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on Experimental Economics |
By: | Bellamare,Charles; Kroeger,Sabine; Soest,Arthur van (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
Abstract: | We combine the choice data of proposers and responders in the ultimatum game, their expectations elicited in the form of subjective probability questions, and the choice data of proposers ("dictator") in a dictator game to estimate a structural model of decision making under uncertainty. We use a large and representative sample of subjects drawn from the Dutch population. Our results indicate that there is considerable heterogeneity in preferences for equity in the population. Changes in preferences have an important impact on decisions of dictators in the dictator game and responders in the ultimatum game, but a smaller impact on decisions of proposer's in the ultimatum game, a result due to proposers subjective expectations about responders' decisions. The model which uses subjective data on expectations has better predictive power and lower noise level than a model which assumes that players have rational expectations. |
Keywords: | ultimatum game;inquity aversion;subjective expectations |
JEL: | C93 D63 D84 |
Date: | 2005 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200582&r=exp |
By: | Boðaçhan Çelen; Shachar Kariv; Andrew Schotter |
Date: | 2005–08–19 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000272&r=exp |
By: | Syngjoo Choi; Douglas Gale; Shachar Kariv |
Date: | 2005–08–19 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000278&r=exp |
By: | Gil Kalai |
Date: | 2005–08–19 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000295&r=exp |
By: | Raymond Fisman; Shachar Kariv; Daniel Markovits |
Date: | 2005–08–19 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000284&r=exp |
By: | Dirk Bergemann (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Juuso Valimaki (Dept. of Economics, Helsinki School of Economics, University of Southampton) |
Abstract: | We survey the recent literature on the role of information for mechanism design. We specifically consider the role of endogeneity of and robustness to private information in mechanism design. We view information acquisition of and robustness to private information as two distinct but related aspects of information management important in many design settings. We review the existing literature and point out directions for additional future work. |
Keywords: | Mechanism Design, Information Acquisition, Ex Post Equilibrium, Robust Mechanism Design, Interdependent Values, Information Management |
JEL: | C79 D82 |
Date: | 2005–08 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1532&r=exp |