|
on Experimental Economics |
|
Issue of 2019‒03‒11
thirty-one papers chosen by |
| By: | YOKOO Hidefumi |
| Abstract: | This study examines public perception of ethicality of randomized field experiments of individuals living in Japan. Two online surveys are implemented targeting approximately, 2,000 respondents each. In the first survey, respondents are asked if they feel there are ethical issues with six past experiments conducted by economists. Among the six experiments, an experiment on the impact of preschools is considered as not unethical by the majority of the respondents. Conversely, a study on using the lottery to promote charitable giving is considered unethical by the majority. To further investigate the drivers behind the respondents stances on the ethics of the experiments, a second survey is conducted focusing on the above two experiments. Respondents are shown different, randomly assigned explanations of the experiment. To test whether the randomized control trial design itself is a cause of the respondents' stance, a study using a before-after comparison is also shown. The result shows that the difference in the experimental design alone does not affect the ethical issues for the study promoting charitable giving. Changing the topic of the study from charitable giving to the other pro-social behavior decreases the responses of "Unethical." Mitigating ethical issues in the experiments is required for evidence-based policymaking in Japan. |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:rdpsjp:19004&r=all |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Stephane Luchini (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales); Julie Rosaz (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jason Shogren (Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming - UW - University of Wyoming) |
| Abstract: | Oath-taking for senior executives has been promoted as a mean to enhance honesty within and towards organizations. Herein we explore whether people who voluntarily sign a solemn truth-telling oath are more committed to sincere behavior when offered the chance to lie. We design an experiment to test how the oath affects truth-telling in two contexts: a neutral context replicating the typical experiment in the literature, and a "loaded" context in which we remind subjects that "a lie is a lie." We consider four payoff configurations, with differential monetary incentives to lie, implemented as within-subjects treatment variables. The results are reinforced by robustness investigations in which each subject made only one lying decision. Our results show that the oath reduces lying, especially in the loaded environment-falsehoods are reduced by fifty percent. The oath, however, have a weaker effect on lying in the neutral environment. The oath did affect decision times in all instances: the average person takes significantly more time deciding whether to lie under oath. |
| Keywords: | Lies,Truth-telling oath,Deception,Laboratory Experiment |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-02018089&r=all |
| By: | Cécile Bazart (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier); Mathieu Lefebvre (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Julie Rosaz (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In a series of experiments, we test the relative efficiency of persuasion and commitment schemes to increase and sustain contribution levels in a Voluntary Contribution Game. The design allows to compare a baseline consisting of a repeated public good game to, respectively, four manipulation treatments relying on: an information strategy, a low commitment strategy, a high commitment strategy and a promise strategy. We confirm the advantages of psychologically orientated policies as they increase the overall level of contribution and for some, that is commitment and promises, question the decreasing trend traditionally observed in long term contributions to public goods. |
| Keywords: | Experiment,Persuasion,Commitment,Voluntary Contribution Mechanism |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02016069&r=all |
| By: | Shachat, Jason; Pan, Jinrui; Wei, Sijia |
| Abstract: | We use laboratory experiments to evaluate the effects of individuals' cognitive abilities on their behavior in a finite horizon Economic Order Quantity model. Participants' abilities to balance intuitive judgement with cognitive deliberations are measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). Participants then complete a sequence of five “annual” inventory management tasks with monthly ordering decisions. Our results show that participants with higher CRT scores on average earn greater profit and choose more effective inventory management policies. However these gaps are transitory as participants with lower CRT scores exhibit faster learning. We also find a significant gender effect on CRT scores. This suggests hiring practices incorporating CRT type of instruments can lead to an unjustified bias. |
| Keywords: | inventory management; economic order quantity; cognitive reflection; Markov learning |
| JEL: | C91 D92 M11 |
| Date: | 2019–03–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:92554&r=all |
| By: | Alice Soldà (Univ Lyon, Université Lyon 2, GATE UMR 5824, 93 Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France ; Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD 4000, Australia); Changxia Ke (Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD 4000, Australia); Lionel Page (University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, NSW 2007, Australia); William von Hippel (University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD 4000, Australia) |
| Abstract: | We aim to test the hypothesis that overconfidence arises as a strategy to influence others in social interactions. We design an experiment in which participants are incentivised either to form accurate beliefs about their performance at a test, or to convince a group of other participants that they performed well. We also vary participants’ ability to gather information about their performance. Our results provide, the different empirical links of von Hippel and Trivers’ (2011) theory of strategic overconfidence. First, we find that participants are more likely to overestimate their performance when they anticipate that they will try to persuade others. Second, when offered the possibility to gather information about their performance, they bias their information search in a manner conducive to receiving more positive feedback. Third, the increase in confidence generated by this motivated reasoning has a positive effect on their persuasiveness. |
| Keywords: | Overconfidence, motivated cognition, self-deception, persuasion, information sampling, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D83 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1908&r=all |
| By: | Luca Corazzini; Christopher Cotton (Queen's University); Tommaso Reggiani |
| Abstract: | When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk miscoordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. We explore such considerations by extending the threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute to an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. We experimentally study the effects of the intermediary on contributions and successful public good funding. Results show that delegation increases overall contributions and public good success, but only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct funding received from donors to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary is detrimental, resulting in lower contributions, a higher probability of miscoordination, and lower payoffs. |
| Keywords: | delegation, threshold public goods, laboratory experiment, fundraising |
| JEL: | C91 C92 H40 H41 L31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qed:wpaper:1412&r=all |
| By: | Alice Solda (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, QUT - Queensland University of Technology [Brisbane]); Changxia Ke (QUT - Queensland University of Technology [Brisbane]); Lionel Page (UTS - University of Technology Sydney); William Von Hippel (University of Queensland [Brisbane]) |
| Abstract: | We aim to test the hypothesis that overconfidence arises as a strategy to influence others in social interactions. We design an experiment in which participants are incentivised either to form accurate beliefs about their performance at a test, or to convince a group of other participants that they performed well. We also vary participants' ability to gather information about their performance. Our results provide the different empirical links of von Hippel and Trivers' (2011) theory of strategic overconfidence. First, we find that participants are more likely to overestimate their performance when they anticipate that they will try to persuade others. Second, when offered the possibility to gather information about their performance, they bias their information search in a manner conducive to receiving more positive feedback. Third, the increase in confidence generated by this motivated reasoning has a positive effect on their persuasiveness. |
| Keywords: | Overconfidence,motivated cognition,self-deception,persuasion,information sampling,experiment |
| Date: | 2019–02–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02050263&r=all |
| By: | Bernardo Moreno (Departamento de Teoría e Historia Econñomica, Universidad de Málaga.); Maria del Pino Ramos-Sosa (Departamento de Economia, Universidad Loyola Andalucia.); Ismael Rodriguez-Lara (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.) |
| Abstract: | We induce conformity in a binary-decision voting game in which one of the options require certain support (majority, supermajority or unanimity) to be the adopted decision. We consider heterogenous types of voters in that each of them prefer a different outcome in the voting game. We demonstrate theoretically that truthful voting is the unique equilibrium without conformity for each possible voting rule. Introducing conformity enlarges the set of equilibria, which includes voting profiles in which agents do not necessarily vote for their preferred option. If we account for the presence of non-conformist honest voters that vote truthfully for their preferred option, truthful voting is more pervasive for conformist voters in equilibrium. In our setting, the effects of conformity and honest voters on the likelihood of voting truthfully depend on the voting rule that determines whether or not voters are in a decisive group to implement one of the decisions. We provide empirical support for our theoretical predictions by means of a laboratory experiment. Our findings indeed suggest an interplay between the voting rule and the willingness to conform. |
| Keywords: | truthful voting, conformity, honest voters, voting rules, experimental evidence. |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2019–03–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gra:wpaper:19/04&r=all |
| By: | Laura M. Andersen (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen); Lars Gårn Hansen (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of CopenhagenAuthor-Name: Tomas Baležentis); Carsten Lynge Jensen (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen); Frank A. Wolak (Stanford University, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development and Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We report results from a large field experiment that with a few hours prior notice provided Danish residential consumers with dynamic price and environmental signals aimed at causing them to shift their consumption either into or away from certain hours of the day. The same marginal price signal is found to cause substantially larger consumption shifts into target hours compared to consumption shifts away from target hours. Consumption is also reduced in the hours of the day before and after these into target hours and there is weaker evidence of increased consumption in the hours surrounding away target hours. The same into versus away results hold for the environmental signals, although the absolute size of the effects are smaller. Using detailed household-level demographic information for all customers invited to participate in the experiment, both models are re-estimated accounting for this decision. For both the price and environmental treatments, the same qualitative results are obtained, but with uniformly smaller quantitative magnitudes. These selection-corrected estimates are used to perform a counterfactual experiment where all of the retailer’s residential customers are assumed to face these dynamic price signals. We find substantial wholesale energy cost savings for the retailer from declaring into events designed to shift consumption from high demand periods to low demand periods within the day, which suggests that such a pricing strategy could significantly reduce the cost of increasing the share of greenhouse gas free wind and solar electricity production in an electricity supply industry. |
| Keywords: | Dynamic electricity pricing, Energy demand, Randomized field experiments |
| JEL: | C93 L51 L94 Q41 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:foi:wpaper:2019_02&r=all |
| By: | Rudolf Kerschbamer; Daniel Neururer; Matthias Sutter |
| Abstract: | Credence goods markets are characterized by pronounced informational asymmetries between consumers and expert sellers. As a consequence, consumers are often exploited and market efficiency is threatened. However, in the digital age, it has become easy and cheap for consumers to self-diagnose their needs using specialized webpages or to access other consumers' reviews on social media platforms in search for trustworthy sellers. We present a natural field experiment that examines the causal effect of information acquisition from new media on the level of sellers' price charges for computer repairs. We find that even a correct self-diagnosis of a consumer about the appropriate repair does not reduce prices, and that an incorrect diagnosis more than doubles them. Internet ratings of repair shops are a good predictor of prices. However, the predictive valued of reviews depends on whether they are judged as reliable or not. For reviews recommended by the platform Yelp we find that good ratings are associated with lower prices and bad ratings with higher prices, while non-recommended reviews have a clearly misleading effect, because non-recommended positive ratings increase the price. |
| Keywords: | credence goods, fraud, information acquisition, internet, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D82 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2019-02&r=all |
| By: | Marit Hinnosaar; Toomas Hinnosaar; Michael Kummer; Olga Slivko |
| Abstract: | Are there positive or negative externalities in knowledge production? Do current contributions to knowledge production increase or decrease the future growth of knowledge? We use a randomized field experiment, which added relevant content to some pages in Wikipedia while leaving similar pages unchanged. We find that the addition of content has a negligible impact on the subsequent long-run growth of content. Our results have implications for information seeding and incentivizing contributions, implying that additional content does not generate sizable externalities by inspiring nor discouraging future contributions. |
| Date: | 2019–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1903.01861&r=all |
| By: | Greer K. Gosnell; John A. List; Robert D. Metcalfe |
| Abstract: | Increasing evidence indicates the importance of management in determining firms’ productivity. Yet, causal evidence regarding the effectiveness of management practices is scarce, especially for high-skilled workers in the developed world. In an eight-month field experiment measuring the productivity of captains in the commercial aviation sector, we test four distinct management practices: (i) performance monitoring; (ii) performance feedback; (iii) target setting; and (iv) pro-social incentives. We find that these management practices—particularly performance monitoring and target setting—significantly increase captains’ productivity with respect to the targeted fuel-saving dimensions. We identify positive spillovers of the tested management practices on job satisfaction and carbon dioxide emissions, and captains overwhelmingly express desire for deeper managerial engagement. Both the implementation and the results of the study reveal an uncharted opportunity for management researchers to delve into the black box of firms and rigorously examine the determinants of productivity amongst skilled labor. |
| JEL: | C93 D01 J3 Q5 R4 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25620&r=all |
| By: | Sebastian Fest; Ola Kvaløy; Petra Nieken; Anja Schöttner |
| Abstract: | In this paper we present results from a large scale real effort experiment in an online labor market investigating the effect of performance pay and two common leadership techniques: Positive expectations and specific goals. We find that positive expectations have a significant negative effect on quantity - and no effect on quality - irrespective of how the workers are paid. On average, workers who receive positive expectations before they start to work, have a five percent lower output than those who do not. Goal-setting has no significant effect, neither on quantity nor quality. Performance pay, in contrast, has a strong positive effect on quantity, although we find no difference between high and low piece rates. Finally, we find no evidence of a multitask problem. Piece rates have no negative effects on the quality of work, even if it is fully possible for the workers to be less accurate and thereby substituting quality for higher quantity. |
| Keywords: | non-monetary motivation, performance pay, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 M52 J33 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7526&r=all |
| By: | Olivier Droulers (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Karine Gallopel-Morvan (EHESP - École des Hautes Études en Santé Publique [EHESP]); Sophie Lacoste-Badie (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Mathieu Lajante (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | The first aim of this research was to assess the effectiveness, in terms of emotional and behavioral reactions, of moderately vs. highly TVWs (Threatening Visual Warnings) displayed on tobacco packs. Given the key role that emotional reactions play in explaining the effect of TVWs on behaviors, psychophysiological and self-report methods were used–for the first time in this context–to measure the emotions provoked by TVWs. The second aim of this research was to determine whether increasing the size of warnings, and their display on plain packaging (compared with branded packaging) would improve their effectiveness. A within-subjects experiment was conducted. Three variables were manipulated: health warning threat level (high vs. moderate), image size (40% vs. 75%) and pack type (plain vs. branded). A convenience sample of 48 French daily smokers participated. They were exposed to eight different packs of cigarettes in a research lab at the University of Rennes. Smokers' emotions and behavioral intentions were recorded through self-reports. Emotions were also evaluated using psychophysiological measurements: electrodermal activity and facial electromyography. The results revealed that TVWs with a high threat level are the most effective in increasing negative emotions (fear, disgust, valence, arousal) and behavioral intentions conducive to public health (desire to quit, etc.). They also highlight the appeal of increasing the size of the warnings and displaying them on plain packs, because this influences emotions, which is the first step toward behavioral change. Increasing the threat level of TVWs from moderate to high seems beneficial for public health. Our results also confirm the relevance of recent governmental decisions to adopt plain packaging and larger TVWs (in the UK, France, Ireland, Canada, New Zealand, Hungary, etc.). |
| Keywords: | Electromyography,Face,Public and occupational health,Emotions,Behavior,Smoking habits,Fear,Electrophysiology |
| Date: | 2017–09–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02024739&r=all |
| By: | Fabrizio Germano; Vicenç Gómez; Gaël Le Mens |
| Abstract: | Ranking algorithms play a crucial role in online platforms ranging from search engines to recommender systems. In this paper, we identify a surprising consequence of popularity-based rankings: the fewer the items reporting a given signal, the higher the share of the overall traffic they collectively attract. This few-get-richer effect emerges in settings where there are few distinct classes of items (e.g., left-leaning news sources versus right-leaning news sources), and items are ranked based on their popularity. We demonstrate analytically that the few-get-richer effect emerges when people tend to click on top-ranked items and have heterogeneous preferences for the classes of items. Using simulations, we analyze how the strength of the effect changes with assumptions about the setting and human behavior. We also test our predictions experimentally in an online experiment with human participants. Our findings have important implications to understand the spread of misinformation. |
| Keywords: | search engine, ranking algorithm, misinformation, Internet, fake news, few-get-richer, experiment |
| JEL: | D83 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1073&r=all |
| By: | Almas, Ingvild (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); W. Cappelen, Alexander (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Tungodden, Bertil (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) |
| Abstract: | There are striking differences in inequality and redistribution between the United States and Scandinavia. To study whether there are corresponding differences in social preferences, we conducted a large-scale international social preference experiment where Americans and Norwegians make distributive choices in identical environments. Combining the infrastructure of an international online labor market and that of a leading international data collection agency, we show that Americans and Norwegians differ significantly in fairness views, but not in the importance assigned to efficiency. In particular, we find that Americans accept significantly more inequality than Norwegians, even when they make distributive choices in identical situations. The study also provides general insights into the nature of social preferences. We provide causal evidence suggesting that fairness considerations are more fundamental for inequality acceptance than efficiency considerations. In both countries, merit instead of luck as the source of inequality causes a huge increase in inequality acceptance, while the introduction of a cost of redistribution has a negligible effect on the distributive choices of the participants. |
| Keywords: | Inequality; Cost redistribution |
| JEL: | D03 |
| Date: | 2019–02–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2019_004&r=all |
| By: | Greer Gosnell; John List; Robert Metcalfe |
| Abstract: | Increasing evidence indicates the importance of management in determining firms' productivity. Yet, causal evidence regarding the effectiveness of management practices is scarce, especially for high-skilled workers in the developed world. In an eight-month field experiment measuring the productivity of captains in the commercial aviation sector, we test four distinct management practices: (i) performance monitoring; (ii) performance feedback; (iii) target setting; and (iv) prosocial incentives. We find that these management practices -particularly performance monitoring and target setting- significantly increase captains' productivity with respect to the targeted fuel-saving dimensions. We identify positive spillovers of the tested management practices on job satisfaction and carbon dioxide emissions, and captains overwhelmingly express desire for deeper managerial engagement. Both the implementation and the results of the study reveal an uncharted opportunity for management researchers to delve into the black box of firms and rigorously examine the determinants of productivity amongst skilled labor. |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:framed:00666&r=all |
| By: | Larry G. Epstein (Department of Economics, Boston University); Shaolin Ji (Institute of Financial Studies, Shandong University) |
| Abstract: | We consider the dynamics of learning under ambiguity when learning is costly and is chosen optimally. The setting is Ellsberg’s two-urn thought experiment modified by allowing the agent to postpone her choice between bets so that she can learn about the composition of the ambiguous urn. Signals are modeled by a diffusion process whose drift is equal to the true bias of the ambiguous urn and they are observed at a constant cost per unit time. The resulting optimal stopping problem is solved and the effect of ambiguity on the extent of learning is determined. It is shown that rejection of learning opportunities can be optimal for an ambiguity averse agent even given a small cost. |
| Keywords: | ambiguity, learning, partial information, optimal stopping, drift-diffusion model |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2017-010&r=all |
| By: | Heather A. Knauer (School of Social Work, University of Michigan); Pamela Jakiela (Center for Global Development); Owen Ozier (World Bank Development Research Group); Frances Aboud (Department of Psychology, McGill University); Lia C.H. Fernald (School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley) |
| Abstract: | Worldwide, 250 million children under five (43 percent) are not meeting their developmental potential because they lack adequate nutrition and cognitive stimulation in early childhood. Several parent support programs have shown significant benefits for children’s development, but the programs are often expensive and resource intensive. The objective of this study was to test several variants of a potentially scalable, cost-effective intervention to increase cognitive stimulation by parents and improve emergent literacy skills in children. The intervention was a modified dialogic reading training program that used culturally and linguistically appropriate books adapted for a lowliteracy population. We used a cluster randomized controlled trial with four intervention arms and one control arm in a sample of caregivers (n = 357) and their 24- to 83-month-old children (n = 510) in rural Kenya. The first treatment group received storybooks, while the other treatment arms received storybooks paired with varying quantities of modified dialogic reading training for parents. Main effects of each arm of the trial were examined, and tests of heterogeneity were conducted to examine differential effects among children of illiterate vs. literate caregivers. Parent training paired with the provision of culturally appropriate children’s books increased reading frequency and improved the quality of caregiver-child reading interactions among preschool-aged children. Treatments involving training improved storybook-specific expressive vocabulary. The children of illiterate caregivers benefited at least as much as the children of literate caregivers. For some outcomes, effects were comparable; for other outcomes, there were differentially larger effects for children of illiterate caregivers. |
| Keywords: | dialogic reading, word gap, early childhood, local-language storybooks, primary school readiness |
| Date: | 2019–02–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgd:wpaper:502&r=all |
| By: | Lergetporer, Philipp (ifo Institute at the University of Munich); Woessmann, Ludger (ifo and LMU Munich) |
| Abstract: | Public preferences for charging tuition are important for determining higher education finance. To test whether public support for tuition depends on information and design, we devise several survey experiments in representative samples of the German electorate. The electorate is divided, with a slight plurality opposing tuition. Providing information on the university earnings premium raises support for tuition by 7 percentage points, turning the plurality in favor. The opposition-reducing effect persists two weeks after treatment. Information on fiscal costs and unequal access does not affect public preferences. Designing tuition as deferred income-contingent payments raises support by 16 percentage points, creating a strong majority favoring tuition. The same effect emerges when framed as loan payments. Support decreases with higher tuition levels and increases when targeted at non-EU students. |
| Keywords: | tuition; higher education; political economy; survey experiments; information; earnings premium; income-contingent loans; voting; |
| JEL: | I22 H52 D72 D83 |
| Date: | 2019–02–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:145&r=all |
| By: | Vesall Nourani (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Christopher Barrett; Eleonora Patacchini (Cornell University); Thomas Walker (World Bank) |
| Abstract: | We model limited commitment informal insurance networks among individuals whose impurely altruistic marginal gains to giving to others diminish with the number of transfers one makes, giving is costly, and stochastic income has both publicly observable and unobservable components. Contrary to the canonical informal insurance model, in which bigger networks and observable income are preferable, our model predicts that unobservable income shocks may facilitate altruistic giving that better targets the least well of individuals within one's network and that too large a network can overwhelm even an altruistic agent, inducing her to cease giving. We test the empirical salience of the model using a unique data set from southern Ghana. We analyze transfer flows among households by coupling observations of gift-giving networks with experimental cash windfall gains - randomized between private and publicly observable payouts - repeated every other month for a year. The empirical evidence supports the model predictions. The magnitude and progressive targeting of transfers precipitated by private income gains underscores the importance of altruistic, and not just insurance, motives underpinning interhousehold transfers. Keywords: Informal insurance, networks, limited commitment, altruism, Ghana JEL classification: D140 O120 O170 |
| Date: | 2019–02–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:adb:adbwps:2439&r=all |
| By: | Laura M. Anderson; Lars Gårn Hansen; Carsten Lynge Jensen; Frank A. Wolak |
| Abstract: | We report results from a large field experiment that with a few hours prior notice provided Danish residential consumers with dynamic price and environmental signals aimed at causing them to shift their consumption either into or away from certain hours of the day. The same marginal price signal is found to cause substantially larger consumption shifts into target hours compared to consumption shifts away from target hours. Consumption is also reduced in the hours of the day before and after these into target hours and there is weaker evidence of increased consumption in the hours surrounding away target hours. The same into versus away results hold for the environmental signals, although the absolute size of the e ects are smaller. Using detailed household-level demographic information for all customers invited to participate in the experiment, both models are re-estimated accounting for this decision. For both the price and environmental treatments, the same qualitative results are obtained, but with uniformly smaller quantitative magnitudes. These selection-corrected estimates are used to perform a counterfactual experiment where all of the retailer’s residential customers are assumed to face these dynamic price signals. We find substantial wholesale energy cost savings for the retailer from declaring into events designed to shift consumption from high demand periods to low demand perio ds within the day, which suggests that such a pricing strategy could significantly reduce the cost of increasing the share of greenhouse gas free wind and solar electricity production in an electricity supply industry. |
| JEL: | C93 L51 L94 Q41 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25615&r=all |
| By: | Michal Krawczyk (University of Warsaw; Group for Research in Applied Economics (GRAPE)); Joanna Tyrowicz (Group for Research in Applied Economics (GRAPE); University of Warsaw; Institut für Arbeitsrecht und Arbeitsbeziehungen in der Europäischen Union (IAAEU); Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)); Wojciech Hardy |
| Abstract: | This study employs a vignette experiment to inquire, which features of online "piracy" make it ethically discernible from a traditional theft. This question is pertinent since the social norm concerning traditional theft is starkly different from the evidence on ethical evaluation of online "piracy". We specifically distinguish between contextual features of theft, such as for example the physical loss of an item, breach of protection, availability of alternatives, emotional proximity to the victim of theft, etc. We find that some of these dimensions have more weight in ethical judgment, but there are no clear differences between online and traditional theft which could explain discrepancy in the frequency of commitment. |
| Keywords: | online piracy, ethical judgment, vignette experiment |
| JEL: | P45 P52 C14 O16 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fme:wpaper:33&r=all |
| By: | Zakaria Babutsidze (SKEMA Business School - SKEMA Business School, GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, OFCE - OFCE - Sciences Po); Nobuyuki Hanaki (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study the effect of the mode of digital communication on the emergence of swift trust in a principal-agent relationship. We consider three modes of communication: plain text, audio, and video. Communication is pre-play, one-way, and unrestricted, but its content is homogenized across treatments. Overall, both audio and video messages have a positive (and similar) effect on trust compared to plain text; however, the magnitude of these effects depends on the content of agent's message (promise to act trustworthily vs. no such promise). In all conditions, we observe a positive effect of the agent's promise on the principal's trust. We also find that providing visual cues about the sender promotes trust and helps overcome gender favoritism in females. |
| Keywords: | Promise,Principal-agent relationship,Trust,Hidden action,Digital communication |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02050514&r=all |
| By: | Zakaria Babutsidze (SKEMA Business School, Université Côte d’Azur (GREDEG) and OFCE, Sciences Po Paris); Nobuyuki Hanaki (Université Côte d’Azur, CNRS, GREDEG); Adam Zylbersztejn (Univ Lyon, Université Lyon 2, GATE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study the effect of the mode of digital communication on the emergence of swift trust in a principal-agent relationship. We consider three modes of communication: plain text, audio, and video. Communication is pre-play, one-way, and unrestricted, but its content is homogenized across treatments. Overall, both audio and video messages have a positive (and similar) effect on trust compared to plain text; however, the magnitude of these effects depends on the content of agent’s message (promise to act trustworthily vs. no such promise). In all conditions, we observe a positive effect of the agent’s promise on the principal’s trust. We also find that providing visual cues about the sender promotes trust and helps overcome gender favoritism in females. |
| Keywords: | Digital communication, Trust, Hidden action, Principal-agent relationship, Promise |
| JEL: | C72 D83 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1909&r=all |
| By: | Lauren Steinbaum; John Mboya; Ryan Mahoney; Sammy M. Njenga; Clair Null; Amy J. Pickering |
| Abstract: | Improved sanitation has been associated with a reduced prevalence of soil-transmitted helminth (STH) infection and has been hypothesized to prevent fecal contamination from spreading throughout the household environment. |
| Keywords: | Sanitation intervention, soil transmitted helminth, household soil, RCT, International |
| JEL: | F Z |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:b451437068284f0ab7b156365a936cb8&r=all |
| By: | Masemola, M.; Ogundeji, A.; Chaminuka, P. |
| Abstract: | Emergence of livestock diseases pose a worldwide socio-economic threat to human and animal welfare. In the past years, South Africa has seen an increase in the extent and rate of various infectious livestock diseases. The continuous outburst in re-emerging infectious disease has created a demand for development of new improved novel livestock vaccines. However, sustainable use of livestock vaccines remains low, necessitating better understanding of farmers� demand and preferences. Using a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) approach, this studyinvestigated attributes influencing farmers` choice of livestock vaccines and their willingness to pay (WTP). Data were drawn from 204 respondents keeping cattle and small stock. The livestock vaccine attributes considered were; target specie, cold chain, multivalent, efficacy and price/50 doses. Analysis was done using descriptive statistics and alternative-specific conditional logit model. Results show that farmers� preferred a vaccine that had the multivalent attribute, could be used on more than one species, and had higher levels of efficacy. Price was however not a significant determinant of the choices made. Positive WTP was estimated for the multivalent attribute and negative for low efficacy. These findings are vital to guide developers in producing vaccines that are more likely to benefit and attract smallholder farmers. |
| Keywords: | Discrete Choice Experiment, Willingness to pay, livestock vaccines and diseases; Livestock Production/Industries |
| Date: | 2018–09–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aeas18:284785&r=all |
| By: | Dan Kovenock (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); David Rojo Arjona (Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | We fully characterize best-response functions in Colonel Blotto games with lottery contest success functions. |
| Keywords: | Multi-Battle contest, Colonel Blotto game, Contest success function, Best-response, Conflict |
| JEL: | C61 C72 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:19-005&r=all |
| By: | Paul Décaire; Erik P. Gilje; Jérôme P. Taillard |
| Abstract: | We study when and why firms exercise real options. Using detailed project-level investment data, we find that the likelihood that a firm exercises a real option is strongly related to peer exercise behavior. Peer exercise decisions are as important in explaining exercise behavior as variables commonly associated with standard real option theories, such as volatility. We identify peer effects using localized exogenous variation in peer project exercise decisions and find evidence consistent with information externalities being important for exercise behavior. |
| JEL: | G30 G31 G32 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25624&r=all |
| By: | Florent Bédécarrats (AFD Paris, France); Isabelle Guérin (IRD CESSMA); Solène Morvant-Roux (School of Social Sciences UNIGE-G3S, University of Geneva); François Roubaud (IRD, UMR DIAL, PSL, Université Paris-Dauphine) |
| Abstract: | We replicate a flagship randomised control trial carried out in rural Morocco that showed substantial and significant impacts of microcredit on the assets, the outputs, the expenses and the profits of self-employment activities. The original results rely primarily on trimming, which is the exclusion of observations with the highest values on some variables. However, the applied trimming procedures are inconsistent between the baseline and the endline. Using identical specifications as the original paper reveals large and significant imbalances at the baseline and, at the endline impacts on implausible outcomes, like household head gender, language or education. This calls into question the reliability of the data and the integrity of the experiment protocol. We find a series of coding, measurement and sampling errors. Correcting the identified errors lead to different results. After rectifying identified errors, we still find substantial imbalances at baseline and implausible impacts at the endline. Our re-analysis focused on the lack of internal validity of this experiment, but several of the identified issues also raise concerns about its external validity. |
| Keywords: | RCT, Microcredit, J-PAL, Replication, Morocco, Internal validity, Data quality |
| JEL: | C18 C83 C93 G21 |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dia:wpaper:dt201809&r=all |
| By: | Hitoshi Matsushima (University of Tokyo) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates infinitely repeated games of a prisoner’s dilemma with additive separability in which the monitoring technology is imperfect and private. Behavioral incentives indicate that, in this setting, a player is not only motivated by pure self-interest but also by reciprocity. Players often become naïve and select an action unconsciously. By focusing on generous tit-for-tat strategies, we characterize a Nash equilibrium with behavioral incentives, termed behavioral equilibrium, in an accuracy-contingent manner. By eliminating the gap between theory and evidence, this study argues that reciprocity plays a substantial role in motivating a player to consciously make decisions. |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf452&r=all |