nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2005‒02‒20
four papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University
  1. Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment By James Andreoni; Yeon-Koo Che; Jinwoo Kim
  2. Information Acquisition: Experimental Analysis of a Boundedly Rational Model By Xavier Gabaix; David Laibson; Guillermo Moloche; Stephen Weinberg
  3. Experiments on Auction Valuation and Endogenous Entry By Elena Katok; Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
  4. How Effective are Electronic Reputation Mechanisms? By Gary Bolton
  1. By: James Andreoni; Yeon-Koo Che; Jinwoo Kim
    Date: 2005–02–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000474&r=exp
  2. By: Xavier Gabaix; David Laibson; Guillermo Moloche; Stephen Weinberg
    Date: 2005–02–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000480&r=exp
  3. By: Elena Katok (Laboratory for Economic Management and Auctions, Penn State University); Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans (College of Business, University of Illinois)
    Abstract: We present results of several experiments that deal with endogenous entry in auctions and auction valuation. One observation that is constant across all of the experiments we report is that laboratory subjects have a difficult time evaluating potential gains from auctions. Even after they are given some experience with particular auctions, the uncertainty inherent in the auctions (the probability of winning as well as the potential gains from winning) makes it difficult for subjects to compare different auction mechanisms. This highlights the need for new experimental procedures to be used for testing theories that involve endogenous auction entry in the laboratory.
    Keywords: Experiments on Auction Valuation and Endogenous Entry
    JEL: C72 D83 D44 C91
    Date: 2004–10–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lma:wpaper:ek1&r=exp
  4. By: Gary Bolton (Laboratory for Economic Management and Auctions)
    Abstract: Electronic reputation or "feedback" mechanisms aim to mitigate the moral hazard problems associated with exchange among strangers by providing the type of information available in more traditional close-knit groups, where members are frequently involved in one another's dealings. In this paper, we compare trading in a market with online feedback (as implemented by many Internet markets) to a market without feedback, as well as to a market in which the same people interact with one another repeatedly (partners market). We find that, while the feedback mechanism induces quite a substantial improvement in transaction efficiency, it also exhibits a kind of public goods problem that, unlike in the partners market, the benefits of trust and trustworthy behavior go to the whole community and are not completely internalized. We discuss the implications of this perspective for improving feedback mechanisms.
    Keywords: Effective Electronic Reputation Mechanisms Experimental Investigation
    Date: 2003–08–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lma:wpaper:gb1&r=exp
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