |
| By: | Kossuth, Lajos (Warwick Business School); Powdthavee, Nattavudh (University of Warwick); Harris, Donna (University of Oxford); Chater, Nick (Warwick Business School) |
| Abstract: | This paper examined whether people gained significant emotional benefits from not engaging in emotional hedging – betting against the occurrence of desired outcomes. Using the 2018 FIFA World Cup as the setting for a lab-in-the-field experiment, we found substantial reluctance among England supporters to bet against the success of the England football team in the tournament. This decision not to offset a potential loss through hedging did not pay off in people's happiness following an England win. It was, however, associated with a sharp decrease in people's happiness following an England loss. Post-match happiness is relatively more stable among those who chose to hedge or were randomly allocated to hedge. We conclude that people do not hedge enough partly because they tend to overestimate the expected diagnostic cost of betting against their social identity, while underestimate the negative emotional impact from betting on their favourite to win when they did not win. |
| Keywords: | hedging, happiness, social identity, wellbeing, world cup, experienced utility |
| JEL: | I31 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12589&r=all |
| By: | Danková, Katarína; Morita, Hodaka; Servátka, Maroš; Zhang, Le |
| Abstract: | How does job assignment affect fairness concerns between coworkers? We experimentally examine agents’ horizontal fairness concerns in a three-person ultimatum game in which all agents are asked to complete a general knowledge quiz before being assigned to a high productivity or low productivity position. Job positions differ in the stakes that are available to be split between the principal and the agent. We disentangle two possible channels through which job assignment impacts fairness concerns, wage differences and the principal’s intentions, by comparing cases in which the job assignment is determined randomly or by the principal. The knowledge quiz signifies the distinction between the two cases as it provides a basis on which the principal can make the assignment decision. We find that the principal’s intentions, combined with the associated wage differences, significantly impact fairness concerns of the agents assigned to the lower productivity position, but wage differences themselves do not. We also find that better-performing agents assigned by the principal to the lower productivity position exhibit significant fairness concerns toward their peers. We discuss managerial implications of our findings. |
| Keywords: | job assignment, fairness concerns, experiment, ultimatum game, wage differences, intentions |
| JEL: | C91 C92 J31 J71 |
| Date: | 2019–09–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:95918&r=all |
| By: | William N. Evans; David C. Philips; Krista J. Ruffini |
| Abstract: | Homelessness may be both a cause of and one of the more extreme outcomes of poverty. Governments at all levels have a variety of tools to combat homelessness, and these strategies have changed dramatically over the past quarter century. In this paper, we catalog the policy responses, the existing literature on the effectiveness of these strategies, and the major gaps that need to be addressed in future research. We focus on studies from randomized controlled trial evaluations and the best quasi-experimental designs, and discuss outstanding questions that can be addressed with these same methods. |
| JEL: | H53 I38 R21 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26232&r=all |
| By: | Emanuele Borgonovo; Stefano Caselli; Alessandra Cillo; Donato Masciandaro; Giovanni Rabitti |
| Abstract: | In the economic literature, a medium of payment has two properties: liquidity and store of value. The fast and increasing development of digital currencies raises the question: is privacy a third attribute? We test these assertions through a laboratory experiment. From the theoretical viewpoint, the experiment relies on the simultaneous combination of Keynes’s traditional demand for money and Friedman’s forward looking intuition on the role of privacy. Results show that privacy positively matters and increases the overall appeal of a medium of payment, even more for risk prone individuals. Given privacy, the sacrifice ratio between liquidity risk and opportunity cost is relatively high. Within the current debate, the experiment suggests that the future competition between alternative currencies will depend on how the three properties will be mixed in a way consistent with the individual’s preferences. |
| Keywords: | Money Demand, Cryptocurrencies, Central Bank Digital Currencies, Behavioural Economics |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp19108&r=all |
| By: | Ivan Soraperra (CREED - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making - UvA - Universiteit van Amsterdam); Anton Suvorov (National Research University Higher School of Economics [Moscow]); Jeroen van de Ven (ASE - Amsterdam School of Economics - UvA - University of Amsterdam [Amsterdam]); Marie Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Several studies show that social image concerns stimulate pro-social behavior. We study a setting in which there is uncertainty about which action is pro-social. Then, the quest for a better social image can potentially conflict with genuinely pro-social behavior. This conflict can induce \bad" behavior, where people lower both their own and others' material payoffs to preserve a good image. This setting is relevant for various types of credence goods. For example, recommending an inexpensive treatment reduces the expert's profits and may not satisfy the true needs of the client, but is generally good for the expert's image (as it signals the lack of greed). We test experimentally if people start to act bad in order to look good. We find that people care about their social image, but social image concerns alone do not induce them to act bad. That is, without future interactions, social image concerns do not lead to bad behavior. However, with future interactions, where building up a good image has instrumental value (reputational concerns), we do find evidence of bad behavior in the short run to secure higher earnings in the long run. |
| Keywords: | Social image,credence goods,prosocial behavior,reputation |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02285897&r=all |
| By: | Carsten Lausberg; Francois Viruly |
| Abstract: | Human decisions are context-dependent, for instance influenced by the availability of infor-mation. But they also depend on the character traits of the decision-maker, for instance the tendency to decide intuitively (based on emotions and affection) or deliberately (based on reasoning). Perhaps real estate development is a field, which is prone to intuitive behaviour because of the specific characteristics of this activity, which include lengthy time horizons, and the lack of information that often accompanies the development process. Surveys among developers have confirmed this, showing that intuition, creativity, instinct, and similar behavioural attributes are regarded as critical success factors in this sector of the market. However, that does not render market analysis, investment calculation and other rational fac-tors useless. The issue that this paper deals with is that decision theory has not yet discovered and, hence, does not assist in deciding in which situation a particular type of decision-making is most advantageous. Our research sheds light on how developers in various cultures and market contexts make decisions. This work should contribute in improving the decision-making quality in the development sector. The paper has two main parts. The first part is a literature review, which combines the find-ings on the role of intuition from the managerial decision theory and the psychological deci-sion theory. The second part introduces our research methodology and deals with a series of experiments, undertaken in South Africa and in Germany. These test the personal prefer-ences of the interviewees and then present them with a case study requiring a choice to be made between two alternative development options. The experiments will be undertaken with experienced property development practitioners and property management students. With the help of statistical analyses we intend to show the influence of personal preferences regarding intuition and deliberation on the decision behaviour in the sphere of property development. |
| Keywords: | Decision-making; Intuition; Property Development; rational behaviour |
| JEL: | R3 |
| Date: | 2019–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arz:wpaper:eres2019_202&r=all |
| By: | null null (Harris School of Public Policy); Horacio Larreguy (Harvard University); Benjamin Marx (Département d'économie); Otis Reid (Massachusetts Institute of Technology [Cambridge] (MIT)) |
| Abstract: | We estimate the effects of one of the largest anti-vote-buying campaigns ever studied—with half a million voters exposed across 1427 villages—in Uganda’s 2016 elections. Working with civil society organizations, we designed the study to estimate how voters and candidates responded to their campaign in treatment and spillover villages, and how impacts varied with campaign intensity. Despite its heavy footprint, the campaign did not reduce politician offers of gifts in exchange for votes. However, it had sizable effects on people’s votes. Votes swung from well-funded incumbents (who buy most votes) towards their poorly-financed challengers. We argue the swing arose from changes in village social norms plus the tactical response of candidates. While the campaign struggled to instill norms of refusing gifts, it leveled the electoral playing field by convincing some voters to abandon norms of reciprocity—thus accepting gifts from politicians but voting for their preferred candidate. |
| Keywords: | Elections; Voting Behavior; Field Experiment; Africa |
| JEL: | C93 D72 O55 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/7j1t12vvla8c887v4q18ihljej&r=all |
| By: | null null (Harris School of Public Policy); Horacio Larreguy (Harvard University); Benjamin Marx (Département d'économie); Otis Reid (Massachusetts Institute of Technology [Cambridge] (MIT)) |
| Abstract: | We estimate the effects of one of the largest anti-vote-buying campaigns ever studied—with half a million voters exposed across 1427 villages—in Uganda’s 2016 elections. Working with civil society organizations, we designed the study to estimate how voters and candidates responded to their campaign in treatment and spillover villages, and how impacts varied with campaign intensity. Despite its heavy footprint, the campaign did not reduce politician offers of gifts in exchange for votes. However, it had sizable effects on people’s votes. Votes swung from well-funded incumbents (who buy most votes) towards their poorly-financed challengers. We argue the swing arose from changes in village social norms plus the tactical response of candidates. While the campaign struggled to instill norms of refusing gifts, it leveled the electoral playing field by convincing some voters to abandon norms of reciprocity—thus accepting gifts from politicians but voting for their preferred candidate. |
| Keywords: | Elections; Voting Behavior; Field Experiment; Africa |
| JEL: | C93 D72 O55 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/7j1t12vvla8c887v4q18ihljej&r=all |
| By: | Marcelo Bérgolo (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía); Rodrigo Ceni (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía); Guillermo Cruces (Universidad Nacional de La Plata (Argentina). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales.); Matías Giaccobasso (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía); Ricardo Pérez-Truglia (Universidad de California en Los Angeles (EEUU)) |
| Abstract: | The canonical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts that firms evade taxes by optimally trading off between the costs and benefits of evasion. However, there is no direct evidence that firms react to audits in this way. We conducted a large-scale field experiment in collaboration with Uruguay’s tax authority to address this question. We sent letters to 20,440 small- and medium-sized firms that collectively paid more than 200 million dollars in taxes per year. Our letters provided exogenous yet nondeceptive signals about key inputs for their evasion decisions, such as audit probabilities and penalty rates. We measured the effect of these signals on their subsequent perceptions about the auditing process, based on survey data, as well as on the actual taxes paid, based on administrative data. We find that providing information about audits had a significant effect on tax compliance but in a manner that was inconsistent with Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Our findings are consistent with an alternative model, risk-as-feelings, in which messages about audits generate fear and induce probability neglect. According to this model, audits may deter tax evasion in the same way that scarecrows frighten off birds. |
| Keywords: | tax, evasion, audits, penalties, frictions |
| JEL: | C93 H26 K34 K42 Z13 |
| Date: | 2019–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-12-19&r=all |
| By: | Qiong Wu; Zheng Zhang; Andrea Pizzoferrato; Mihai Cucuringu; Zhenming Liu |
| Abstract: | We propose an integrated deep learning architecture for the stock movement prediction. Our architecture simultaneously leverages all available alpha sources. The sources include technical signals, financial news signals, and cross-sectional signals. Our architecture possesses three main properties. First, our architecture eludes overfitting issues. Although we consume a large number of technical signals but has better generalization properties than linear models. Second, our model effectively captures the interactions between signals from different categories. Third, our architecture has low computation cost. We design a graph-based component that extracts cross-sectional interactions which circumvents usage of SVD that's needed in standard models. Experimental results on the real-world stock market show that our approach outperforms the existing baselines. Meanwhile, the results from different trading simulators demonstrate that we can effectively monetize the signals. |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1909.04497&r=all |
| By: | Bertoni, Marco (University of Padova); Brunello, Giorgio (University of Padova); De Benedetto, Marco Alberto (University of Messina); De Paola, Maria (University of Calabria) |
| Abstract: | We use the repeated random assignment of external examiners to school institutes in Italy to investigate whether the effect of external monitoring on test score manipulation persists over time. We find that this effect is still present in the tests taken one year after exposure to the examiners, and is stronger for open-ended questions, for small school institutes, and for institutes located in the northern and central regions of the country. In the second year after exposure, however, this effect disappears, suggesting that monitoring is a symptomatic treatment rather than a cure of score manipulation. We discuss learning, reputational concerns, peer pressure and teacher preferences as potential mechanisms behind our findings, and present some evidence on the role played by social capital and high stakes. |
| Keywords: | education, testing, external monitoring, long-run effects |
| JEL: | H52 I2 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12591&r=all |