|
on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Dorian Jullien (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Alexandre Truc (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur) |
| Abstract: | Existing histories of behavioral and experimental economics (BE-XP) are mostly focused on the intellectual and institutional developments of these approaches in the United States of America -and to a lesser extent in Germany. While a seminal contribution to these approaches was produced in the early 1950s in France by Maurice Allais, the literature is rather silent on how BE-XP developed subsequently in France. We propose to fill this gap by comparing the history of BE-XP in France to international trends previously identified in the literature. We show that after an ambivalent influence of the work of Allais ( 1953) on BE-XP in France during the 1980s, that influence rapidly faded. BE-XP in France then largely follows international trends. We nevertheless identify some heterogeneity across the French territory and the development of at least two national specificities on the measurement of utility and the modeling of social preferences. |
| Keywords: | Scientometrics, Behavioral economics, Experimental economics, History of economics |
| Date: | 2024–11–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-04810987 |
| By: | Alger, Ingela; Bayer, Péter |
| Abstract: | Norms indicate which behaviors are commonly expected and/or considered to be morally right. We examine how such norms come about and change by modeling a population of individuals with preferences – found elsewhere to be evolutionarily founded – combining ma-terial self-interest, Kantian moral concerns, and attitudes towards being materially ahead and behind others. The individuals interact in a public goods game. We identify conditions on preferences and beliefs which promote, respectively hamper, spontaneous norm change. Cru-cially, an individual’s preferences and beliefs about the material benefits uniquely determines her threshold for collective behavior: s/he contributes if and only if sufficiently many others do so. However, those with sufficiently strong Kantian concerns contribute regardless. |
| Keywords: | moral norms; descriptive norms; social norms; social-Kantian preferences |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:130038 |
| By: | Hendriks, Patrick; Sturm, Timo; Mehler, Maren F.; Buxmann, Peter |
| Abstract: | Culture is fundamental to our society, shaping the traditions, ethics, and laws that guide people’s beliefs and behaviors. At the same time, culture is also shaped by people—it evolves as people interact and collectively select, modify, and transmit the beliefs they deem desirable. As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes more integrated into our lives, it plays an increasing role in how cultural beliefs are (re)shaped and promoted. Using a series of agent-based simulations, we analyze how different ways of integrating AI into society (e.g., national vs. global AI) impact cultural evolution, thereby shaping cultural diversity. We find that less globalized AI can help promote diversity in the short run, but risks eliminating diversity in the long run. This becomes more pronounced the less humans and AI are grounded in each other’s beliefs. Our findings help researchers revisit cultural evolution in the presence of AI and assist policymakers with AI governance. |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dar:wpaper:150816 |
| By: | Jaylson Jair da Silveira; Gilberto Tadeu Lima; Leonardo Barros Torres |
| Abstract: | There is considerable empirical evidence that heterogeneity in tax compliance behavior is persistent and pervasive. This paper develops an evolutionary analytical framework in which taxpayers periodically choose between to comply or not to comply with their tax obligations. Aggregate demand formation arising from private and public expenditures depends on the frequency distribution of tax compliance behavior across taxpayers, so that the macrodynamic of the rates of capacity utilization and output growth is coevolutionarily coupled to the microdynamic of tax compliance across individuals. The analytical framework set forth here replicates several pieces of evidence on tax evasion. First, the proportion of non-complying taxpayers (and hence the volume of tax evasion) depends on the tax rate and the expected cost of tax evasion. Second, heterogeneity in tax compliance behavior is evolutionarily persistent instead of temporary. Third, the immediate impact of a change in the proportion of tax evading individuals on the rates of capacity utilization and output growth is non-linear. Fourth, the proportion of non-complying taxpayers and the rates of capacity utilization and output growth vary positively with the tax rate in the evolutionary equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | Tax evasion; evolutionary dynamics; heterogeneous behavior; capacity utilization; economic growth |
| JEL: | B52 C73 E12 E70 H26 |
| Date: | 2025–01–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spa:wpaper:2025wpecon1 |