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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Vallstrom, Daniel |
| Abstract: | https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2404.03685 With an evolutionary approach, the basis of morality can be explained as adaptations to problems of cooperation. With ‘evolution’ taken in a broad sense, AIs that satisfy the conditions for evolution to apply will be subject to the same cooperative evolutionary pressure as biological entities. Here the adaptiveness of increased cooperation as material safety and wealth increase is discussed — for humans, for other societies, and for AIs. Diminishing beneficial returns from increased access to material resources also suggests the possibility that, on the whole, there will be no incentive to for instance colonize entire galaxies, thus providing a possible explanation of the Fermi paradox, wondering where everybody is. It is further argued that old societies could engender, give way to, super-AIs, since it is likely that super-AIs are feasible, and fitter. Closing is an aside on effective ways for morals and goals to affect life and society, emphasizing environments, cultures, and laws, and exemplified by how to eat. `Diminishing returns’ is defined, as less than roots, the inverse of infeasibility. It is also noted that there can be no exponential colonization or reproduction, for mathematical reasons, as each entity takes up a certain amount of space. Appended are an algorithm for colonizing for example a galaxy quickly, models of the evolution of cooperation and fairness under diminishing returns, and software for simulating signaling development. |
| Date: | 2025–02–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:bq438_v3 |
| By: | Derex, Maxime; Bonnefon, Jean-François; Boyd, Robert; McElreath, Richard; Mesoudi, Alex |
| Abstract: | In many domains, learning from others is crucial for leveraging cumulative cultural knowledge, which encapsulates the efforts of successive generations of innovators. However, anecdotal and experimental evidence suggests that reliance on social information can reduce the exploration of the problem space. Here, we experimentally investigate the extent to which cultural transmission fosters the persistence of arbitrary solutions in a context where participants are incentivized to improve a physical system across multiple trials. Participants were exposed to various theories about the system, ranging from accurate to misleading. Our findings indicate that even under conditions conducive to exploration, the transmission of cultural knowledge canalizes learners’ focus, limiting their consideration of alternative solutions. This effect was observed in both the theories produced and the solutions attempted by participants, irrespective of the accuracy of the provided theories. These results challenge the notion that arbitrary solutions persist only when they are efficient or intuitive and underscore the significant role of cultural transmission in shaping human knowledge and technologies. |
| Keywords: | cultural evolution; cumulative culture; innovation, cultural inertia; social learning |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:130345 |
| By: | Luca Delle Foglie (DEF, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Stefano Papa (DEF, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Giancarlo Spagnolo (CEIS & DEF, University of Rome "Tor Vergata") |
| Abstract: | We examine how betrayal aversion and ambiguity attitudes influence trust. To disentangle these effects, we use a Trust game and manipulate trustors’ perception of being the intentional recipients of trustees’ betrayal by varying the nature of the latter: a human or a machine that replicates human choices in probability. After confirming that this manipulation does not affect ambiguity attitudes or beliefs about others’ behavior, we find that both factors significantly influence trust. Nonetheless, even when controlling for these attitudes and beliefs, participants exhibit lower trust in humans than in machine. Furthermore, using Noldus’ FaceReader technology to measure emotions during trustors’ decision-making process, we find that participants express greater anger toward human trustees. Our results indicate that both betrayal aversion and ambiguity attitudes play important roles in shaping trust decisions. |
| Keywords: | Ambiguity attitudes, Anger, Betrayal cost, Emotions, FaceReader, Trust game |
| JEL: | A13 C91 D03 D64 D90 |
| Date: | 2025–02–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:593 |
| By: | Hauer, Mathew; Brewster, Karin; Brooks, Matthew M (McGill University) |
| Abstract: | Historical estimates of the total fertility rate (TFR) are relatively uncommon, owing to the onerous data requirements for direct calculation and the lack of digitized records. Recent advancements in indirect fertility estimation 1 allow for estimation of TFR using data as minimal as a population pyramid – relatively common data in historical contexts through census records and population registers. Here we use published data on the age structure of Roman Egypt circa AD 12 to AD 259 2 to estimate TFR and 90%ile credible interval in an ancient time period and place using a Bayesian approach. Furthermore, the population data is separated by urban and rural areas, allowing for an unprecedented glimpse into ancient fertility levels. We find that ancient Roman Egyptian women in urban areas had considerably lower fertility than women in rural areas -- urban TFR: 3.37 [2.26 – 4.55], and rural TFR: 8.57 [6.01 – 11.25]. Our findings suggest that the modern day urban/rural fertility differential dates back nearly 2000 years. As demonstrated here, the advancements in indirect estimation could be deployed to better understand historical and ancient fertility regimes, shedding light on societies far before the existence of modern vital statistics systems. |
| Date: | 2024–12–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:ru8xd_v1 |